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Abstract
This thesis addresses a set of issues related to the choice of an exchange rate regime, 
including the effects of different regimes on inffation, growth, and their vulnerability 
to currency crises. It also explores the ability of a fiscal sustainability indicator to 
predict these crises and employs a selection of Latin American countries to assess 
whether their business cycles are sufficiently synchronised with th a t of the United 
States to support dollarization. Chapter 1 briefly sets the stage for the issues tha t 
will be discussed. Chapter 2 introduces the basic concepts th a t recur throughout the 
thesis exploring more than 30 years of ideas on the issues surrounding the selection 
and assessment of exchange rate regimes.
Chapter 3 provides empirical support for the hypothesis tha t different exchange 
rate regimes have an impact on inffation and growth, as well as on currency crisis 
vulnerability in advanced, emerging and developing countries. The analysis is facili­
ta ted  through the use of an exchange market pressure indicator. It also distinguishes 
between the de jure and the de facto regime classifications. The effects of different 
exchange rate regimes on macroeconomic performance are examined through least 
squares dummy variables regressions using panel data on 125 countries for the post-
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Bretton Woods (1974-1999). In addition, the exchange rate arrangements asociated 
with heightened foreign exchange market pressure are investigated. Finally, tests 
are carried out to determine whether certain exchange rate arrangements are more 
prone to currency crises using a probit model. The results indicate th a t countries 
with fixed regimes tend to have a lower inflation rate compared to floating and inter­
mediate exchange rate regimes, particularly in emerging and developing countries. 
However, it became evident th a t the impact of exchange rate regimes on growth is 
not equally clear. Only advanced economies with floating exchange rate regimes may 
achieve higher levels of economic growth. The empirical results also suggest tha t 
developing countries adopting fixed exchange rate arrangements experience lower 
foreign exchange market pressure and have a lower probability of currency crises.
Chapter 4 is an empirical study on the synchronisation and common cycles 
between selected Latin American countries and the United States. The dynam­
ics of business cycles are estim ated separately for each country using a univariate 
Markov-switching autoregressions (MS-AR) approach. All the countries under study 
have experienced persistent but shorter durations of contractions (recessions) than 
expansions and their mean growth is lower in absolute value than those for ex­
pansions. The different behaviour in the duration and variances and the formal 
testing for asymmetry suggest th a t some cycles are asymmetric between regimes. 
The smoothed probabilities obtained from these models lend some support to the 
assumption about common regime shifts, particularly between the Dominican Re­
public and the US, and Panam a and the US. Next, an MS-VAR model is used to 
identify the existing common cycles. Common business cycles are dated on the basis 
of regime probabilities. Furthermore, the identification of smoothed probabilities, 
turning points and the calculation of contemporaneous correlations between output 
suggests th a t there is some evidence about common regime shift and common cy­
cles. As a consequence, the smoothed probabilities of experiencing contractions and 
expansions obtained from the MS-AR model for each individual country are used in
a cross-correlation analysis in order to detect any existing commonality among Latin 
American countries and the US. Again, the results suggest tha t there is a moderate 
sychronisation between the Dominican Republic and the United States as well as 
Panam a and the United States. Overall, there is some evidence for the existence of 
a common cycle between these countries. The LR statistics and Davies test for all 
the models support the presence of regime shifts.
The purpose of Chapter 5 is to assess fiscal sustainability and investigate whether 
a fiscal sustainability indicator (FSI) can be used as a leading indicator to predict 
currency crises. Firstly, the sustainability of the fiscal policy in 18 developing coun­
tries is analysed, and it is found tha t 12 countries have a large unsustainable fiscal 
position for most of the period studied, which is basically explained by the primary 
fiscal deficit. Then, using different procedures, the FSI is evaluated in order to help 
predict currency crises. Granger causality tests suggest th a t the lagged FSI has an 
explanatory power over currency crises. The results using a probit model support 
this view. Indeed, the FSI can predict the probability of currency crises. In ad­
dition, focusing on a non-linear Markov-switching model, and applying the Gibbs 
sampling approach, it is found tha t the FSI influences the probability of entering a 
currency crisis period. Also, in the absence of official definitions for currency crises, 
different definitions are used to evaluate whether they induce different results in the 
analysis. In general, the results highlight how an unsustainable fiscal position leads 
to the eventual collapse of the exchange rate in some developing countries. Finally, 
Chapter 6 is a summary of our mains conclusions.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Since the early 1950s extensive discussions on optimal exchange rate regimes, fiscal 
stances and currency crises, have taken place, not only in academic circles, but 
also in political contexts, reflecting the evolution of the world economy. The main 
reason for this is tha t the post-war period has been punctuated by numerous foreign 
exchange crises, encountered by and interrupting the growth of many countries. 
During the 1950s and 1960s industrial countries were almost exclusively under fixed 
but adjustable exchange rate regimes which increasingly became standardised by 
the dollar. The United States’ rate of inflation at tha t time was relatively low. 
However, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, some developed and developing countries 
often experienced crises associated with attem pts to prevent their currency being 
devalued as well as speculative runs. Notable currency crises occurred in the United 
Kingdom in late 1967, France in 1968 and 1969, India in 1966, Chile in 1966 and 
1969, Argentina in 1970 and Chana in 1970, among others. As a consequence, these 
crises were a major factor leading to the abandonment of the Bretton Woods system
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in 1973.
In the 1980s, Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, the Philippines^ and some 
member countries of the European Monetary System experienced crises basically 
explained by interaction between domestic financial weakness, exchange rates, un­
sustainable fiscal policies and international financial crises. Most countries, partic­
ularly Latin America, presented low primary fiscal balances and hence problems in 
sustainable public debt levels. In addition, a massive process of capital outflow, 
particularly in the United States, served to devaluate or depreciate the exchange 
rates, thereby raising the real interest rate. The real GDP growth rate for Latin 
America was only 2.3% between 1980 and 1985. However, in per capita terms, Latin 
America experienced a negative growth of almost 9%. The continuing devaluation 
and/or depreciation of the exchange rates provoked high inflation in many countries.
In the late 1980s, numerous studies emphasised the importance of macroeconomic 
fundamentals and consistency in exchange rate regimes with underlying macroec- 
nomic policies. Influential economic arguments supported fixed exchange rate regimes 
as an anchor to break periods of high inflation, particularly in many emerging mar­
kets. As well as to promoting transparency and credibility, monetary policy was 
constrained by a commitment to a fixed exchange rate, establishing a macroeco­
nomic discipline and centring on ending the inflationary financing of government 
deficits. However, at the beginning of the 1990s, signs of fragilities became evident. 
In the autumn of 1992 a wave of speculative attacks hit the European Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) and its periphery. Towards the end of 1992, Finland, Italy, 
Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom had fioated their currencies. Despite 
attem pts by numerous countries to remain in the ERM with the assistance of de­
valuations (Ireland, Portugal and Spain), the system was unsalvageable and put 
enormous pressure on the future of monetary union. For the European Union (EU) 
as a whole, the real GDP declined to 0.4% in 1993, following a modest 1% growth in
 ^South East and East Asia was relatively unaffected.
Introduction
1992. Finland and Sweden, not yet members of the EU, both experienced negative 
growth in 1993.
Similarly, the Mexican “peso” was attacked between the end of 1994 and 1995, 
and floated shortly after an unsuccessful devaluation. Mexico’s “tequila” crisis led to 
a decline in the Mexican GDP of almost 7%. The crisis also spread to the other major 
economies in the Latin American region (Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela). 
Argentina’s GDP experienced negative growth in 1995 reaching approximately -2.8% 
(down from 5.8% in 1994). But not all the economies attacked were in Latin America; 
Thailand, Hong Kong, the Philippines and Hungary also suffered speculative attacks 
but with few devaluations.
The Asian crisis began with attacks on Thailand’s economy in the late spring 
of 1997 and continued with the flotation of the Thai baht in early July 1997. The 
currency crisis in Thailand in 1997 led to bank insolvencies which rapidly spread to 
the rest of East Asia, particularly Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia and later 
Hong Kong and South Korea. The Asian crisis revealed a connection between asym­
metric information (amongst domestic banks and foreign banks), exchange rates and 
banking crises. Thailand’s GDP fell by 11% in 1998, while Indonesia’s fell by 14% 
and Malaysia’s by almost 8%, against a precrisis growth rate averaging 8% or more 
in all three countries. The South Korean crisis lead to a fall in GDP of almost 
7% in 1998, while Hong Kong’s .and the Philippines’ GDP fell by 5% and 0.6%, re­
spectively. The consequent sudden reversals of capital inflows accentuated inherent 
vulnerabilities in many Latin American economies. The crisis then spread across 
the Pacific to Chile and Brazil.
In August 1998, Russia was forced to declare a default on its sovereign debt, 
declaring a suspension of payments by commercial banks to foreign creditors and 
abandoning its attem pts to use a fixed exchange rate to stabilise price levels. Russia 
ended 1998 with a decrease in real output of 4.9%. Furthermore, economic and 
financial crises occurred in Brazil and Ecuador in 1999, Argentina in 2001, Turkey
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in 2000 and 2001 and Brazil and Uruguay in 2002. Other countries in the Latin 
American region also came under pressure. In most crisis cases in the 1990s, the 
countries were characterised by a balanced government budget and a modest public 
debt before the crisis. However, there is some empirical evidence on the influence of 
fiscal sectors on the vulnerability to currency crises specially in developing countries.
In general, crises affected economic growth and motivated more and more debate 
over the choice of exchange rate regimes and its relationship with currency crises 
and their rapid propagation. The debate suggested that emerging and developing 
economies should adopt an optimal exchange rate regime as a form to avoid finan­
cial contagion and currency crises, achieving credibility, fiscal discipline, sustainable 
growth and lowering inflation. Some studies suggest that, in a world of increas­
ingly mobile capital, countries cannot fix their exchange rate and at the same time 
maintain an independent monetary policy (impossible trinity). They must choose 
between the confidence and stability provided by a fixed exchange rate and the 
control over policy offered by a floating rate. A floating currency allows a country 
to adjust to external shocks through the exchange rate. In countries with a fixed 
currency, domestic wages and prices will come under pressure instead. However, 
fioating exchange rates have a big drawback: they can overshoot and become highly 
unstable, especially if large amounts of capital flow in and out of a country. More­
over, floating rates can reduce investors’ faith in a currency, thus making it harder 
to fight inflation.
Some more pragmatic proponents of floating rates recognise the risks of volatility. 
O ther authors argue tha t floating exchange rates make no sense for small emerging 
and developing economies. Developing and emerging markets should link up with 
the leading regional currency, such as the dollar in the Americas, as eliminating the 
exchange rate through the outright adoption of another currency would eradicate 
the potential for a currency crisis. Official dollarization has become a common policy 
advice.
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As recent events have shown, a country’s choice of exchange rate regime clearly 
affects its vulnerability to crises. As a consequence, some countries, particularly 
emerging and developing countries, believed they made a bad choice in their ex­
change rate regime.
This thesis addresses a set of issues regarding the choice of an exchange rate 
regime, the effects of different exchange rate regimes on inflation and growth, the 
role of specific exchange rate regimes in generating currency crises and the role of 
a fiscal sustainability indicator [FSI )  in predicting those crises. While most recent 
empirical studies, available in economic literature, on the choice of exchange rate 
regimes and its effect on inflation, growth and currency crises concentrated on spe­
cific regions (Asia, Latin America and Europe), this thesis expands this analysis to 
include the largest possible number of countries around the world, including Africa, 
the Caribbean, Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. This 
study also employs the proper classifications for exchange rate systems using official 
and de facto exchange rate arrangements. In addition, it evaluates the adoption of 
hard exchange rate regimes (official dollarization) in developing countries from the 
point of view of achieving the synchronicity of business cycles. Furthermore, this 
thesis evaluates whether weak fiscal stance indicators can help to predict currency 
crises. All this additional empirical input allowed a re-examination of the existing 
theoretical models, accumulated empirical observations and verification of policy 
conclusions and recommendations proposed by other authors. The main objectives 
of this research can be expressed in the form of the following three questions:
1. Which exchange rate regimes are better suited to deal with progressively glob­
alised capital markets?
2. Is macroeconomic performance influenced by the nature of the exchange rate 
regime?
3. Is a sustainable fiscal position associated with a currency crisis and the choice
Introduction
of an exchange rate regime?
This thesis will attem pt to provide a satisfactory answer to each of these questions 
before answering the more ambitious question of what is the optimal exchange rate 
regime for a specific economy. In order to do so, it is first necessary to understand 
which criteria needs to be factored in for the selection of any particular exchange 
rate regime.
Chapter 2 will attem pt to provide a comprehensive overview on the theoretical 
and empirical analysis of the selection and assessment of exchange rate regimes, ex­
posing and interpreting those areas which, from our point of view, are representative 
of the most influential contributions in this context. A discussion on the relevant 
considerations for the choice of optimal exchange rate regimes, particularly in devel­
oping and emerging countries, and on why certain countries choose to float or to peg 
follows. Theoretical explanations for exchange rate regime choice include optimal 
currency area (OCA) theory, the “impossible trinity constraint”, time-inconsistency, 
the influences on economic performance, the balance sheet effects for financially dol­
larized economies, and the role of currency crises. The literature can be divided 
into two main groups: classical and modern. The first group refers to earlier studies 
examining the differences between floating and fixed exchange rate regimes based 
on the nature of the shocks and on the OCA theory. The second group is focused 
on the trade-off between credibility and flexibility, the economic performance and 
currency crisis, among others.
In addition, Chapter 2 reviews certain discrepancies between the declared and 
actual exchange rate regimes both before and after the crisis. In other words, this 
chapter reviews why many countries follow de facto regimes different from their de 
jure regimes, tha t is, declaring different regimes to the actual regimes in place. This 
chapter also presents particular methodologies th a t are employed to classify the 
different exchange rate regimes [de jure and de facto). Finally, Chapter 2 reviews 
the more recent empirical criteria tha t has been used to evaluate the choice of an
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optimal exchange regime.
Chapter 3 evaluates the effects of different exchange rate regimes on inflation 
and economic growth, and the impact of exchange arrangements on foreign exchange 
(FX) speculative pressure and currency crises in advanced, emerging and developing 
countries. The countries under consideration are grouped into those tha t followed a 
flxed exchange rate regime, those tha t followed more relaxed types of pegs (interme­
diate) and those that allowed their currency to fluctuate. This chapter distinguishes 
between the de jure and the three de facto classifications system using panel data 
and a probit model to fulfill the objective of this research. Empirical results suggest 
tha t fixed exchange rate regimes play an im portant role in macroeconomic stabil­
ity, especially in developing countries, since this regime can discipline policy-making 
and minimises discretion. Also, since a currency crisis is defined as a period char­
acterised by the presence of intense foreign exchange market pressure, tha t is, as 
a sudden decline in confidence for a specific currency, fixed exchange rates may 
help to promote financial stability in developing countries. Similarly, fixed exchange 
rate regimes are associated with high growth in developing countries. On the con­
trary, fixed regimes are associated with more inflation and lower growth in advanced 
economies
In addition, Chapter 3 provides an insight on how different regime choices and 
fiscal stances are connected with currency crises. Among the fiscal signs which might 
indicate an increased probability of a currency crisis, are indicators of fiscal stances: 
budget deficit, level of indebtedness and debt service ratios.
Chapter 4 studies whether adopting a strong supranational currency, known 
as “dollarization”, is a real option for the Dominican Republic. The question of 
whether a country should join a monetary union or abandon its own currency and 
adopt another country’s currency requires knowing whether both countries experi­
ence synchronisation in their business cycles. Assessing business cycle synchronisa­
tion between Latin American countries and the US is not only im portant for a better
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understanding of the influence of im portant trading partners on the business cycle 
fluctuations in the domestic economies. Information about the degree of business 
cycle synchronisation is im portant as it provides information on the necessity of in­
dependent fiscal and monetary policy. If the business cycles are similar and shocks 
are common, then a coordination of macro policies can become desirable, with a 
common currency as the ultim ate form of policy coordination. On the other hand, 
if shocks are predominately country-specific resulting in low degree of business cycle 
synchronisation, then the ability to conduct independent monetary and fiscal policy 
is generally seen as im portant in helping an economy adjust to a new equilibrium.
The objective of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, using Hamilton’s model of the 
US business cycle, the chapter studies the characteristics of business cycles in the Do­
minican Republic, El Salvador, Ecuador, Panam a and the United States. Secondly, 
Hamilton’s model is generalised into a Markov-switching vector autoregressive time 
series model characterising international business cycles as common regime shifts in 
the stochastic process of economic growth of interdependent countries. The find­
ings of the chapter suggest tha t there is some weak evidence for the existence of a 
common cycle between the Dominican Republic and the US. Furthemore, when the 
degree of business cycle synchronisation between the US and dollarized economies 
was evaluated, the results contrasted with the endogenous optimal currency area 
hypothesis. As a consequence, the ex ante degree of business cycles integration be­
tween a particular country with the potential anchor country is im portant because 
dollarization does not seem to be a straightforward substitute for integration includ­
ing a high degree of international labour mobility, fiscal transfers, and flexible wages 
and prices. Hence, developing and emerging countries should carefully consider the 
option of relying on a suitable domestic anchor for monetary policy before opting 
for official dollarization.
Based on a recursive algorithm derived from the law of motion in the debt to GDP 
ratio to measure fiscal sustainability. Chapter 5 studies the role of a fiscal unsus-
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tainability position in the foreign exchange market and currency crises in developing 
countries. Chapter 5 also focuses on im portant issues such as: how should currency 
crises be defined? However, this chapter does not intend to give a detailed overview 
of the causes of currency crises; instead it concentrate mainly on whether a fiscal 
sustainability indicator can predict currency crises. Granger causality tests, probit 
models and the Markov-switching model with Time-Varying Transition Probabili­
ties (TVTP) are adopted to assess the ability of fiscal sustainability’ in predicting 
currency crises.
Each chapter contains an introduction tha t provides more detail as well as the rel­
evant conclusions obtained. The empirical implementation and econometric analysis 
in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 implicated the collection of a variety of data. Best efforts were 
made to obtain a set of reliable data. The sources which provided the relevant data 
are cited in each chapter, as well as, detailed information about the construction of 
specific variables. In some cases, additional notes, tables and figures are provided 
in the appendices.
In Chapter 6 there is a set of global conclusions that complement and summarise 
the ones within each part. The limitations of this analysis are also acknowledged 
and directions for future research are presented.
Figure 1.1: The Conceptual Connection Between Chapters
Chapter 3
Chapter 4 Chapter 2
Exchange Regime
Growth
Cycle Synchronisation Inflation
\
Crises
Chapter 5
Fiscal conditions
To conclude, this thesis as a whole is links itself together in the following way: 
Chapter 2 introduces some concepts on the choice of an exchange rate regime. Chap­
ter 3 explores the effects of the choice a particular exchange rate regimes on inflation,
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growth and the probability of currency crises (see Figure 1.1). According to the re­
sults obtained in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 measures the synchronicity of business cycles 
between the Dominican Republic and the US in order to determine whether this cri­
terion of the OCA theory is satisfied. Finally, Chapter 5 assesses if fiscal conditions 
can predict currency crises in developing countries.
CHAPTER 2
Choosing and Assessing Exchange Rate Regimes
2.1 Introduction
In the last fifty years, the choice of an exchange rate regime has been key to deter­
mining economic policy. Following the collapse of Bretton Woods’ architecture of 
fixed exchange rates in the early 1970s, the wave of financial crises in the 1990s and 
the introduction of the Euro, there has been continued debate about the exchange 
rate regimes most suited to particular countries or groups of countries.
Over the years, theoretical explanations for exchange rate regime choice have 
expanded the shock vulnerability theory to factor in the following: the optimal cur­
rency area (OCA) theory, the “impossible trinity constraint” in times of high capital 
mobility, time-inconsistency issues associated with regime choice, the influences on 
economic performance, the balance sheet effects for financially dollarized economies 
and the role of currency crises. Empirically, the range of methods has expanded sim­
ilarly. While some consensus has appeared to take shape in terms of the theoretical
11
Choosing and Assessing Exchange Rate Regimes 12
debate on exchange rate regime choice determinants, empirical evidence suggests no 
such consensus has formed here.
This chapter sets out to review the main theories and empirical methods em­
ployed in selecting an appropriate exchange rate regime. In order to achieve this, 
the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 introduces the distinct classifica­
tions of exchange regimes (official exchange rate regimes versus those in practice) 
and the different theoretical approaches which illustrate how an optimal exchange 
rate regime is determined. Section 2.3 reviews the relevant empirical methods and 
finally, a summary is provided in Section 2.4.
2.2 Choosing an Exchange R ate Regim e
The selection of an exchange rate regime has been at the centre of debate in in­
ternational macroeconomics for a long time. This section, examines the distinct 
classifications [de jure and de facto) of exchange rate regimes. Secondly, theoretical 
and empirical literature on the choice of exchange rate regimes is surveyed.
2.2.1 Exchange Rate Classifications: De Facto versus De Jure
In order to study the selection of an exchange rate regime, it is necessary to em­
ploy the proper classifications for exchange rate systems. Until the late 1990s, most 
studies on the choice of exchange rate regimes have focused on official regimes.^ Re­
cently, numerous empirical studies of exchange rate regimes have provided evidence 
tha t the evaluation of adjustments in central parities and foreign exchange market 
interventions can generate considerable differences between the official arrangements 
and the de facto  regime adopted by a country (Ghosh et al., 1997, 2002; Calvo and 
Reinhart, 2002; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenergger, 2005). A vast range of empirical
^One early exception is the work developed by Holden et al. (1979), which constructed an 
empirical index to measure exchange rate flexibility.
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literature classifies exchange rate regimes as either de jure or de facto?  The former 
establishes a list of regimes and it is based on the official exchange rate regimes 
declared by governments and usually collected by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). In other words, countries are classified by what they declare they do. The 
IM F’s classification scheme has started from a very rough peg or not dichotomy in 
the 1970s and the early 1980s, to a four regime classification in the 1980s and most 
of the 1990s, and finally to an eight regime scheme since 1998.
The first column in Table 2.1 presents a list of the eight categories of exchange 
rate regimes actually used in the de jure classification and widely employed in litera­
ture on the subject (Frankel, 1999; Edwards and Savastano, 1999; IMF, 1999; Ghosh 
et al., 1997, 2002). They are arranged from top to bottom by the relative stability 
they afford the nominal exchange rate or, in inverse order by the degree of flexibility 
tha t they im part to the economy and now they run the gamut from monetary union 
to crawling peg and floats with varying degrees of intervention.^ However, several 
attem pts have been made to adjust this classification or to offer altogether new ones 
based on observed behaviour of the exchange rate, which results in a classification 
of de facto exchange rate regimes.
De facto classifies countries by what they do. This classification attem pts to 
ensure that the official classifications are consistent with actual practice. A country 
might experience very small exchange rate movements but a high relative variability 
in reserves and interest rates, even though the monetary authorities have no official 
commitment to maintaining the parity. This behaviour is often referred to as the 
“fear of fioating” phenomenon (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002).
Moreover, a country may manifest to have a pegged exchange rate, while in
^For a further discussion on the issues involved in classifying exchange rate regimes, see Ni- 
tithanprapas and Willett (2002).
^Table A .l briefly describes the main features of each category in the de jure classification and 
summarises their alleged advantages and disadvantages.
^In many cases central banks attempt to stabilise the exchange rate because they view devalua­
tions or depreciations as probable causes of adverse effects on the balance sheet, particularly when 
countries have high debts in a foreign currency (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000).
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Table 2.1: The De Jure and De Facto Classification Scheme
De Jure De Facto by Reinhart and Rogofl De Facto by
Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenergger
(1) Currency Union
(2) Dollarization
(3) Currency Board
(4) Conventional Peg
(5) Crawling Peg
(6) Bands
(7) Managed Float
(8) Pure Float
(1) No separate legal tender
(2) Pre-announced peg or currency 
board arrangement
(3) Pre-announced horizontal band 
that is narrower than or equal to ±2%
(4) De facto  peg
(5) Pre-announced crawling peg
(6) Pre-announced crawling band that 
is narrower than or equal to ±2%
(7) De facto  crawling peg
(8) De facto  crawling band that is nar­
rower than or equal to ±2%
(9) Pre-announced crawling baud that 
is wide than or equal ±2%
(10) De facto  crawling band that is 
narrower than or equal to ±5%
(11) Moving band that is narrower 
than or equal to ±2%
(12) Managed floating
(13) Fi-eeiy floating
(14) Freely falling
(15) Hyperfloating
(1) Fixed
(2) Crawling peg
(3) Dirty floats
(4) Flexible
Soxtrces: Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenergger (2005); Reinhart and RogofF (2004).
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fact it carries out frequent changes in parity. This behaviour is called the "fear of 
pegging” phenomenon (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenergger, 2005).^ The performance of 
each classification can be evaluated according to the matrix in Table 2.2, as proposed 
by Genberg and Swoboda (2005).
Table 2.2: Fear of Floating and Fear of Pegging
De Facto 
Classification
Fixed Floating
De Jure 
Classification
Fixed A B
Floating C D
In this matrix, cell C represents the countries officially claiming to be on a floating 
exchange rate regime, however these countries have not allowed their exchange rate 
to float freely (fear of floating). While the countries in cell B represent the fear of 
pegging, the de facto regimes are more flexible than the de jure ones. Cells A and 
D correspond to cases where official and de facto classifications coincide. However, 
the frequency of observations tha t fall into these cells is much smaller than many 
would have assumed until recently (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenergger, 2005).
The de facto classifications have become increasingly relevant over time in empir­
ical research on exchange rate regimes. This new classification led to a re-evaluation 
of many hypotheses tha t had been tested using the de jure classification, and many 
results were overthrown. The most prominent de facto exchange rate arrangements 
are classifications made by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzen­
ergger (2005). The new classification scheme constructed by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004) reclassified exchange rate regimes by focusing on market determined dual
^Genberg and Swoboda (2005) suggest that countries actively using monetary policy instru­
ments to stabilise their exchange rate may rationally not want to announce and commit to a fixed 
exchange rate due to the fear of being subjected to speculative attacks.
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and parallel exchange rates as well as a statistical analysis of observed behaviour in 
the exchange rate for 153 countries over the period 1946-2001. If there is a paral­
lel market in the country, they proceed to a statistical classification based on the 
percentage of the nominal exchange rate in absolute value and on the probability of 
remaining in a band of fluctuation. If there is a single foreign market, they test if 
the announced regime matches the statistical de facto classification. By combining 
official announcements, inflation performances and the volatility of exchange rate 
movements, they are able to distinguish among 15 de facto exchange rate regimes 
(see Table 2.1). These authors distinguish floating in countries with high inflation 
(freely falling) from other types of floating. They defined a category of "freely falling” 
rates when annual inflation equals or exceeds 40% and when, in these episodes of 
inflation, there is no official announcement of the exchange regime by the authori­
ties.® In the same way, they identified a special sub-category of freely falling, called 
“hyperfioats”. This last category refers to those episodes th a t fall under the clas­
sic definition of hyperinflation (50% or more of inflation per month) developed by 
Cagan (1956). These periods of macroeconomic instability and very high inflation 
rates are often reflected in high and frequent exchange rate depreciations.
The results represented in Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) suggest tha t since the 
1980s over 50% of de jure floats are de facto  pegs and approximately half of de 
jure pegs were floats. Moreover, they find numerous cases where the announced 
de jure band is much wider than the de facto band. Similarly, Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenergger (2005)^ constructed a de facto classification based on data obtained 
on the behaviour of three variables; changes in the nominal exchange rate, the 
volatility of these changes and the volatility of international reserves from all IMF 
reporting countries over the period 1974-2000. They use cluster analysis to classify
® Also, they label an exchange rate as freely falling during the six months immediately following 
a currency crisis, but only for those cases where the crisis marks a sudden transition from a fixed 
or quasi fixed regime to a managed or independently floating regime.
^Their analysis is based on the Holden et al. (1979) framework.
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countries into four main groups of pegged, intermediate (crawling peg and dirty 
floats), flexible and inconclusive® exchange rate regimes according to the following 
principle: pegged rate regimes should have low volatility in the exchange rate and in 
the change of the exchange rate but a high volatility of foreign reserves, as countries 
use reserve assets to intervene in the foreign exchange market and to stabilise the 
exchange rate. Intermediate regimes should have a medium level of volatility in the 
exchange rate, low volatility in the change of the exchange rate, and medium to 
high volatility in international reserves.® In contrast, flexible rate regimes should be 
characterised by high volatility in the exchange rate and in its change rate but low 
volatility in international reserves, since the exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate 
freely, and interventions, which may cause high volatility in international reserves, 
should be less frequent. They label it inconclusive regimes, as the actual policy 
intention of the authority is difficult to infer when the foreign exchange market 
is tranquil. Their results suggest tha t 26% of the countries examined follow an 
exchange rate arrangement tha t is different from their de jure regime.
Other authors have proposed alternative methods in the classification of ex­
change rate regimes (Bailliu et al., 2001; Poirson, 2002; Dubas et ah, 2005). Bailliu 
et al. (2001) developed a classification based on the level of volatility in the observed 
nominal exchange rate. These authors take into account external shocks and reval­
uations, finding substantial differences in how exchange rate regimes are classified, 
depending on the methodology used. They also find that over 50% of the countries 
identifying themselves as floaters are found to follow more rigid arrangements. In 
the same way, Poirson (2002), following the fear of fioating approach, use an alter­
native flexibility index based on the movements in exchange rates and international
®For an analysis on this methodology see Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenergger (2002).
®To discriminate between crawling peg and dirty floats, two measures are made for the volatility 
of the exchange rate: the average of the absolute monthly percentage change in the exchange rate, 
and the standard deviation of the monthly percentage change in the exchange rate, both being 
calculed for a calendar year. Reserves volatility is measured by the average of absolute monthly 
change in net dollar reserves divided by monetary base of the previous month taken in dollars too.
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reserves. While Dubas et al. (2005) propose an econometric procedure for obtaining 
an “effective” de facto exchange rate regime classification. These authors employ the 
de facto classifications as outcomes of a multinominal logit choice problem condi­
tional on measures of the volatility in a country’s effective exchange rate, a bilateral 
exchange rate and foreign reserves.
In addition, critics constantly moved away from the official International Mone­
tary Fund classification itself to construct a de facto classification system in 1999.^® 
The new IMF classification combines the available information on exchange rate 
and monetary policy framework, and the formal or informal policy intentions of 
authorities with data on actual exchange rates and reserve movements to reach an 
assessment of the actual exchange rate regime. However, it can be argued tha t the 
new IMF classification system is still one of the de jure regimes, since it still relies 
heavily on official information and looks mainly to the behaviour of official exchange 
rates.^^
In spite of the fact that the evolution of exchange rate arrangements and the 
association between exchange rate regimes and economic performance looks very 
different when viewed through de facto schemes, this does not imply tha t official 
regimes are irrelevant, even if they are not always coincide with the de facto  regimes. 
Official regimes are likely to guide the financial market expectations on exchange 
rate developments and affect international financial policy decisions. Also, the use of 
interest rates and the change in gross international reserves as a proxy for interven­
tion in exchange rate markets has serious drawbacks. In some countries, movements 
in central bank foreign reserves can be linked to reserve management strategies, 
the servicing of foreign debt or payments for bulky purchases such as oil imports, 
and not necessarily for an exchange rate stabilisation motive. Interest rates in many 
countries are set administratively. As a consequence, the statistics and reality might 
diverge for data  on foreign exchange reserves (Bubula and Otker-Rober, 2002; Ghosh
i°See IMF (1999) for details. 
i^See Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).
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In summary, de facto measures vary considerably, depending on the method­
ology used to assess regimes. However, all these methodologies lead to the same 
conclusion: de facto exchange rate regimes are different from de jure regimes, and 
the discrepancies between the two are not uncommon. The most complete de facto 
exchange rate classifications are made by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).
2.2.2 Theoretical Considerations
The theoretical literature on the selection of an exchange rate regime is vast and can 
be divided into two broad categories: classical and modern theories, i® In the classical 
exchange rate literature the choice is often portrayed as being either a completely 
fixed exchange rate regime or a fully flexible one. The general presumption in this 
kind of literature is tha t the prices of commodities are relatively sticky compared 
to exchange rates, implying tha t shocks to the economy may lead to fluctuations in 
economic activity. Major contributors in early literature include Friedman (1953), 
Fleming (1962) Mundell (1961, 1963), McKinnon (1963), and Kenen (1969), among 
others. Friedman (1953) argued that, in the presence of sticky prices, floating rates 
would provide better insulation from foreign shocks by allowing relative prices to 
adjust faster. Moreover, Mundell (1963) explored the role of capital mobility in 
the choice of exchange rate regimes. W ith this approach, known as exchange rate 
policy and the absorption of real and nominal shocks, the choice between fixed and 
fioating depends on the sources of the shocks, whether they are real or nominal, 
and the degree of capital mobility. In an open economy with capital mobility a 
fioating exchange rate provides insulation against real shocks, such as a change in 
the demand for exports or in the terms of trade, because under a fioating rate
i^See Rogoff et al. (2003) for a comparison of the main features of various de facto classifications. 
^^For a survey on the issue of exchange rate regime choice for both industrial and emerging 
countries from an historical perspective see Bordo (2003). Wickham (1985) provides a survey of 
the literature on optimal exchange rate regimes for small open developing countries.
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system the exchange rate can adjust quickly helping to restore equilibrium, as in 
Fi’iedman (1953), rather than requiring price level changes. On the contrary, a 
fixed exchange rate is desirable in the case of nominal shocks such as a shift in 
money demand, because money supplies automatically adjust to changes in money 
demand without requiring interest rate changes or price level changes (Mundell, 
1963; Fleming, 1962).^^
The key assumption in the Mundell-Fleming framework is tha t perfect capital 
mobility implies international arbitrage across countries in the form of uncovered 
interest parity. This model concludes tha t it is impossible to simultaneously achieve 
the three domestic goals: exchange rate stabilisation, capital market integration 
and independent monetary policy. Otherwise known as the impossible trinity (or 
the trilemma).
Similarly, Boyer (1978), Henderson (1979) and McKinnon (1981), following the 
analysis of Poole (1970) on optimal monetary policy instruments, argue that fixed 
exchange rates perform better in terms of output stability in the presence of mone­
tary shocks originating in the domestic economy, while flexible rates perform better 
in the presence of real shocks. Their analysis suggests tha t countries exposed to a 
large supply of side shocks should opt for flexible exchange rates, while countries 
suffering from large monetary and financial market disturbances should peg their 
exchange rates.
On the other hand, Mundell (1961) stressed the fundamentals of optimal currency 
area (OCA) theory, defining the characteristics of areas for which it is optimal to 
have a single currency regime.^® The OCA approach weighs out the trade and 
welfare gains from a stable exchange rate against the benefits of exchange rate 
flexibility as a shock absorber in the presence of nominal rigidities. According to
'^^This model was extended by Dornbuscli (1976), a study demonstrating that sticky nominal 
output prices can induce overshooting behaviour in exchange rates.
^^An OCA can be defined as a region for which it is optimal to have its own currency and its 
own monetary policy.
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Mundell (1961), the advantages of fixed exchange rates increase with the degree 
of economic integration among countries.^® Based on Mundell (1961), McKinnon 
(1963) advanced the criterion of the openness of an economy. He also points to 
economic size and openness as im portant fundamentals of OCA theory and argues 
tha t small and open economies are more likely to adopt fixed exchange rate regimes 
than large and relatively closed economies.
In the same way, Kenen (1969) argued tha t product diversification in trade should 
be considered a major determinant of whether an area or not should adopt a fixed 
exchange rate regime. A country is more likely to adopt a fixed exchange rate regime, 
if its trade is heavily concentrated on a particular currency area. Kenen (1969) also 
suggests that countries with very concentrated production structures are more likely 
to adopt flexible exchange rates than countries with highly diversified production, as 
exchange rate changes are almost equivalent to changes in the relative output prices 
and are, therefore, more useful to cope with the demand shocks from the former. In 
general, OCA theory suggests tha t countries which are highly integrated with each 
other in terms of trade and other economic and political relations and have a high 
degree of symmetry in their business cycles are likely to constitute an OCA.^®
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1973 set the stage for more diver­
sified choices in exchange rate regimes (from pure floats through many intermediate 
arrangements to hard pegs like currency boards, dollarization, and currency unions), 
and opened the door to modern literature on the subject of exchange rate regime
^®Bayoumi (1994) provides a formal OCA model with microeconomic foundations and Melitz 
(1995) developed a theory on optimum currency area based on the idea of selecting monetary union 
partners with which the covariances of equilibrium real exchange rates is low. His model has been 
extended to compare choices between regimes of pegged rates, currency boards and dollarization. In 
addition, Alesina and Barro (2002) and Alesina et al. (2002) examined theoretically and empirically 
the determinants of OCAs.
'^^Some authors point out that foreign shocks are more important in countries that are more 
open, increasing the appeal of floating rates as a shock absorber (Mussa et al., 2000).
Additional OCA criteria, such as the degree of labour mobility, wage flexibility or the existence 
of fiscal transfers among the members, relate to the cost of processing the necessary adjustments 
in the case of asymmetric shocks among member countries when independent monetary policy has 
been foregone.
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selection. A part of this literature emphasises the credibility aspects of monetary 
policy and exchange rate regimes mainly to combating inflation and avoiding finan­
cial crises.
The environment of high inflation in many countries at the end of the 1970s 
and during the 1980s introduced a new approach to exchange rate selection, focused 
on the transmission of inflation between countries and the use of exchange rate 
policies to achieve low inflation rates. Building on the theory developed by Barro 
and Gordon (1983a,b) on monetary policy credibility, some of the literature of the 
1980s developed the idea tha t a fixed exchange rate could help import credibility of 
low inflation policies from a foreign central bank.^® Numerous authors emphasised 
the credibility gains of adopting a peg a r ra n g e m e n t.T h e  main argument in favour 
of fixed rates is their ability to induce discipline and make the monetary policy more 
credible because the adoption of lax monetary (and fiscal) policies would eventually 
lead to an exhaustion of reserves and the collapse of the fixed exchange rate system 
implying a big political cost for policy-makers. In the same way, some empirical 
studies introduced considerations on optimal macroeconomic stabilisation, adding 
proxies for various types of shocks (Melvin, 1985; Savvides, 1990, 1993). These 
authors find th a t the presence of domestic nominal shocks raises the likelihood of a 
currency peg, while real shocks reduce it.
On the contrary, another line of research supporting the fioating exchange rate 
was initiated in the late 1970s. This line has been based on the theoretical work 
on credibility and time-inconsistency of Kyndland and Prescott (1977). According 
to this approach, fioating regimes provide maximum discretion for monetary policy, 
but discretion comes with the problem of time-inconsistency. T hat is, if a govern­
ment tends to misuse its discretion and cannot keep its promise of low inflation
Velasco (1996) presents a survey on the sustainability of fixed exchange rates considering a 
dynamic version of the Barro and Gordon fr amework, and Benigno and Missale (2004) present an 
open economy version of the Barro and Gordon model.
2°See Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989), and Dornbusch (2001), among others.
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today, it will be difficult to get people to believe its future policy announcements. 
As a result, governmental restraints need to be established to ensure tha t discre­
tion is not misused and economic policies are consistent and sustainable so as to 
avoid episodes of inflation. Therefore, designing a set of domestic institutions tha t 
will produce low inflation and long run expectations of low inflation is consistent 
with the monetary independence associated with floating exchange rates (Svensson, 
2000). Several hypotheses, factoring in various institutional and historical character­
istics, like the independence of the central bank were then developed as an approach 
to the exchange rate regime selection (Cukierman et ah, 1992; Tornell and Velasco, 
1995). The idea is that, independent central banks’ use of inflation targeting prob­
ably solves the time-inconsistency problem bringing credibility for monetary policy 
without abandoning the floating exchange rate (Larrain and Velasco, 2001). Sim­
ilarly, countries with a history of high inflation could adopt a fixed exchange rate 
regime or a currency board, but without the appropriate fiscal institution it would 
not be enough to secure credibility. The attraction of a pegging regime would be 
lowered as the degree of independence afforded to the central bank increases (Rogoff, 
1985). Other studies have emphasised the trade-off between credibility and flexi­
bility (Rogoff, 1985; Edwards, 1996; Frankel, 1996). According to this argument, a 
flexible regime allows a country to have an independent monetary policy, providing 
the flexibility to accommodate domestic and foreign shocks, while a fixed exchange 
rate regime reduces the degree of flexibility to accommodate such shocks but imparts 
a higher degree of credibility (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988; Mendoza, 2001).
More recent theoretical and empirical literature considers the influence of po­
litical variables on exchange rate regime choices. This approach to exchange rate 
determination uses exchange rate rules as a policy crutch in credibility challenged 
economies.2^  The policy crutch is intimately related with the credibility gains of 
adopting a fixed regime when countries have a weak institutional credibility. Gov-
^The precursors are based on Barro and Gordon (1983b).
Choosing and Assessing Exchange Rate Regimes 24
ernments with a low inflation bias but low institutional credibility have difficulty 
in convincing the public of their commitment to nominal stability and may adopt 
a fixed exchange rate as a policy crutch to reduce inflationary expectations. In 
addition, some authors argued that a fixed exchange rate disciplines the govern­
ment because any fiscal excess might result in a currency c ris is .C onverse ly , other 
researchers suggest tha t a flexible exchange rate system has advantages from a po­
litically economic point of view, as flexible rates lower the political costs of exchange 
rate changes (Aghevli et ah, 1991; Edwards, 1996; Edwards and Savastano, 1999; 
Poirson, 2002). Poirson (2002) points out th a t when a country lacking political 
stability has an incentive, ceteris paribus, to let its exchange rate float, it would be 
difficult for the government to gather support for the unpopular measures tha t may 
be required to defend a fixed regime. Edwards (1996) introduces variables that mea­
sure the degree of political stability and the strength of the government. He finds 
tha t weaker governments and political instability tends to increase the likelihood of 
flexible exchange rate regimes. His results contradict the policy crutch approach.
Moreover, the issue of exchange rate regime selection has also been analysed 
from a point of view incorporing their influence on economic performance, mainly 
its impact on inflation and growth (Ghosh et ah, 1997, 2002; Rogoff et ah, 2003; 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2001, 2003b; Bailliu et ah, 2001, 2002; Husain et ah, 
2005 and Chapter 3 of this thesis). Earlier studies indicate that, compared to fioat­
ing regimes, pegged exchange rate regimes are associated with lower inflation and 
slightly lower output growth. In addition, some research suggests tha t countries 
with fixed exchange rates can achieve price stability, but this presents some prob­
lems reaching other macroeconomic objectives, particularly fiscal balance, compet­
itiveness, and growth (Nashashibi and Bazzoni, 1993). More recently, some studies 
found pegged regimes posed no significant impact on inflation but confirmed the 
lower correlation between pegged regimes and per capita output growth.
*See Aghevli et ai. (1991), Levy-Yeyati et ah (2003) and Chapter 5 of this thesis, among others.
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On the other hand, many empirical studies took into account the level of a 
country’s debt, the ability of a country to borrow in its domestic currency and 
international reserves for the selection of an exchange rate system. However, the 
results of these empirical studies are not robust in terms of the choice of an exchange 
rate regime (Juhn and Mauro, 2 0 0 2 ) . In tha t order, the balance sheet exposure 
of exchange rate changes in financially dollarized economies has been studied by 
recent literature (Calvo and Reinhart, 2001; Calvo, 2001). Effects on the balance 
sheet in financially dollarized economies are particularly relevant in countries with 
im portant foreign liabilities (private or public), because they may be more prone to 
fixed regimes (either de jure or de facto) owing to the inherent currency imbalance 
and the deleterious impact of pointed nominal depreciation in the currency on the 
solvency of financial institutions (Levy-Yeyati et ah, 2003).
The optimal choice of an exchange rate regime has been analysed from the point 
of view of fiscal policy sustainability. The exchange rate regime plays an im portant 
role in determining external debt and debt service burden, as well as the sustainabil­
ity of both. Firstly, because of its direct effect on their size and, secondly, because of 
its effect on competitiveness and growth particularly in developing countries which 
have a large amount of debt denominated in a foreign currency (Tornell and Velasco, 
1994; Calvo et ah, 2003). Large depreciations lead to a growth in public sector debt 
and to substantial deteriorations in the sustainability of fiscal positions. Early lit­
erature suggest that fixed exchange rate regimes provide more fiscal discipline than 
flexible exchange regimes do since fiscal profligacy is deterred by the risk of losses 
in foreign reserves or the build-up of public debt. However, in countries with a 
pegged exchange rate and a tax base highly dependent on international trade, an 
overvaluation of the real exchange rate would tend to undermine tax  revenues and 
results in a widening of the fiscal deficit (Tanzi, 1977; Nashashibi and Bazzoni, 1993). 
Futhermore, some authors explore the hypothesis tha t the selection of an exchange
23See also, Velasco (1996) and Benigno and Missale (2004).
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rate regime following a sudden stop in capital flow may be influenced by fiscal costs 
(Calvo et aL, 2003; Galindo and Izquierdo, 2003).
Until recent years, many studies favoured intermediate regimes (e.g. adjustable 
pegs and exchange rate bands) as an optimal choice in the face of the presumably 
dominant trade-off between credibility (associated with fixed exchange rates) and 
flexibility (associated with fioating regimes). However, the general trend towards 
full or large capital mobility has shifted attention on to the implications of capital 
movements in the choice of exchange rate r e g i m e s . T h e  currency crises of the 
1990s (European Monetary System in 1992, Mexico in 1994, East Asia in 1997, 
Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1999, Turkey and Argentina in 2001) involved combinations 
of some form of intermediate exchange rates with high capital mobility (Hausmann 
et ah, 1999).2^ Those combinations are exposed to speculative attacks resulting from 
fundamental policy inconsistencies (Krugman, 1979) or self-fulfilling expectations 
tha t arise in the context of multiple equilibria (Obstfeld, 1996).2® Some authors 
highlight the inconsistency between fiscal policy fundamentals and the exchange 
rate peg that leads to currency crises (De Kock and Grilli, 1993; Daniel, 1997, 2001; 
Corsetti and Mackowiak, 2005, among others). On the other hand, several studies 
suggest that countries exposed to large capital flows (countries with an open capital 
account) must avoid unstable exchange rate regimes and are left with two corner 
solutions: a hard currency peg (such as a currency board, dollarization or monetary 
union)2  ^ or pure fioating exchange rate regimes. This point of view has been called
the 1990s, two major trends changed the conventional analysis of optimal exchange rates. 
Firstly, surges in capital flows once again led to the rapid growth of debt stocks in emerging 
economies and secondly, the type of flows changed substantially, as initially the most significant 
part of these increasing flows (and debts) were portfolio flows. When these flows started to decline 
(after 1998), foreign investment flows become dominant.
Early studies of Holden et al. (1979) point out that higher capital mobility increases the 
likelihood of fixing the exchange rate.
^®Important factors that reduce the risk of speculative attacks are the availability of foreign 
currency reserves to defend a fixed exchange rate, and the consistency of macro economic policies. 
Sustainable public finances are a key factor in this regard.
^ I^t is worth noting from the outset that a monetary union and dollarization are conceptually dis­
tinct, a monetary union involves the establishment of a new central bank that can be administered
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the “hollow-out hypothesis” or the “bipolar view” ®^ (Eichengreen, 1994; Obstfeld and 
Rogoff, 1995; Fischer, 2001).
Over the course of the 1990s, the bipolar view has become a new orthodoxy in 
the selection of an exchange rate regime. Some empirical research points out tha t 
since the early 1990s there has been a continuous fall in the number of countries tha t 
maintain some type of intermediate exchange rate regime, and a continuing rise in 
the number of countries with both pure floating rates and hard pegs. This polari­
sation has led some authors to conclude tha t intermediate exchange rate regimes in 
countries open to international capital flows (with open capital accounts) or integrat­
ing their domestic capital markets with global capital markets are not sustainable 
for extended periods, and tha t these countries should move away from the middle 
towards both extremes of the exchange rate spectrum (Eichengreen, 1994; Obstfeld 
and Rogoff, 1995). Hence, they must either float freely or fix truly and thus find 
credibility under a hard peg regime.
The first empirical work on the bipolar view was undertaken in Caramazza and 
Aziz (1998). These authors point out tha t 87% of developing countries had some type 
of pegged exchange rate in 1975, but this proportion fell to well below 50% in 1996. 
They also suggest tha t countries in the 1990s opted more for flexible exchange rates 
than hard pegs.®® Similarly, Fischer (2001) documented the case for the hollowing- 
out hypothesis or bipolar view by examining the evolution of exchange rate regimes 
in a large sample of countries in the period between 1991 to 1999. His work shows 
a trend in moving away from intermediate regimes and towards fioating regimes, 
but there is no evidence to suggest tha t the intermediate exchange rate regime is
by representatives from all the countries using the new transnational currency while dollarization, 
in contrast, implies the adoption of the currency of another country.
®^It is also referred to as the missing middle, or the hypothesis of the vanishing intermediate 
regime.
^®Some studies indicate that the currency crises of the 1990s and increasing capital mobility 
brought the impossible trinity hypothesis to the forefront and resulted in the bipolar view of 
exchange rate regimes (Fischer, 2001).
similar conclusion is also reached by Larrain and Velasco (2001) and Fiankel (2003).
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disappearing, except for industrialised countries (see Figure 2.1). Nonetheless, that 
increase in the number of pegs in industrialised countries (from 5% to 50%) in the 
1990s is mainly related to the introduction of the Euro Zone and some transitional 
economies (Rogoff et ah, 2003).
Figure 2.1: Evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes: Developed Market Economies
F l o a t i n g
Source: Fischer (2001).
On the other hand, the study developed by Fischer (2001) indicates that the 
number of emerging market countries with intermediate regimes declined from 21 
countries (64%) in 1991 to 14 countries (42%) in 1999. Likewise, the number of 
developing countries with intermediate exchange rate regimes decreased from 62 
countries (59%) to 48 countries (36%) in the same period (see Figure 2.2 and 2.3, 
respectively). In both cases the increase in floating was more im portant than fixed 
regimes. However, the work developed by Fischer (2001), like most studies on ex­
change rate regimes up until that moment, is based on the de jure scheme or the 
official classification of exchange rate regimes. On the contrary, some empirical 
studies using the de facto classification had no founded support for the bipolar view
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Figure 2.2: Evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes: Emerging Market Economies
F I s a t i n g
Source: Fischer (2001).
Figure 2.3: Evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes: Other Countries
11991
11999
F l o a t i n g
Source: Fischer (2001).
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(Masson, 2001; Bubula and Otker-Rober, 2002; Rogoff et aL, 2003).®  ^ In addition. 
Bird and Rowlands (2005), using a de facto classification, examine the link between 
exchange rate regimes and IMF programmes (as a proxy to the balance of payment 
difficulties) and find strong evidence suggesting that countries with intermediate 
exchange rate regimes are less likely to go to the IMF than others.
On the other hand, Frankel (1999) stressed tha t the relative difficulty in verifying 
intermediate regimes, particularly broad band regimes pegged to a basket of curren­
cies, is also a critical factor in explaining why intermediate regimes are less viable 
than corner solutions. In addition, some authors suggest tha t intermediate regimes 
are, and will continue to be, a viable option especially for emerging markets (Frankel, 
1999, 2003; Williamson, 2000; Masson, 2001; Bubula and Otker-Rober, 2002; Husain 
et ah, 2005).®2 Moreover, W illett (2002) affirm tha t it is possible for intermediate 
exchange rate regimes to remain stable, but this requires exchange rates and do­
mestic macroeconomic policies to be mutually determined in a consistent manner, 
and Bérnassy-Quéré and Coeuré (2001) illustrate how intermediate exchange rate 
regimes are potentially superior when there is a trade-off between stabilisation and 
disinflation. Notwithstanding, dollarization has perhaps become the leading theo­
retical and policy debate of the past five years (Calvo, 1999, 2001; Hausmann and 
Powell, 1999; Calvo and Reinhart, 2001; Alesina and Barro, 2001; Dornbusch, 2001; 
Edwards, 2001). An im portant part of modern literature on exchange rate regimes, 
with its focus on central bank credibility, considers the adoption of a foreign cur­
rency (dollarization) as the domestic currency as a means to buy a credible policy
^^Bubula and Otker-Rober (2002) using a monthly database on IMF de facto classifications find 
that intermediate regimes have been more prevalent than suggested by the de jure classification 
in the period between 1990-2001. While Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenergger (2005) using their own 
de facto classification find evidence on bipolar view during the 1990s but not for countries with 
limited access to capital markets. According to their study, there is a reduction in the number of 
countries using intermediate exchange rate from 62% in 1991 to 32% in 2000. Nonetheless, the 
authors find important representations in each of the three categories (fixed, intermediate, and 
fioating). Their results also suggest that the recent increase in the number of de jure floats goes 
hand in hand with an increase in the number of de facto dirty float (fear of fioating).
Williamson (2000) proposed alternative crawling band regimes satisfying the BBC rules: Bas­
ket, Band, and Crawl.
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of price stability.®® Dollarization also eliminates the role of short-run discretionary 
government policies tha t can give rise to inconsistencies in policies, and avoids spec­
ulative attacks and currency crises.®^ Dollarization can be viewed as the extension 
to a fixed exchange rate regime, to the point where the possibility of parity changes 
are ruled out completely.®®
The OCA criteria developed by Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen 
(1969) is the basis for countries to evaluate the adoption of dollarization (although 
the context is different from the original application of the OCA theory).®® In ad­
dition, other studies have discussed the dollarization in terms of a dynamic general 
equilibrium framework (Mendoza, 2001; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2001). Dollar­
ization leads to lower inflation and real interest rates but its impact on economic 
growth is not clear (Edwards, 2001; Edwards and Magendzo, 2001, 2003b).®^
In summary, in classic literature, the relative incidence of nominal and real shocks 
becomes a key criterion in the selection of an the exchange rate regime. The issue 
stressed in modern literature takes two paths, while researchers in the 1980s con­
centrated on studying the implications of exchange rate regimes as stabilisation 
instruments (or as credibility enhancers), in recent years the debate has focused 
on how different regimes may act as external shocks absorbers or provide a shield 
against speculative attacks.
^^For a discussion on the pros and cons of dollarization see Alesina and Barro (2002); Chang 
and Velasco (2003); Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003a); Berg and Borensztein (2003), among 
others.
^^For a discussion on the conditions under which emerging countries will benefit from giving up 
their currency see Mendoza (2002) and Alesina et al. (2002).
^^The choice of dollarization is considered to involve a trade-off between credibility and flexibility. 
See the Chapter 4 in this thesis for a further discussion on this.
^OCA issues defined the debates that led to the European Monetary Union. However, the focus 
of the dollarization debate in developing economies differs substantially from that of the European 
Monetary Union debate.
^^Edwards and Magendzo (2003a) find that currency unions and dollarized countries have lower 
inflation than countries with a domestic currency, but dollarized countries have lower growth and 
higher volatility than countries with a domestic currency, while currency unions have a higher 
growth and a higher volatility than countries with their own currencies.
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2.3 A ssessing Exchange R ate Regimes
In this section, more recent empirical approaches used to evaluate the selection of an 
optimal exchange regime are reviwed. In general, there are three main approaches: 
economic performance, currency crisis, and optimal currency area criterion.
2.3.1 Economic Approach Criterion
Since inflation and growth may influence a government’s choice of exchange rate 
regimes, some empirical studies have attem pted to explain the impact of exchange 
rate regimes on economic performance. This empirical analysis can be grouped 
under two categories: country-specific studies and multi-country studies. Country- 
specific investigations have had a difiicult time unravelling the independent effects 
of the nominal exchange rate regime on macroeconomic performance: the detection 
of regularity associated with a particular regime in one study was followed by a 
counter example in another study. Multi-country studies have also found it difficult 
to make generalisations. Ghosh et al. (1997, 2002); Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2001, 2003b); Rogoff et al. (2003) and Husain et al. (2005) conducted comprehensive 
multi-country studies.
Ghosh et al. (1997) examine the effects of the nominal exchange rate regime on 
inflation and economic growth using data from 135 countries during the period of 
1960-1989. Their results suggest tha t both the level and variability of inflation is 
markedly lower under fixed exchange rates than under floating exchange rates. How­
ever, their study fails to find a robust link between growth and exchange arrange­
ments. Similarly, Ghosh et al. (2002) confirmed tha t there is a negative association 
between fixed exchange rate regimes and inflation, but they not find evidence of a 
strong link between exchange rate regimes and economic growth. Conversely, Levy- 
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001, 2003b) demonstrate tha t developing countries with 
pegged regimes are associated with lower inflation than developing countries using
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floating arrangements, but pegged regimes are associated with slower growth.
Rogoff et al. (2003) study the link between exchange rate regimes and economic 
performance and their results suggest that, for countries at a relatively early stage 
of financial development and integration, fixed or relatively rigid regimes appear to 
offer some anti-inflation credibility gain without compromising growth objectives. 
On the contrary, for developed countries th a t are not in a currency union, relatively 
flexible exchange rate regimes appear to offer higher growth w ithout any cost to 
credibility.
On the other hand, Husain et al. (2005) finds tha t developing countries adopt­
ing fixed exchange rate present low inflation than developing countries with flexible 
rates. Following the work developed by Ghosh et al. (1997, 2002); Rogoff et al. 
(2003) and Husain et al. (2005), Chapter 3 investigates whether particular exchange 
arrangements impact on macroeconomic performance, particularly inflation and eco­
nomic growth.
2.3.2 Currency Crises Criterion
Early empirical research on currency crises focuses on the description of stylised facts 
regarding the period preceding the currency crisis or on testing specific theoretical 
models of crises using standard econometric methods (signalling approach). How­
ever, more recent empirical studies go beyong explaining the causes of a currency 
crisis. They do not differentiate between various indicators but consider a wide 
range of variables tha t can help in constructing a system for predicting a currency 
crisis.
Numerous empirical analyses use the technique of a discrete dependent variable 
(probit and logit) associated with a set of exogenous continuous variables in a cur­
rency crisis. While the dependent variable of a currency crisis remains a binary or 
multinomial variable the independent variables are continuous. This approach pro­
vides the possibility of evaluating a formal model the relationships between various
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indicators including exchange rate arrangements and the discrete occurrence of a 
currency crisis. The prediction model is simply interpreted as the probability of a 
currency crisis occurrence. Eichengreen et al. (1996) were among the first to use a 
probit regression; they applied it to data obtained on twenty industrialised coun­
tries in the period 1959-1993 in order to empirically identify the determinants of a 
currency crisis. One of the more im portant novelties introduced in their analysis is 
the contagion effect. These authors also use the definition of a currency crisis based 
on an index of speculative pressure.
Frankel and Rose (1996) applied probit regressions to yearly data  for 100 de­
veloping countries in the period 1971-1992 and defined a currency crisis tha t only 
assumes the occurrence of successful speculative attacks. In addition, an impor­
tan t amount of subsequent research applied the binomial probit model but these 
empirical analyses differed in the choice of indicators, the sample of countries, the 
definition of a currency crisis, the prognostic time horizon and the frequency of used 
data. Based on the works developed by Eichengreen et al. (1996) a probit model is 
employed in this study to identify the impact of a particular exchange rate regime 
on the probability of a currency crisis, as detailed in Chapter 3.
On the other hand, numerous empirical studies have argued tha t probit models 
tend to lead to a limited definition of currency crises. Those authors have tried 
to resolve the problems inherent in the signalling approach and the discrete choice 
approach of currency crises using alternative models (Cerra and Saxena, 2002; Mar­
tinez Peria, 2002; Abiad, 2003; Arias and Erlandsson, 2005; Chen, 2005). Jeanne 
and Masson (2000) and Pratzscher (2002), among others, use the Markov-switching 
model developed by Hamilton (1990) in order to encompass the possibility of multi­
ple equilibria. The contributions of these models, in comparison to the models using 
the index of speculative pressure, is tha t the parameters evaluated in the model and 
the data  obtained reveal the state of the economy, so the model does not depend 
on an arbitrary decision on the time of onset of the currency crisis, based on the
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signal provided by the index of speculative pressure. Similarly, a significant part of 
contemporary literature on the subject focuses on improving Hamiltons’ framework 
to allow Time-Varying Transition Probabilities (TVTP) to study currency crises 
(Cerra and Saxena 2002; Martinez Peria 2002; Abiad 2003; among others).
In addition, Abiad (2003); Arias and Erlandsson (2005) and Chen (2005) con­
struct early warning systems using a Markov-switching model with time-varying 
transition probabilities to help predict currency crises. Assuming transition proba­
bilities are time-varying rather than fixed. Chapter 5 sets out to estimate whether 
currency crises are driven by a fiscal sustainability indicator and defines currency 
crisis regime states when the variance of the exchange rate is high and in a tranquil 
(no crisis) state when the variance is low. To evaluate if the fiscal sustainability in­
dicator is a good predictor of currency crises we use also probit models and different 
definitions for a crisis.
2.3.3 OCA Criterion
The theory on Optimal Currency Area (OCA) (Mundell, 1961), seeks to organise the 
economic considerations tha t motivate the choice of an exchange rate regime.^® The 
OCA criterion argues tha t the symmetry of business cycles is an im portant argument 
for a common currency. An im portant part of empirical literature uses Structural 
Vector Autoregressions (SVAR) to measure the degree of synchronisations (sym­
metries) in business cycles and the contemporaneous correlation of shocks between 
countries. An interesting finding in papers using the structural VAR methodology 
is tha t results can differ, whether the focus is on the correlation of shocks or of busi­
ness cycles. Another has looked at measures in business cycle synchronicity and at 
tests for the presence of common features or common cycles. Markov-switching ARs 
and VARs have also proved useful tools, following the work developed by Hamilton 
(1989) and Krolzig (1997a); this procedure can also be used to identify a common
38See Dreyer (1978) and Heller (1978) for early empirical work on the OCA approach.
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cycle (Artis et a l ,  2004). The estimate of the so-called classical cycle, as distinct 
from the growth cycle, has also been carried out and is now making a comeback.
Following Krolzig (1997a) and Artis et al. (2004), Chapter 4 details the use of 
Markov-switching ARs and VARs models to identify common cycles and the degree 
of synchronisation of real output (GDP) among dollarized economies, the Dominican 
Republic and the United States.
2o4 Conclusion
The literature on the selection of exchange rate regimes can be divided into two main 
groups: classical and modern. Classical literature refers to earlier studies which 
examined systematic differences between floating and fixed exchange rate regimes. 
The analysis in these studies is closely related to the literature on the choice between 
fixed and flexible regimes based. Firstly, on the nature of the shocks generated by 
changes in trade flows and by a deterioration in terms of trade and secondly, on the 
optimal currency area theory. This period was characterised by strict controls on 
capital flows, relatively stable exchange rates, low inflation, high growth and a rapid 
increase in trade.
The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the periods of high inflation in 
the 1970s and 1980s and the currency crises th a t occurred in the international fi­
nancial market in the 1980s and 1990s led to a second significant development in 
this literature. The relevance of the exchange rate regime for macroeconomic perfor­
mance became a key issue in international macroeconomics and the choice between 
alternative regimes focused on the trade-off between credibility and flexibility.
The financial deregulation in domestic economies and the reductions of barriers 
to financial flows initiated in the 1970s took the form of rapidly expanding financial 
flows among mature economies and, later, between them and developing economies. 
The debate on exchange rate regimes has become increasingly concerned with the
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need to mitigate the potential deleterious effects of abrupt change in the direction of 
capital flows and hence with the question of exchange rate regime sustainability and 
credibility of domestic policies. The succession of currency crises in the second half 
of the 1990s has led to a polarisation in the exchange rate regime debate between 
what has come to be known as a “bipolar view” or “corner solution”. However, the 
evidence found in this literature reveals th a t the popularity of intermediate regimes 
declined in the 1990s. It is unclear at this point whether they are in the process of 
becoming extinct. In effect, the stronger evidence for the bipolar view comes from 
industrialised countries where most have adopted exchange rate regimes at one end 
of the two extremes. However, for emerging and developing countries, intermediate 
regimes remain an option (though less so than a decade ago). Moreover, some 
studies using alternative classification schemes do not find im portant bipolar views, 
contrary to those studies based on official classifications.
An im portant part of the modern literature on exchange rate regimes, with its 
focus on central bank credibility, considers tha t adopting a foreign currency (dollar­
ization) as the domestic currency buys a credible policy of price stability and avoids 
speculative attacks and currency crises. Some empirical evidence confirmed tha t 
dollarized countries have lower inflation than countries with a domestic currency, 
but dollarized countries have lower growth and higher volatility than countries with 
a currency of their own. In this context of increasing capital flows and large external 
shocks, the exchange rate debate is focusing on the trade-off between inflation and 
growth.
To conclude, this chapter has examined the distinct exchange rate classifications 
and surveyed the theoretical and empirical literature on the selection of exchange 
rate regimes, providing necessary background for this investigation.
CHAPTER 3
Exchange Arrangements, Currency Crises and Macroeconomic 
Performance
3.1 Introduction
Since the financial crises of the 1990s in emerging markets, the issue of the suitability 
of exchange rates regimes has returned to the international finance research agenda. 
More precisely, the debate over fixed and floating exchange arrangements has once 
again taken centre stage in academic circles. Some economists maintain tha t the first 
round of this debate was won by those advocating floating arrangements because all 
crisis episodes took place in countries which had adopted a variety of mechanisms 
for pegging their exchange regimes. Conversely, the advocates of fixed exchange 
regimes suggest tha t there are bad fixes and good fixes (like official dollarization) 
and good or truly fixed arrangements tha t allow countries to achieve credibility and 
lower inflation.
An im portant recent development in the debate over optimal exchange rate
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regimes is the recognition tha t the choice of an exchange rate arrangement is differ­
ent between particular groups of countries. The choice of an exchange rate regime 
for developed countries is different from that of developing countries or emerging 
economy countries. Developing countries are often beset by a lack of credibility and 
limited access to international capital markets. Hence fixed exchange rate regimes 
play a useful role by providing policymakers with a nominal anchor for monetary 
policy and by helping to establish a degree of policy credibility. In contrast, emerg­
ing market economies are more integrated with global financial markets but they 
have encountered more currency crises under pegged exchange rate arrangements 
(Husain et al., 2005). Developed countries have obtained more benefits from flexible 
exchange regimes because they are more developed economically and institutionally, 
and more integrated in global financial markets (Rogoff et al., 2003).
Contrary to a large number of theoretical studies in the literature, relatively few 
studies attem pt to empirically investigate the impact of an exchange rate regime on 
currency crises and macroeconomic performance in developed, emerging and devel­
oping countries, separately. This is perhaps, because such an empirical investigation 
is fraught with difficulties, including the problem concerning the classification of ex­
change arrangement.^
The purpose of this chapter is to empirically investigate the influence of exchange 
rate arrangements on currency crises and economic performance (inflation and eco­
nomic growth) in developed, emerging and developing economies using a data set 
covering some 125 countries for the period 1974-1999 (post Bretton Woods era). To 
this end, we first utilise a least squares dummy variables regression technique to 
investigate whether inflation and growth performance are affected by the choice of a 
particular exchange rate system. We then investigate whether certain exchange rate
^Most of the previous empirical studies in this area have failed to identify a robust relationship 
between the choice of the exchange rate regime and economic growth. However, several authors 
have noted that this could be the result of discrepancies between declared and effective exchange 
rate arrangements, because most studies are based on the IMF’s official exchange rate classification, 
which is based on self-classification by member countries.
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arrangements are more prone to currency crises using a probit model. In addition, 
we investigate which exchange rate arrangements are associated with more foreign 
exchange market pressure, a relationship which is estimated using a least squares 
dummy variables panel data  model.
We define a currency crisis as a period characterised by the presence of intense 
foreign exchange market pressure. The definition is based on a foreign exchange 
market pressure index {MPI ) .  If the value of the M P I  is above a certain threshold, 
we define tha t period as a crisis state; otherwise the period is defined as a tranquil 
state. The definition of currency crises used in this chapter focuses on discrete 
events.
This study addresses the issue of measurement errors in the classification of 
exchange rate regimes by using four different classification schemes. Three de facto 
and one de jure classifications are used. Consequently, the sensitivity of these results 
to alternative exchange rate classifications is also tested.
The principal conclusions emerging from this study are the following: firstly, 
fixed exchange rate arrangements deliver lower infiation particularly in emerging 
and developing countries. This result supports those view arguing tha t the credi­
bility associated with fixed regimes helps policy-makers achieve lower infiation out­
comes. Secondly, our empirical results provide no evidence on a positive association 
between fioating exchange rate regimes and higher economic growth in emerging 
and developing economies. In contrast, the findings imply tha t advanced economies 
with fioating exchange rate regimes may achieve higher economic growth. Thirdly, 
emerging and developing countries adopting fixed exchange rate arrangements ex­
perience lower foreign exchange market pressure and have a lower probability of 
currency crises.
The remainder of this chapter is organised in the following way: Section 3.2 
presents a brief literature review focusing on exchange arrangement classifications 
and on the link between exchange rate regimes and currency crises and macroeco­
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nomic performance. Section 3.3 discusses the issues of exchange market pressure 
indicators and currency crises. Section 3.4 describes the empirical framework. A 
preliminary analysis of the data  is presented in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 reports 
empirical findings. Section 3.7 concludes the findings of this chapter.
3.2 Exchange R ate R egim es, Currency Crises, In­
flation and Growth: A  Survey of the Literature
This literature review section is broken down into four sub-sections. The first sub­
section constitutes a brief discussion on the different approaches, considered in this 
study, to exchange rate regime classification is presented. The second sub-section 
presents a review of empirical analyses of exchange arrangements and currency crises. 
The last two sub-sections describe possible linkages between exchange rate regimes 
and economic performance, particularly infiation and growth.
3.2.1 Regime Classification
A common problem in the empirical analysis of exchange rate systems is regime 
classification. The literature identifies two approaches to this problem: the de jure 
classification and the de facto  classification. The former classifies countries by what 
they say they do {de jure). However, countries often act differently to what they 
declare they do. In particular, a self-declared independent fioating regime, in reality, 
often operates a managed peg regime. This phenomenon of operating a disguised peg 
is referred to as “fear of fioating” (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). Classifying countries 
by what they actually do is a de facto  classification. Some authors develop de facto 
classifications using various methods (Poirson, 2002; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenergger, 
2005; Bubula and Otker-Rober, 2002; Bailliu et al., 2001; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; 
Ghosh et al., 1997), but these are fundamentally based on data  on the behaviour of
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nominal exchange rates, international reserves and interest rates.
Some empirical studies simply employ the de facto classification because the de 
jure classification may reach incorrect results,^ particularly about floating regimes. 
On the other hand, some research employs the de jure classification arguing that it 
suffers from less drawbacks than the de facto classification.^
In this chapter we employ a combination of three de facto and one de jure clas­
sifications. Firstly, we use the de facto  classification developed by Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenergger (2005), henceforth known as the “LYS classification”. These authors 
apply a cluster analysis to a data  set with three variables: changes in the nominal 
exchange rate, the volatility of these changes, and the volatility of international re­
serves from all IMF reporting countries in the period 1974-2000. Secondly, the “nat­
ural classification” developed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) is employed. Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2004) reclassified exchange rate regimes based on market determined 
dual and parallel exchange rates, and use official rates only if the exchange rates are 
unified.'^ These authors examine the chronologies of the exchange rate history for 
153 countries in the period 1946-2001. They are able to distinguish among fioat­
ing by high infiation countries (freely falling) from fioating by others. They define 
the category of “freely falling” rates when the 1 2  month rate of infiation exceeds 
40% and when, during these periods of high infiation there is no official announce­
ment of the regime by the authorities.^ In addition, they define hyperfloats as
^This could be the results of measurement error in the classification of exchange rate arrange­
ments.
^The de facto classification has the advantage of being based on observable behaviour, but it 
does not capture the distinction between stable nominal exchange rates resulting from the absence 
of shocks, and stability that stems from policy actions offsetting shocks. More importantly, it 
fails to reflect the commitment of the central bank to intervene in the foreign exchange market. 
Although the de jure classification captures this formal commitment, it falls short of capturing 
policies inconsistent with the commitment, which lead to a collapse or frequent adjustments of the 
parity.
‘‘in case where there are no dual or multiples rates or parallel markets are not active.
®In situations where the currency crisis marks a sudden transition from a fixed or quasi-fixed 
regime to a managed or independently floating regime, they label an exchange rate as freely falling 
during the six months immediately following a currency crisis.
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those episodes of macroeconomic instability tha t are characterised by hyperinflation 
where the monthly inflation rate is 50% or more. Thirdly, an alternative classifi­
cation scheme developed by Bailliu et al. (2001) is used. These authors develop a 
Hybrid Mechanical Rule (HMR) classification. This system classifies exchange rate 
regimes in terms of their observed flexibility and takes into account external shocks 
and revaluations. Their analysis is based on a sample of 60 countries for the period 
1973-1998. Finally, the de jure classification from the IMF is used.®
In our analysis all the different classifications are grouped into three broader 
regimes: fixed, intermediate and fioating exchange rate regimes (see Table 3.1). 
Managed floating is classified under the fioating category because managed, in the 
context of the Reinhart-Rogoff classification, does not necessarily imply active or 
frequent foreign exchange market intervention.
3.2.2 Exchange Rate Arrangements and Currency Crises
Earlier contributions to the theoretical literature on currency crises pointed almost 
exclusively to deteriorating economic fundamentals as the trigger for currency crises. 
However, few studies have made an attem pt to investigate empirically whether a 
particular exchange rate regime is more prone to a currency crisis. Some empirical 
research suggests tha t currency crises are more likely to occur under fixed or inter­
mediate exchange regimes. However, a study developed by the IMF (1997), based 
on the IM F’s de jure classifications, finds tha t close to half of the currency crashes 
(sharp changes in the exchange rate) occur under fioating regimes, implying tha t 
crises can arise under both pegged and fioating regimes.^ Similarly, Ghosh et al. 
(2 0 0 2 ) find that de jure pegged regimes have the lowest probability of a currency
®The data on the de jure classification of exchange rate regimes is taken from Ghosh et al. 
(2002).
^An important observation is that many exchange rate regimes are improperly classified as 
flexible when they are in fact, pegged regimes.
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Table 3.1: Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes
F ixed In term ed iate F loating
De facto  Classification by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenergger
(1) Fixed (2) Crawling peg
(3) Dirty floats
(4) Float
De facto  Classification by Reinhart and Rogoff
(1) No separate legal tender
(2) Pre-announced peg or cur­
rency board arrangement
(3) Pre-announced horizontal 
band that is narrower than or 
equal to ±2%
(4) De facto  peg
(5) Pre-announced crawling peg
(6) Pre-announced crawling 
band that is narrower than or 
equal to ±2%
(7) De facto  crawling peg
(8) De facto  crawling band 
that is narrower than or equal 
to ±2%
(9) Pre-announced crawling 
band that is wide than or equal 
± 2%
(10) De facto  crawling band 
that is narrower than or equal 
to ±5%
(11) Moving band that is nar­
rower than or equal to ±2%
(12) Managed floating
(13) Freely floating
(14) Freely failing
(15) Hyperfloating
De facto  classification by Bailliu, Lafrance and Perrault
(1) Currency boards
(2) Single currency pegs
(3) Basket pegs
(4) Crawling pegs with narrow 
bands
(5) Flexibility index <  1 (6) Flexibility index >  1
De jure  Classification by Ghosh, Guide and Wolf
(1) Pegged regimes (2) Intermediate regimes (3) Floating regimes
Note: Inconclusive classifications from Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenergger are not considered in our analysis.
Sources: Bailliu et al. (2001, 2002); Ghosh et al. (2002); Reinhart and Rogoff (2004); and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzen­
ergger (2005).
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crisis.® Likewise, Falcetti and Tudela (2006) show that currency crises in develop­
ing and emerging markets are less frequent under de jure fixed exchange rates than 
under de jure flexible regimes in the period 1970-1997. On the other hand, Rogoff 
et al. (2003) find tha t currency crises tend to occur more frequently in de facto 
intermediate regimes especially in emerging markets. Similar conclusions are drawn 
by Peltonen (2006) who finds, using the de facto classification from Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004), tha t emerging markets with more rigid exchange rate regimes were 
less prone to currency crises during the last two decades. Empirical case studies 
conducted by Jakubiak (2001) demonstrate that a floating exchange rate regime 
does not guarantee an emerging country avoiding a currency crisis. Haile and Pozo 
(2006), using the IM F’s de jure and the LYS de facto classifications analyse the 
incidence of currency crises in emerging markets according to the exchange regime 
in place between 1974 and 1998. Their results suggest tha t the de facto  exchange 
regime plays no role in determining currency crisis period. As a consequence, fixed 
exchange regimes tha t are not truly fixed appear to invite speculation against the 
currency, increasing the likelihood of currency crisis.
On the contrary, Bubula and Otker-Rober (2003), using their own de facto clas­
sification,® find tha t pegged regimes, as a whole, are more prone to currency crises 
compared with fioating regimes, particularly for developed and emerging market 
economies tha t are integrated with international capital markets, in the period 1990- 
2001.10
3.2.3 Exchange Rate Regimes and Inflation
Theoretical and empirical literature on exchange rate arrangements and inflation 
suggests that countries using fixed exchange rate regimes and consistent macro poli-
^However, the impact of a currency crisis is more severe under pegged and intermediate regimes 
than under floating regimes.
®For details on this classification, see Bubula and Otker-Rober (2002).
‘°They define currency crises as episodes of severe market pressures, reflected by sharp move­
ments in both exchange rates and interest rates.
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cies tend to have lower and more stable rates of inflation. The explanation for this is 
simply tha t a fixed exchange rate provides a credible nominal anchor for monetary 
policy^^ and for the evolution of the price level. Fixed rates also provide a visi­
ble commitment, thereby raising the political costs of excessive monetary growth. 
A credible peg is likely to engender a more robust demand for money, which re­
duces the inflationary consequences of a given monetary expansion. In this order, 
the empirical work of Ghosh et al. (1997) shows tha t inflation under fixed exchange 
rate regimes is significantly lower than under intermediate or freely floating arrange­
ments. Similarly, Ghosh et al. (2002) find a positive association between the degree 
of nominal exchange rate regime flexibility and inflation even after controlling the 
effects of money growth.
On the other hand, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) investigate the impact 
of exchange rate regimes on inflation, nominal money growth, real interest rates, 
and GDP growth. These authors show that, for non-industrial economies, “long” 
(lasting five or more years) pegs are associated with lower inflation than floats, but 
at the cost of slower growth.
Rogoff et al. (2003) re-examine the link between exchange rate regimes and 
economic performance across four dimensions: inflation, output growth, growth 
volatility, and the incidence of crises. Their results suggest that, for countries at 
a relatively early stage of financial development and integration, fixed or relatively 
rigid regimes appear to offer some anti-inflation credibility gain without compro­
mising growth objectives. On the contrary, for developed countries tha t are not in 
a currency union, relatively flexible exchange rate regimes appear to offer higher 
growth without any cost in credibility. In the same way, Husain et al. (2005), using
iiQne advantage of fixing the exchange rate in terms of a particular major currency like the 
dollar is the provision of a nominal anchor to prevent inflationary monetary policies. This means 
that over time domestic price and inflation levels will converge with the foreign country. In many 
developing countries, fixed exchange rates have provided a nominal anchor for so long because 
domestic anchors can not be achieved due to a lack of institutional development, experience and 
stability. They rely on the fixed exchange rate for its clarity and understanding as well as viewing 
it as a sign of commitment from policymakers.
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the de facto classification from Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), find tha t for developing 
countries with little exposure to international capital markets, pegs are notable for 
their durability and relatively low inflation.
3.2.4 Exchange R ate Regimes and Economic Growth
Contrary to the attention paid on the effects of exchange regimes on inflation in 
theoretical and empirical literature, only a few studies have attem pted to investigate 
the consequences of exchange arrangements on economic growth. Yet, some studies 
suggest tha t the exchange rate arrangement may m atter for growth either directly 
through its effects on the adjustment to shocks and/or indirectly via its impact on 
other im portant determinants of growth, such as investment, international trade, 
capital flows and financial sector development. However, it is not clear what type of 
arrangement would be more likely to promote economic growth. For instance, Ghosh 
et al. (1997) find no systematic differences in growth rates or output volatility across 
exchange rate regimes in a sample of 136 countries over period the 1960-1990, though 
growth tends to be more variable under fixed exchange rate regimes. According 
to these authors countries operating under fixed rates invest more and are more 
openly, while countries under flexible rates enjoy faster residual productivity growth. 
Similarly, Ghosh et al. (2002) did not find evidence of a strong link between exchange 
rate regimes and economic growth, especially after controlling the country-specific 
effects possible from a simultaneity bias.
These results contrast with the work developed by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2003b), who use their own de facto  classification of regimes to study the relationship 
between exchange rate regimes and economic growth for a sample of 183 countries in 
the post-Bretton Woods’ period. They find that, for developing countries (including 
emerging markets), less flexible exchange rate regimes are associated with slower 
growth, as well as with greater output volatility. For industrial countries, regimes 
do not appear to have any significant impact on growth.
Exchange Arrangements, Currency Crises and Macroeconomic Performance 48
Likewise, Larram and Parro (2003), using an earlier version of the de facto clas­
sification from Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenergger (2005), find that, for non-industrial 
countries the floating exchange rate regime leads to a higher per capita growth rate 
and smaller growth volatility than other exchange rate regimes. Their analysis is 
based on 147 countries during the period 1975-2000.
Bailliu et al. (2001) estimate the impact of the type of exchange rate regime on 
growth using a panel data  set of 25 emerging market economies for the period 1973- 
1998, in a framework tha t controls other determinants of growth, while accounting 
for country-specific effects and for the presence of global shocks. Using their own 
exchange rate classification, they find evidence tha t more flexible exchange rate 
arrangements are associated with higher economic growth, but only for countries 
tha t are relatively open to international capital flows and, to a lesser extent, tha t 
have well developed financial markets.
Bailliu et al. (2002) expand their previous study to include industrialised as well 
as developing countries, using a dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
model. They estimate the impact of exchange rate arrangements on growth in 
a panel data  set of 60 countries for the period 1973-1998, finding evidence that 
exchange rate regimes characterised by a monetary policy anchor, whether they are 
pegged, intermediate, or flexible, exert a positive influence on economic growth. 
They also find evidence tha t intermediate/ flexible regimes without an anchor are 
detrimental to growth. Their results thus suggest that it is a presence of a strong 
monetary policy framework, rather than the type of exchange rate regime per se, 
th a t is im portant for economic growth.
On the other hand. Dub as et al. (2005), using their effective exchange rate clas­
sification, find tha t higher growth is associated with fixed exchange rate regimes. 
Their results suggest tha t growth in industrial country is not significantly related 
to the exchange rate regime. In contrast, Husain et al. (2005), using the natural
Authors call monetary policy anchor for intermediate and flexible exchange rate regimes when 
there is information on the objectives of monetary policy.
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classification from Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), suggest tha t floating regimes appear 
to be associated with higher growth in advanced economies.
The next section presents the exchange market pressure indicator {MPI )  and 
the currency crisis definition used to evaluate the influences of exchange rate regimes 
on the probability of currency crises.
3.3 The Exchange M arket Pressure Indicator and 
Currency Crisis Periods
In any empirical analysis of currency crises the first issue is to define the nature of 
a crisis. A currency crisis can be understood as a sudden decline in the confidence |I
to an individual currency usually leading to a speculative attack against it. Since, ;
in a currency crisis situation, a speculative attack may lead to sharp currency de- '
predation, an increase of interest rates and/or a substantial reserve loss, the most '
straightforward approach is to employ an index of speculative pressure.^® This tech­
nique is common in the empirical literature on currency crises. The exchange market 
pressure indicator was originally developed by Girton and Roper (1977) to describe 
the composite behaviour of nominal exchange rates and international reserves, and 
later modified by Eichengreen et al. (1996). In the interest of measuring currency 
crises Eichengreen et al. (1996) add a third term: changes in the nominal interest 
rate. The idea behind this is th a t an excess demand for foreign exchange can be met 
through several channels. Depreciation or devaluation occurs if the speculative a t­
tack is successful, but monetary authorities may instead accommodate the pressure 
by running down their international reserves or deter the attack by raising interest ;
rates. This methodology, which identifies currency crises using an exchange market
theoretical literature, a currency crisis is mostly defined only in the case of fixed exchange 
rate regimes, usually as the official devaluation or abandonment of the fixed exchange rate regime. 
However, this definition is not flexible enough to serve a use in empirical research, since many 
currencies are not formally pegged to a specific currency and many countries use various forms of 
fioating exchange rate regimes.
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pressure indicator, has been followed, in principle, by Sachs et al. (1996); Kaminsky 
et al. (1998); Tudela (2004); Peltonen (2006); Haile and Pozo (2006); Falcetti and 
Tudela (2006), among others.
In this chapter, the exchange Market Pressure Indicator {MPI )  is calculated 
as the weighted average of percentage changes in the exchange rate (e), percentage 
changes in the interest rate (%), and percentage changes in international reserves 
(r),^'^ using the United States as the country of reference.^® The exchange market 
pressure index is defined as follows:
M P I  = a% Ae  +  P% Ai -  y% A r  (3.1)
where e represents the price of US$1 in domestic currency, i the interest rate, and r 
international reserves. Since the volatilities of foreign reserves, exchange rates and 
interest rates are very different, the weights a, (3 and 7 , attached to each component 
are used to equalise the volatilities of each of the three M P I  components, thereby 
preventing any one of them from dominating the index, and are defined as the inverse 
of the standard deviation of each of the individual series. Formally:
T  T T tDsV'i= —
StDeve S tD evi SiD evr
where j  stands for any of the three variables and StD ev  stands for the standard 
deviation. According to equation 3.1, if a country has a fixed exchange rate regime, 
a speculative attack may lead to sharp currency devaluation, an increase of interest 
rates and/or a substantial foreign reserve loss. Contrary, if a country has a flexible 
exchange rate regime, a speculative attack may lead to sharp currency depreciation, 
and then to an increase of interest rates and/or a substantial international reserve 
loss, but only if monetary authorities want to deter the attack.
A decrease rather than increase in international reserves is used, since an increase in speculative 
pressure tends to increase the exchange rate and the interest rate, but tends to reduce foreign 
reserves.
‘^Variables in logarithms.
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A crisis period is defined to occur when the value of the M P I  exceeds an arbitrary 
threshold.^® Following Eichengreen et al. (1996) we define crisis periods as M P I  
values tha t are greater than 1.5 standard deviation over the mean of the series. 
Formally:
, f 1 if M P I  > ^iMPi +  I-Sctmp/C risis  =  < (3.2)I 0  otherwise
where ^mpi and <jmpi denote the mean and the standard deviation of the sample 
of the M P I .  Hence, a crisis takes place for an individual country when its M P I  
variable takes an “extreme” positive v a l u e . T h e  total number of crises identified is 
227 (43 in advanced, 52 in emerging and 132 in developing countries) and about 8 8 % 
of the countries experienced at least one currency crisis over the sample period.^® 
The M P I  is a continuous variable, while our currency crisis definition is a discrete 
binary variable. Also, the last definition is sensitive to the threshold used.
3.4 Empirical M ethodology
Two different models are used in our analysis. Firstly, a panel data  model is used 
to estimate the impact of exchange rate regimes on the M P I ,  inflation and eco­
nomic growth. Then, we use a probit model estimating the influence of exchange 
arrangements on the probability of currency crises. We employ both the M P I  and
Unsuccessful speculative attacks are also included in our definition of a currency crisis since 
they point to the vulnerability of the system as seen in a fall in international reserves and a rise 
in interest rates.
‘■^ We use country specific thresholds because the standard deviations are computed within each- 
country and not for the whole sample.
‘^ F^or an analysis of sensitivity to different threshold we use the M P I  greater in value than 1.3, 
1.4, 1.6, 1.7, 2.0, 2.5 and 3.0 standard deviations over the country’s own mean value. The total of 
number of crises according to the conventional criterion of 2.5 or 3.0 standard deviation are very 
small (50 and 25 respectively). Similarly, the total of number of crises when we use high threshold 
(mean plus 1.7 or 2.0 standard deviations) are 164 and 101, respectively. Contrary, when we use 
low threshold (mean plus 1.3 standard deviation) we obtained 295 crises. However, when we use 
the threshold of mean plus 1.4 or 1.6 standard deviation we obtained 256 and 195 crises, these 
results are closer to those obtained when we use 1.5 standard deviation.
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the binary currency crisis measure because a continuous M P I  variable generally 
contains more information than a discrete crisis dummy since this measure captures 
pressures which reflect the idiosyncrasy of the countries.
3.4.1 Panel D ata
The model used is a static panel data  through Least Squares Dummy Variables 
(LSDV). The following equation describes the general specification used:
Vit — 3Cit/3 +  Diai +  Eit (3.3)
where î =  1,2 N , t = 1 ,2....T, is the dependent variable in country i and time
t, X it is the vector of inputs for the zth variables in the tth  period, Di is a dummy 
variable, is a country specific effect and eh is an error term. We also assume 
Eii ^  iid  (0,<7^).
The country specific effect, is designed to capture the determinants of a 
country’s inflation rate (or growth rate) tha t are not already controlled by the other 
explanatory variables. It thus accounts for unobservable characteristics that vary 
across countries but not over time. The country specific effect could be either a fixed 
effect (i.e., a constant tha t varies for each cross-sectional unit), or a random effect 
(i.e., a random variable drawn from a common distribution with a mean o: and a 
variance We use a Hausman test to decide whether it is more appropriate to
model the country effects as being fixed or random.^®
We employ a panel data estimating method to determine the impact of the ex­
change arrangement on exchange market pressure, and macroeconomic performance 
(inflation and growth). The dependent variables are M P I ,  inflation scaled, which is 
a measure robust to hyperinflationary outlier countries, and GDP per capita growth.
‘®See Appendix A .l for details.
^®The null hypothesis of the Hausman test in this context states that there is no correlation 
between country effects and explanatory variables. Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that 
modelling country effects as fixed is more appropriate.
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respectively. To ascertain tha t our results are robust to the regime classifications, 
we employ both de jure and de facto classifications in this study. We also use three 
different de facto classifications.
3.4.2 Probit M odel
The analysis of the relation between exchange arrangements and currency crises 
will be based on the discrete choice model method (probit m o d e l ) . G i v e n  our 
indicators, the model estimates the probability of a currency crisis. The estimated
model takes the form !
!
Prob. {yu = 1 |% , pt) = F  (%#, /?*) (3.4) ;
Iwhere Xt corresponds to our set of indicators and Pt is a vector of unknown para- i
meters. The observed variable yu assumes a value of 0  or 1 depending on whether a :
currency crisis has occurred or not. W ith a probit model, the right hand side of the 
model is constrained between 0  and 1 , and is compared to the observed value yu.
The probit model assumes that the probability distribution function {yu conditional 
on Xu) corresponds to normal distribution. The model with a success probability 
F  {xu,Pt) and independent observations leads to the joint probability.
3.5 The D ata
The sample consists of panel data for 125 countries classified by the World Bank 
according to their income. Advanced countries are those economies classified as 
upper income countries. Emerging markets countries are defined according to the 
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) i n d e x . T h e  rest of the countries
2iSee Appendix A.2 for details.
^^Tlie MSCI index classifies a country into an emerging market in line with a number of factors 
relating to international capital market access.
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are designated as developing. Table 3.2 provides a list of countries classified in each 
group.
Table 3.2: List of Countries
A d v a n c e d
C o u n tr ie s
E m e rg in g
M a r k e t s
D e v e lo p in g
C o u n tr ie s
A ustra lia A rgen tina A lgeria H aiti N igeria
A ustria Brazil A n tig u a  Sc B arbuda H onduras P anam a
Belgium Chile Benin Ivory C oast P araguay
C anada B olivia Jam aica R om ania
C yprus Colom bia B otsw ana K azakhstan Saudi A rab ia
D enm ark Czech R epublic B urk in a  Faso Kenya Senegal
F in land E gypt B urund i K yrgyz Rep. Slovak Rep.
France H ungary C am eroon Lao Dem. Rep. Sri Lanka
G erm any Ind ia C had L atv ia S t. Lucia
Indonesia Congo, Rep. Lebanon S t. K ilt Sc Nevis
Iceland Israel C o s ta  R ica Lesotho S t. V icent Sc G renadines
Ireland Jo rd an C ro a tia L iberia Surinam e
Ita ly K orea, Rep. D om inica Libya T anzan ia
Jap an M alaysia D om inican Rep. L ithuan ia Togo
K uw ait M exico E cuador M acedonia T unisia
Luxem bourg M orocco El S alvador M adagascar U kraine
N etherlands P ak istan E qu a to ria l G uinea M alawi U ruguay
Norway Peru E ston ia M ali Zam bia
P o rtugal Philippines G abon M alta Zimbabwe
Singapore Poland G am bia, T he M auritius
Slovenia Russia G eorgia M oldova
Spain South  A frica G h an a M ongolia
Sweden T ha iland G renada M yanm ar
Sw itzerland Turkey G u atem ala N epal
U nited  Kingdom Venezuela G uinea-B issau N icaragua
U nited  S ta te s G uyana Niger
Mote: Emerging market economies are those that are included in the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) 
index. Advanced economies are those that are classified as upper income economies by the World Bank, with 
the exception of Israel, which is in an emerging market. The remaining countries were designated as developing 
countries.
The data  set is annual, spanning from 1974 through to 1999. D ata availability 
differs across countries. Particularly, the data  for East-European countries which
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starts from the 1990s. As a consequence, our panel data set is unbalanced.
Most of the macroeconomic and financial variables used in our analysis are taken 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the IM F’s World Eco­
nomic Outlook databases. A few series are taken from the CD-ROM version of 
the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistic (IFS). For the 
Market Pressure Index { MPI )  calculations, we employ total non-gold international 
reserves, average period exchange rates and short-term interest rates. Money market 
rates were used for all the countries where available, and t-bill rates, bank lending 
or deposit rates otherwise; in a number of cases, discount rates were used, when no 
other interest rate data were available (see Table 3.3). The central bank turnover 
rate, which is the number of central bank governors per five year period, used as a 
proxy of aversion to inflation, is taken from Chosh et al. (2 0 0 2 ) and the Cukierman- 
Webb central bank database. Average years of schooling of the total population 
aged twenty-five years or older, taken from the Barro-Lee data  set.
The variables used in this analysis and their descriptions are listed in Table 
3.4. These variables were selected on the basis of previous theoretical and empirical 
literature. Covernment balance is defined as current and capital revenue and official 
grants received, less total expenditure and lending minus repayments. This variable 
considers central governments only. Short-term debt is defined as debt tha t has an 
original maturity of one year or less. Available data does not permit a distinction 
between public and private non-guaranteed short-term debt. The ratio of bank 
liquid reserves to bank assets is the ratio of domestic currency holding and deposits 
with the monetary authorities to claims on other governments, nonfinancial public 
enterprises, the private .sector, and other banking institutions. Money and quasi 
money are defined as the sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits other 
than those of the central government, and the time, savings, and foreign currency 
deposits of resident sectors other than the central government. This definition of 
money supply is frequently called M2. Foreign direct investment is the sum of equity
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Table 3.3: Interest Rate Used for the Corresponding Countries
M o n e y  M a r k e t T - b i l l B a n k  L e n d in g B a n k  D e p o s i t D is c o u n t
A rgentina Belgium A ntigua  & B arbuda A lgeria Benin
A ustra lia France D om inica Bolivia Botsw ana
A ustria G uyana B1 Salvador Chile B urk ina Paso
Brazil Jam aica Eq. G uinea D om inican Rep, Burundi
C anada K azakhstan E ston ia Cam eroon
C ro a tia K enya G abon G uatem ala Chad
Czech Rep. K yrgyz Rep. G renada G uinea-B issau C hina
D enm ark Lesotho H onduras H aiti Colom bia
F in land Moldova Israel H ungary Congo, Rep. of
G eorgia R om ania L iberia Iceland C osta  R ica
G erm any S t. K itts  & Nevis M acedonia, FY R Indonesia C yprus
Ireland Nigeria Korea Ecuador
Ita ly Panam a Lao Dem. Rep. E gypt
Jap an Poland Libya G am bia, T he
L atv ia Slovak Rep. L ithuan ia G hana
Luxem bourg Slovenia M adagascar India
M alaysia S t. Lucia Mexico Ivory C oast
M auritius S t. V incent & G reus. M ongolia Jo rdan
N etherlands Surinam e Morocco K uw ait
Norway Sw aziland M yanm ar Lebanon
P ak is tan U kraine N icaragua M alawi
Paraguay U ruguay Saudi A rab ia M ali
Philippines Zam bia Turkey M alta
Russia U ganda N epal
Singapore New Zealand
S ou th  A frica Niger
Spain Peru
Sri Lanka P ortugal
Sweden Senegal
Sw itzerland T anzan ia
T ha iland Togo
T unisia Venezuela
U nited  Kingdom
U nited S ta tes
Zimbabwe
N otes:  Money M arket is th e  ra te  on sho rt-te rm  lending betw een financial in s titu tio n s . T reasury  bill ra te  is th e  ra te  a t  w hich sh o rt­
te rm  securities are issued or tra d ed  in th e  m arket. Lending ra te  is th e  bank ra te  th a t  usually  m eets th e  sho rt- and  m edium -term  
financing needs o f th e  p riva te  sector. T h is  ra te  is norm ally  d iffe ren tia ted  according  to  the  creditw orth iness of borrow ers and  objectives 
of financing. D eposit ra te  usually  refers to  ra tes  offered to  resident custom ers for dem and, tim e or saving deposits. D iscount ra te  
is th e  ra te  a t  which th e  cen tra l banks lend or d iscount elegible p ape r for deposit money banks, typically  shown on an  end-of-period
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Table 3.4: List of Variables Used in the Estimations
V ariable D escrip tion
Gov. Balance C en tra l governm ent balance {% of G D P)
S td eb ra tio S ho rt-te rm  d e b t/T o ta l d eb t (%)
D ebt T o ta l d e b t/G N I {%)
Domfin D om estic financing, to ta l  (% of G D P)
D ebtsx D ebt se rv ic e /E x p o rls  of goods and  services (%)
Bnkres R atio  of bank  liquid reserves to  bank assets (%)
D crep D om estic c red it to  p riva te  sector (% G D P)
M 2gdp M oney and  quasi m oney (% of G D P)
M2ros Money an d  quasi m oney (% Reserves)
R esdebt R eserves/T o ta l d e b t (%)
Resim p R eserves/Im ports  of goods and  services {%)
Fdigni Foreign d irec t investm en t (% of GNI)
C agni C u rren t accoun t balance (% of G D P)
Infla tion T he  consum er price index  (%)
U nem pl U nem ploym ent, to ta l  (% of to ta l  labour force)
U sirate USA sh o rt-te rm  in te re s t ra le  (%)
Reserves In te rn a tio n a l Reserves (US$)
Per ca p ita  G D P P er ca p ita  rea l G D P grow th  (%)
Money B road money grow th  (% per year)
Real G D P Real G D P  grow th  (%)
O penness E x p o rts  plus im ports  of goods and services (% G D P)
CB tu rnover C en tra l B ank tu rnove r ra te  (per 5 years)
T T  grow th Term s o f tra d e  grow th  (%)
Invest, ratio  
Schooling
G ross fixed investm ent (% of G D P)
Average num ber of years of schooling of to ta l popu la tion  age 
25 an d  o lder (p er 5 years)
Tax ra tio G eneral governm ent revenue (% of G D P)
In itia l G D P Averages of p e r c a p ita  G D P  over each five-year period
Pop. size P opu la tion  size (logarithm )
Pop. grow th P o pu la tion  grow th  (%)
F loating D um m y variable  ca p tu rin g  float exchange ra te  regimes
In te rm ed ia te D um m y variab le  ca p tu rin g  in term ed ia te  arrangem ents
Notes: The table does not include the dependent variables, which are explained in the text. Variables expressed in 
US dollars were converted to the natural logarithmic scale for the purpose of estimation.
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capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as 
shown in the balance of payments. Current account balance is the sum of the credits 
less the debits arising from international transactions in goods, service, income, and 
current transfers. Unemployment refers to the share of the labour force tha t is 
without work but available for and seeking employment. International reserves are 
the sum of a country’s monetary authorities holdings of special drawing rights, its 
reserve position in the IMF, its holdings of foreign exchange, and its holdings of 
gold. Variables expressed in US dollar were converted to the natural logarithmic 
scale. The rest of variables were expressed in percentage. In addition, variables 
such as population size were expressed as natural logarithmic. Finally, floating 
and intermediate exchange rate regimes are identified with a dummy variable that 
received the value of one in which these regimes prevail in a country in a particular 
year.
3.6 E stim ation R esults
This section presents the results of regressions for the Least Squares Dummy Vari­
ables (LSDV) and probit models. The LSDV models estimated are an unbalanced 
panel with robust standard errors. In the estimating of inflation, following Ghosh 
et al. (1997), we transform the inflation rate by calculating a scaled measure, , 
to avoid the bias caused by some cases of very high inflation without deleting them 
from the sample.
In fla tio n .  To examine the relationship between exchange rate arrangements and 
inflation we regress the scaled inflation (henceforth inflation) on two exchange rate 
system dummies for floating and intermediate rate regimes. The dummy takes the 
value one if a floating or intermediate exchange rate regime prevails in a country in a 
particular year; otherwise, it is assigned a value of zero. Fixed exchange rate regimes 
are the excluded category. Hence, the coefficients on floating and intermediate
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regimes should be interpreted as the inflation differential relative to a fixed exchange 
rate arrangement. The independent variables are broad money growth, real per 
capita GDP growth, trade openness, central bank governor turnover rate, terms of 
trade growth and government balance. Faster money growth is associated with high 
inflation (by raising money supply), while higher real GDP growth should reduce 
inflation (by increasing money demand). Similarly, we expect a negative sign in 
the trade openness coefficient because greater trade openness increases the cost of a 
monetary expansion, which should imply lower inflation in more open economies.
The central bank governor turnover rate is a proxy for central bank indepen­
d e n c e . A higher turnover rate of the central bank governor should be associated 
with higher inflation. Also, we include terms of trade growth because it contributes 
to aggregate demand pressures. The government balance (fiscal balance) is closely 
related to inflation. If the government balance is negative (fiscal deficit), the need 
to finance this fiscal deficit can lead to an excessive growth in money supply, which 
causes inflation.
As shown by Table 3.5 the null hypothesis of the Hausman test (no correlation 
between the country effects and the explanatory variables) is rejected at a 5% level 
in most cases and at a 10% level in emerging countries with the LYS de facto 
classification. As a consequence, we use the fixed effects model except in emerging 
countries with the HMR de facto schemes, because the Hausman specification test 
suggests that it is more appropriate to model the country effects as random rather 
than fixed in this case.
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 report the impact of exchange arrangements on inflation in
^ I^f a country opens up to trade, the incentive to inflate diminishes because if the price index that 
monetary authorities seek to stabilise includes foreign goods, real currency depreciation exacerbates 
the inflation cost of a monetary expansion. Romer (1993) tests the proposition that more open 
economies have lower inflation rates. He finds that more open countries indeed appear to have 
lower inflation, and generally finds this conclusion to be quite robust.
According to the literature on policy credibility, an independent central bank can help solve 
the time-inconsistency problem. Hence, if central banks are less independent, governors can be 
fired more easily (Cukierman et al., 1992).
Exchange Arrangements, Currency Crises and Macroeconomic Performance 60
Table 3.5: Inflation Data: Hausman Specification Test
C ln s s if lc a tlo n A ll C o u n tr ie s A d v a n c e d E m e rg in g D e v e lo p in g
N atu ra l =  64.52(0.0000) X ^ ( 8 )  =  83.79(0.0000) X ^ ^ ( 8 )  =  17,41(0.0261) X ® ( 8 )  =  66.42(0.0000)
LYS X * ( 8 )  =  71.43(0.0000) X ^ ( 8 )  =  185.33(0.0000) X'^(8) =  15.45(0.0509) X ^ ( 8 )  =  145.11(0.0000)
HMR X ^ ( 8 )  =  44.70(0.0000) X ^ { 8 )  =  61.16(0.0000) x “ (8) =  11.29(0.1861) X ® ( 8 )  = 42 .98 (0 .0000 )
Dc Ju re X ® ( 8 )  =  29.41(0.0003) X ^ ( 8 )  =  210.91(0.0000) X ^ ( 8 )  =  17.54(0.0250) x “ {8) =  102.17(0.0000)
S ource: A u th o r’s calculations.
all and advanced economies, and in emerging and developing countries, respectively. 
As indicated by the adjusted R^, the model explains between 75 and 87 per cent 
of the variation in inflation rates in our sample. In addition, Table 3.8 shows a 
summary of the main coefficients and their economic interpretation.
The sign of the coefficients on the explanatory variables are generally statistically 
significant and consistent with theory. Money growth shows a positive sign in all 
estimations (not always statistically significant). While real GDP growth shows a 
negative sign, as expected. Similarly, the openness variable shows a negative sign, 
so that a more open economy has less i n f l a t i o n . T h e  central bank turnover rate 
shows a positive association with inflation in almost all samples. However, when we 
estimate the inflation equation in advanced economies this variable shows a negative 
and statistically significant relation with inflation (except in the LYS scheme but it 
is statistically insignificant). This negative relation may capture the fact tha t these 
countries are more developed institutionally. Conversely, the central bank turnover 
rate shows a positive association with inflation in emerging and developing countries. 
Terms of trade growth show a negative sign in all, advanced and developing countries, 
but it shows a positive sign in emerging economies (not statistically significant). 
Finally, the government balance (fiscal balance) displays a negative sign in most of
These results are interesting because openness is a traditional variable of the Optimal Currency 
Area (OCA) theory. An increase in trade openness makes a country more likely to adopt a fixed 
regime as opposed to an intermediate or floating regime.
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Table 3.6: 
Economies
The Impact of Exchange Rate Regimes on Inflation in All and Advanced
All A dvanced
N atu ra l LYS H M R De Ju re N atu ra l LYS HMR De Ju re
C o n s tan t 0.181 0.148 0.173 0.195 0.152 0.139 0.153 0.149
(8.752)-» (7.917)* (12.921)* (9.617)* (7.610)* (8.006)* (7.648)* (7.969)*
Money 7.14e“ °® 7.07e~°® 0.037 7.78e“ °° 0.141 0.064 0.140 0.132
(1.159) (1.400) (4.762)** (1.317) (3.157)* (2.258)** (3.063)* (3.183)*
R eal G D P -0.506 -0.353 -0.412 -0.523 -0.126 -0.153 -0.216 -0.141
(-4.026)-» (-3.609)* (-3.012)* (-3.752)* (-1.298) (-1.654)*** (-1.909)** (-1.528)
O penness -0.126 -0.096 -0.117 -0.122 -0.176 -0.169 -0.185 -0.181
(-6.693)-» (-5.003)* (-7.387)* (-6.269)* (-7.404)* (-7.387)* (-7.338)* (-7.589)*
CB tu rnover 0.095 0.122 0.020 0.102 -0.511 0.016 -0.055 -0.047
(7.233)* (7.116)* (1.301) (6.693)* (-4.267)* (1.069) (-4.128)* (-3.741)*
T T  grow th -0.002 0.015 -0.042 -0.006 -0.106 -0.081 -0.100 -0.105
(-0.133) (0.755) (-1.482) (-0.294) (-2.747)* (-2.079)** (-2.721)* (-2.518)**
G ov. balance -0,036 -0.095 -0.059 -0.125 -0.044 0.010 -0.043 -0.041
(-0.442) (-1.119) (-0.800) (-1.546) (-0.871) (0.203) (-0.783) (-0.855)
F loating 0.103 0.036 0.035 0.022 -0.001 0.005 0.003 -0.014
(9.623)* (5.899)* (2.580)* (1.517) (-0.128) (0.919) (0.510) (-2.332)**
In te rm ed ia te 0.004 0.085 0.024 0.027 0.001 0.0136 0.010 0.023
(0.496) (7.559)* (2.862)** (2.353)** (0.126) (1.914)*** (2.309)** (4.079)*
O bservations 1806 1442 1147 1778 562 445 486 562
F -te s t prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj. R-sq 0.77 0.78 0.83 0.75 0.82 0.87 0.82 0.82
N otes: T he  tab le  repo rts  th e  least squares dum m y variables resu lts  of unbalanced  panels w ith  fixed effects. D ependent variable is 
inflation . T he  s tan d a rd  errors of the  es tim ates  are ro b u s t to  cross contem poraneous correlation , (-s ta tis tic s  are  displayed in brackets. 
(*) deno te significance a t  th e  1 per cen t level, {**) a t  th e  6 per cen t and  (***) a t  th e  10 per cent level.
S ou rce: A u th o r’s estim ates.
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Table 3.7: 
Developing
The Impact of 
Countries
Exchange Rate Regimes on Inflation in Emerging and
Em erging Developing
N atu ra l LYS HM R De Ju re N atu ra l LYS HM R De Ju re
C o tistan l 0.155 0.1131 0.201 0.178 0.233 0.183 0.063 0.222
(7.178)* (5.203)* (4.877)* (7.394)* (5.546)* (4.724)* (2.890)* (6.871)*
M oney 4.22e~°'* 3.93e~°® 0.031 4 .75e“ °® 0.015 0.01 0.269 0.015
(1.157) (1.021) (5.138)* (1.068) (2.853)* (4.171)* (7.977)* (3.326)*
R eal G D P -0.471 -0.391 -0.636 -0.506 -0.539 -0.272 -0.379 -0.571
(-3.06)* (-2.450)** (-3.096)* (-2.373)** (-3.227)* (-2,024)** (-2.447)** (-3.457)*
O penness -0.109 -0.052 -0.125 -0.109 -0.101 -0.091 0.035 -0.089
(-3.633)* (-1.963)** * (-4.185)* (-4.716)* (-4.094)* (-3.048)* (1.073) (-4.147)*
CD tu rnover 0.138 0.174 0.083 0.182 0.079 0.099 0.031 0.092
(4.549)* (6.155)* (3.707)* (5.528)* (3.951)* (4.105)* (1.828)*** (4.369)*
T T  grow th 0.048 0.053 -0.033 0.033 -0.027 -0.003 -0.081 -0.023
(1.273) (1.037) (-0.581) (0.709) (-1.359) (-0.166) (-2.887)* (-1.065)
Gov. balance -0.119 -0.200 -0.025 -0.374 0.124 -0.079 0.055 -0.009
(-0.883) (-1.059) (-0.141) (-2.511)** (1.135) (-0.636) (0.297) (-0.080)
F loating 0.165 0.0338 0.131 0.042 0.082 0.042 0.007 0,029
(8.316)* (2.084)** (4.189)* (0.987) (4.156)* (3.120)* (0.089) (2.602)*
In te rm ed ia te 0.019 0.119 0.036 0.035 -0.038 0.081 0.010 0.013
(1.076) (5.664)* (2.183)** (2.007)** (-1.634) (4.636)* (1.034) (0.667)
O bservations 513 408 357 489 731 589 304 727
F -te s t prob. 0,000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj. R-sq 0.81 0.79 0.80 0.78 0.81 0.79 0.85 0.78
N o te s ' T he  tab le  repo rts  the  least squares dum m y variab les resu lts  of unbalanced  panels w ith  fixed effects. D ependent variab le is 
inflation . T he  s tan d a rd  errors of the es tim ates  are  ro b u s t to  cross contem poraneous correlation , t-s ta tis tic s  are displayed in brackets. 
(*) denote significance a t  th e  1 per cent level, {**) a t  the  5 per cent and  (***) a t the 10 per cen t level.
.Source: A u th o r 's  estim ates.
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Table 3.8: The Impact of Exchange Rate Regimes on Inflation: Main Coefficients
All A dvanced
N atu ra l LYS HM R De Ju re N atu ra l LYS HM R De Ju re
F loating 0.103 0.036 0.035 0.022 -0.001 0.006 0.003 -0.014
(9.623)* (5.899)* (2.580)* (1.517) (-0.128) (0.919) (0.510) (-2.332)**
In te rm ed ia te 0.004 0.085 0.024 0.027 0.001 0.0136 0.010 0.023
(0.496) (7.559)* (2.862)** (2.353)** (0.126) (1.914)*** (2.309)** (4.079)*
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Em erging D eveloping
N atu ra l LYS HM R De Ju re N atu ra l LYS H M R De Ju re
F loating 0.165 0.0338 0.131 0.042 0.082 0.042 0.007 0.029
(8.316)* (2.084)** (4.189)* (0.987) (4.156)* (3.120)* (0.089) (2.602)*
In te rm ed ia te 0.019 0.119 0.036 0.035 -0.038 0.081 0.010 0.013
(1.076) (5.664)* (2.183)** (2.007)** (-1.634) (4.636)* (1.034) (0.667)
P-V alue 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N otes:  T he  tab le  repo rts  the least squares dum m y variab les resu lts  of unbalanced panels w ith  fixed effects. D ependent variab le is 
inflation . T he s tan d a rd  errors of the  estim ates are ro b u st to  cross contem poraneous correlation , t-s ta tis tic s  are displayed in brackets. 
(*) deno te significance a t  the  1 per cent level, (**) a t  th e  5 p e r cen t an d  (***) a t th e  10 per cent level,
S u m m a v y :  F ixed exchange ra te  regimes are associa ted  w ith  lower inflation  ra tes  p articu larly  in  em erging and  developing countries. 
D eveloping countries using de ju r e  floa ting  exchange ra te  regim es show a inflation  ra te  of 2.9% bigger th a n  developing countries 
using  de ju r e  fixed regimes.
Source:  A u th o r’s estim ates.
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cases, but usually this variable is not statistically significant. In general, these results 
suggest tha t higher real GDP growth and trade openness reduces inflation, while 
faster money growth and central bank governor turnover rates increase inflation, as 
expected.
On the other hand, when the impact on inflation of our main variable of interest 
is analysed it is found tha t there are positive and significant associations between 
inflation and floating and intermediate exchange regimes in most classifications. In 
other words, fixed exchange regimes are associated with lower inflation rates, in con­
trast to floating and intermediate regimes. Particularly, in emerging and developing 
countries the de facto floating regimes, from natural classification, show an inflation 
rate of 16.5% and 8.2% bigger than under fixed regimes, respectively. Interestingly, 
in contrast to the results for the world, emerging and developing samples, fixed 
regimes are associated with higher inflation in advanced economies when we use the 
de jure classification.^® De jure floating in advanced economies is associated with 
inflation rates tha t are 1.4% lower than under fixed regimes, while intermediate 
regimes are associated with higher inflation relative to fixed regimes (about 2.3%).
In addition, our results on intermediate regimes show tha t the inflation rate is 
higher in advanced countries using intermediate regimes compared to those advanced 
economies using fixed and floating regimes. Conversely, the effects of intermediate 
regimes on inflation are weaker than the effects of floating regimes in emerging 
countries. In developing countries, intermediate arrangements display a lower impact 
on inflation than fixed and floating regimes but the coefficient is not significant. In 
Table 3.9 the performance of exchange rate regimes on inflation is reported. In most 
cases, inflation is lower if the regime is fixed.
Comparing our results for developing countries to earlier studies by Ghosh et al. 
(1997, 2002), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) and Husain et al. (2005), we 
notice they are largely similar. Ghosh et al. (1997, 2002) find that, in the relatively
Similarly, the natural classification shows a positive association between fixed regimes and 
inflation in advanced economies, but its coefficient is too low and not significant.
Exchange Arrangements, Currency Crises and Macroeconomic Performance 65
Table 3.9: Exchange Arrangements Performance on Inflation
Natural LYS HMR De Jure
A ll C ountries
Ranking from the 
best to the worst
Fixed
Intermediate*
Fixed
Floating
Fixed
Intermediate
Fixed
Floating*
performance Floating Intermediate 
Advanced Econom ies
Floating Intermediate
Floating*
Fixed
Fixed
Floating*
Fixed
Floating*
Floating
Fixed
Intermediate* Intermediate 
Emerging Econom ies
Intermediate Intermediate
Fixed
Intermediate*
Fixed
Floating
Fixed
Intermediate
Fixed
Intermediate
Floating Intermediate 
Developing C ountries
Floating Floating*
Intermediate*
Fixed
Fixed
Floating
Fixed
Floating*
Fixed
Intermediate
Floating Intermediate Intermediate* Floating
Note: (*) insignificant variables. 
Source: Author’s calculations.
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low income per capita developing countries (based on the World Bank classifica­
tion), inflation under a fixed exchange arrangement is significantly lower than under 
intermediate or floating exchange rate regimes in the period 1970-1999. Similarly, 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) find th a t fixed exchange rates are associated 
with lower inflation than floating or intermediate exchange rates in non-industrial 
countries (both emerging markets and developing countries), but, in contrast with 
Ghosh et al. (1997, 2002), floating arrangements are associated with lower infla­
tion than intermediate ones (see Table 3.10). The results obtained by Husain et al. 
(2005) suggest that developing countries appear to benefit from fixed exchange rates 
because they deliver a lower inflation than floating or intermediate regimes. When 
we use the de jure classification, our results are similar to Ghosh et al. (1997, 2 0 0 2 ) 
and Husain et al. (2005), while our results using the LYS and HMR classifications 
are similar to Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001).^^
Table 3.10: Inflation and Exchange Arrangements in Developing Countries
Gosh e t al. Levy-Yeyati H usain et O ur results
(2002) & al. (2005)
Sturzenegger
(2001)
HM R
1970-1999 1974-1999 1970-1999 1974-1999 1974-1999 1974-1999 1974-1999
O bservations 967 629 1401 731 689 304 727
M ethod Pool Pool Pool LSDV LSDV LSDV LSDV
R anking Fixed Fixed Fixed In term edia te* Fixed Fixed Fixed
In te rm ed ia te F loating In te rm ed ia te* Fixed F loating F loating* In term edia te*
F loating In te rm ed ia te F loating Floating In term edia te In term edia te* F loating
N o te : T he  resu lts  by H usain  e t al. (2006) a re  based on th e ir  es tim ate  w ith  coun try  fixed effects. (*) insignificant variables. 
S ou rce : G osh e t. a l (2002), Levy-yeyati and  S turzenegger (2001), H usain  e t al. (2005) and  A u th o r’s ca lcu la tions.
In summary, our results provide some support for the role of fixed exchange rate
^^Our model was also applied to non-industrial countries (both emerging and developing) and 
the results are similar to those of developing countries. These results are available upon request.
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regimes as credibility enhancing stabilisation devices particularly in emerging and 
developing economies. The inflation results are quite robust to different exchange 
rate classifications.
E co n o m ic  G row th. In this section, we explore how per capita output growth 
varies across exchange rate regimes in our sample, using the percentage change in 
real per capita GDP as the dependent variable and two dummies for floating and 
intermediate regimes. Like in the inflation specifications we have dropped fixed 
arrangements from the equation. The rest of the independent variables are in­
vestment ratio, trade openness, terms of trade growth, average years of schooling, 
general government revenue, government balance, initial GDP, population growth 
and population size. The expected sign for the investment ratio is positive, since 
capital accumulation is expected to lead to higher real per capita GDP growth. The 
literature on endogenous growth has established a positive link between openness to 
international trade and economic growth. Countries tha t are more open to interna­
tional trade tend to grow more rapidly because they have developed a greater ability 
to absorb technical knowledge and can take advantage of larger markets (Barro and 
Sala-i Martin, 1995). On the other hand, the effects of terms trade development 
on economic growth is expected to be positive. We also use the average years of 
schooling in the population 25 years of age and over as a proxy for the stock of 
human capital. According to growth theory, whether neo-classical or endogenous, it 
predicts that the coefficient on the stock of human capital should be positive, since 
countries tha t have more human capital tend to grow faster.
The initial per capita GDP (in natural log form) is measured as averages over 
each five-year period and represents initial conditions in a neo-classical growth 
model. According to neo-classical theory, the coefficient on per capita GDP rep­
resents the convergence effect and should be negative.^® In endogenous growth 
models, there is no convergence effect (since economies do not depart from their
convergence holds, the economy of a country will grow faster with a relatively lower level of 
initial per capita GDP, since it is that much further away from its steady state and must catch up.
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steady states) and therefore the coefficient is expected to be zero. Larger coun­
tries (as measured by population size) tend to have higher growth rates, but faster 
population growth itself is associated with lower per capita GDP growth.
The Hausman test suggests tha t the preferred model is the fixed effects, as we 
reject the null hypothesis in most of cases at 5% and 10% level (see Table 3.11). 
However, in advanced economies using the LYS classification and in developing 
countries using the de jure classification, the random effects were preferred. In 
addition, in some cases the random effects estimator has degenerated into a pooled 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator; in those cases we used a fixed effects 
because the assumption of common slope parameters would become unreasonable.^® 
Also, using the traditional restricted F-test, which is based on loss of goodness-of- 
fit, to testing group effects: F^n-i,nT-n-k) = , where LSDV is
the unrestricted model, we reject the null hypothesis of a common intercept for all 
countries. In other words, we may conclude tha t the fixed effect model is better 
than the pooled OLS.
Table 3.11: Economic Growth: Hausman Specification Test
C la s s if ic a t io n A ll C o u n tr ie s  A d v a n c e d E m e rg in g D e v e lo p in g
N atu ra l (11) =  3 6 .8 7 (0 .0 0 0 0 ) X ^ ( l l )  =  65 .1 4 (0 .0 0 0 0 ) X ^ ( l l )  =  2 3 .7 8 (0 .0 1 8 7 )
LYS X ^ ( l l )  =  2 8 .6 3 (0 .0 0 2 6 ) X ^ (H ) =  1 2 .1 6 (0 .3 5 1 6 ) - X ^ ( l l )  =  19 .0 9 (0 .0 5 9 5 )
HM R X ^ ( l l )  =  3 3 .5 3 (0 .0 0 0 4 ) - -
De Ju re X® (11) =  2 6 .2 8 (0 .0 0 5 9 ) X ^ ( l l )  =  1 8 .4 9 (0 .0 7 0 9 ) X ^ ( l l )  =  1 7 .0 6 (0 .1 0 6 2 )
N otes: In advanced economies w ith  N atu ra l, IIM R  an d  De ju re  classifications; in em erging w ith LYS and  IIM R classifications; and  
in developing countries w ith  IIM R  classification  th e  random -cffects es tim ato r has degenerated  to  pooled OLS and  the  H ausm an te st 
may n o t be app rop ria te .
S ource: A u th o r’s ca lcula tions.
In Tables 3.12 and 3.13 we report the impact of exchange rate regimes on eco­
nomic growth. The adjusted displays tha t the model explains between 10% to
^®The statistical significance of the estimated coefficients, the value and the Durbin-Watson 
value, are higher in the LSDV than pooled OLS.
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59% of the variation in the growth rates in our sample. In addition, Table 3.14 
shows a summary of the main coefficients and their economic interpretation.
The signs of coefficients are mostly statistically significant and consistent with 
growth theory. According to our results, investment ratio, openness and terms of 
trade growth have a positive influence on the GDP per capita growth. On the con­
trary, the coeffcients on the proxy for human capital are not statistically significant 
or do not present the expected signs.
As shown in Tables 3.12 and 3.13, we do not find support that general government 
revenue influences economic growth; its coefficient is not statistically significant for 
neither classification scheme or groups of countries. On the contrary, government 
balance shows positive and statistically significant coefficients in most cases. The ini­
tial per capita GDP shows a negative and statistically significant coefficient, mainly 
in emerging economies. Moreover, population growth shows the expected negative 
relations with per capita GDP growth, while population size shows a positive coef­
ficient.
Our empirical evidence suggests tha t real per capita GDP growth in developing 
countries with floating regimes is 3.5% lower than developing countries using fixed 
regimes when we use the natural classification. Similarly, in emerging economies 
floating regimes show a negative sign, but only the de jure classification is significant. 
T hat is, per capita income growth in emerging economies using floating regimes is 
3% lower than in emerging countries using fixed arrangements. However, our results 
in emerging economies, like previous studies from Husain et al. (2005), do not find 
a strong link between particular exchange rate regimes and economic growth.
In advanced economies, floating regimes show a positive association with per 
capita GDP growth, regardless of which classification scheme is used, but coefficients 
are not statistically significant (see Table 3.15).
In developing countries, when the natural classification is used our results are 
more in line with the earlier findings of Husain et al. (2005) on fixed regimes being
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Table 3.12: The Impact of Exchange 
in All and Advanced Economies
Arrangements on Per Capita Income Growth
All Advanced
N atu ra l LYS HM R De Jure N atu ra l LYS HM R De Ju re
C o n s tan t 0.194 0.117 0.012 0.159 -0.076 0.068 -0.011 -0.101
(2.149)** (1.221) (0.145) (1.810)*** (-0.443) (1.378) (-0.067) (-0.608)
Invest, ra tio 0.089 0.072 0.126 0.094 0.116 0.137 0.094 0.127
(0.014)** (1.964)** (2.749)* (2.948)* (1.809)*** (2.681)* (1.834)*** (1.936)***
O penness 0.034 0.024 0.017 0.032 0.045 0.033 0.057 0.046
(2.079)** (1.569) (0.963) (2.144)** (2.566)** (5.155)* (3.429)* (3.026)*
T T  grow th 0.015 0.018 0.021 0.015 0.004 -0.009 0.022 0.002
(1.256) (1.569) (1.301)*** (1,398) (0.142) (-0.341) (0.762) (0.050)
Schooling 0.001 0.001 -0.006 0.001 -0.003 -0.0002 -0.005 -0.003
(0,215) (0.246) (-1.776)*** (0.168) (-1.152) (-0.149) (-1.003)*** (-1.000)
Tax ra tio -0.008 0.004 0.006 -0.009 -0.035 -0.017 -0.020 -0.032
(-0.379) (0.126) (0.304) (-0.343) (-1.241) (-0.941) (-0.771) (-1.114)
Gov. balance 0.175 0.190 0.274 0.196 0.063 0.117 0.073 0.068
(4.907)* (5.0302)* (5.642)* (5.674)* (1.437) (2.773)* (1.756)*** (1.584)
In itia l G D P -0.026 -0.016 0.003 -0.021 0.010 -0.008 0.003 0.011
(-1.791)*** (-1.037) (0.289) (-1.456) (0.531) (-1.437) (0.162) (0.592)
Pop. grow th -0.524 -0.213 -1.398 -0.519 -0.960 -0.799 -1.057 -0.961
(-0.821) (-0.269) (-4.061)* (-0.815) (-4.085)* (-3.350)* (-4.015)* (-3.923)*
Pop, size 7 .29e~ “® 2.65e~°® 9.77e“ °^ 6 .2 4 e -°^ -2 .27e“ °® 7.23e~°® 0.0001 8.316“ °*^
(1.355) (0.335) (0.275) (1.255) (-0.084) (2.366)** (0.529) (0.313)
F loating -0.019 -0.003 0.009 -0.001 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.004
(-3.420)* (-0.696) (1.570) (-0.268) (0.852) (0.744) (1.624) (1.104)
In te rm ed ia te -0.004 -0.016 0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 0.007 0.004
(-0.615) (-5.937)* (1.244) (-0.784) (-0.926) (-1.463) (1.459) (1.631)
O bservations 1690 1367 1141 1673 515 412 4SI 515
F -te s t prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj. R-sq 0.25 0.21 0.38 0.25 0.49 0.41 0.59 0.48
N otes: T he  tab le  reports  least squares dum m y variables resu lts  of unbalanced  panels w ith fixed effects. T he dependen t variable is 
P er c a p ita  real G D P grow th. T he s ta n d a rd  errors of the es tim ates  a re  ro b u st to  cross contem poraneous corre la tion , (-s ta tis tic s  are 
displayed in brackets. (*) deno ting  significance a t th e  1 per cent level, (**) a t  th e  5 p er cen t and  (***) a t  th e  10 per cen t level.
Source: A u th o r 's  estim ates.
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Table 3.13: The Impact of Exchange Arrangements on Per Capita Income 
in Emerging and Developing Countries
Growth
Em erging Developing
N atu ra l LYS HM R De Ju re N atu ra l LYS H M R De Jure
C onstan t 0.271 0.267 0.168 0.225 0.223 0.055 0.053 0.004
(1.729)**» (1.492) (0.975) (1.454) (2.750)* (0.616) (0.470) (0.089)
Invest, ra tio 0.146 0.189 0.229 0.174 0.073 0.049 0.161 0.107
(2,487)** (2.822)* (2.583)** (2.878)* (1.831)*** (1.066) (2.353)** (2.277)**
O penness 0.065 0.027 0.034 0.068 0.005 0.004 -0.015 0.009
(1.754)*** (0.619) (1.052) (1.802)*** (0.319) (0.218) (-0.327) (0.846)
T T  grow th 0.049 0.056 0.007 0.050 0.001 0.009 0.031 0.001
(1.689)*** (1.637) (0.461) (1.692)*** (0.067) (0.801) (1.215) (0.126)
Schooling 0.002 0.007 -0.006 0.004 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007
(0.283) (0.984) (-1.258) (0.539) (-1.955)*** (-1.672)*** (-0.983) (-2.266)**
Tax ratio 0.011 0.060 0.078 0.060 -0.004 -0.003 0.002 -0.029
(0.156) (0.803) (1.634) (0.749) (-0.072) (-0.049) (0.039) (-0.728)
Gov. balance 0.081 -0.031 0.338 0.109 0.236 0.268 0.449 0.223
(0.589) (-0.190) (4.125)* (0.809) (5.072)* (6.307)* (3.816)* (4.878)*
In itia l G D P -0.047 -0.048 -0.025 -0.044 -0.024 0.0003 0.007 0.006
(-2.390) ** (-1.769)*** (-1.013) (-1.904)*** (-1.779)*** (0.017) (0.371) (1.029)
Pop. grow th 0.347 0573 -0.949 0.326 -1.302 -1.116 -2.205 -1.117
(0.276) (0.400) (-4.887)* (0.252) (-3.204)* (-4.118)* (-3.097)* (-2.805)*
Pop. size 0.0001 5.52e“ °® 0.0001 0.0002 0.002 0.001 -0.002 9.92e~°®
(1.556) (0.453) (1.570) (2.033)** (1.936)*** (1.198) (-1.064) (0.019)
F loating -0.018 -0.003 -0.005 -0.030 -0.035 -0.002 0.008 0.008
(-1.424) (-0.345) (-0.383) (-3.063)* (-4.031)* (-0.437) (0.457) (1.510)
In te rm ed ia te 0.009 -0.032 -0.010 -0.008 -0,011 -0.010 0.015 0.002
(0.948) (-5.176)* (-1.258) (-1.629) (-1.216) (-2.475)** (2.266)** (0.406)
O bservations 447 357 317 424 728 598 371 734
F -te s t prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
A dj. R -sq 0.26 0.18 0.40 0.22 0.22 0.14 0.28 0.10
N o tes: T he tab le  repo rts  least squares dum m y variables resu lts  of unbalanced  panels w ith fixed effects. T he  dependen t variable is 
P er ca p ita  real G D P grow th. T he s ta n d a rd  errors of th e  es tim ates  are ro b u st to  cross contem poraneous corre la tion , t-s ta tis tlc s  are 
displayed in brackets. (*) deno ting  significance a t th e  1 per cen t level, (**) a t  th e  5 p e r cent and  (***) a t the 10 p er cen t level.
Source:  A u th o r’s estim ates.
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Table 3.14: The Impact of Exchange Rate Regimes on Per Capita Income Growth: 
Main Coefficients
All Advanced
N atu ra l LYS IIM R De Ju re N atu ral LYS IIM R Do Jure
F loating -0.019 -0.003 0.009 -0.001 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.004
(-3.420)* (-0.696) (1.570) (-0.268) (0.852) (0.744) (1.624) (1.104)
In te rm edia te -0.004 -0.016 0.005 -0.002 -0,003 -0.004 0.007 0.004
(-0.615) (-5.937)* (1.244) (-0.784) (-0.926) (-1.463) (1.459) (1.631)
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0,000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Em erging Developing
N atu ra l LYS HM R De Ju re N atu ra l LYS HM R Dc Jure
F loating -0.018 -0.003 -0.005 -0.030 -0.035 -0.002 0.008 0.008
(-1.424) (-0.345) (-0.383) (-3.063)* (-4.031)* (-0.437) (0.457) (1.510)
In te rm ed ia te 0.009 -0.032 -0.010 -0.008 -0.011 -0.010 0.015 0.002
(0.948) (-5.176)* (-1.258) (-1.629) (-1.216) (-2.475)** (2.266)** (0.406)
P-Valiie 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note s:  T he  tab le  repo rts  th e  least squares dum m y variab les resu lts  of unbalanced panels w ith  fixed effects. T he  dependen t variable 
is P er ca p ita  real G D P  grow th. T he s tan d a rd  errors of th e  estim ates a re  robust to  cross contem poraneous corre la tion , ( s ta tis tic s  are 
displayed in brackets. (*) denote significance a t  th e  1 per cen t level, (**) a t  th e  5 per cen t and (***) a t th e  10 per cent level. 
S u m m a ry : In developing countries fixed exchange ra te  regim es are associa ted  w ith  higher economic grow th. Developing countries 
using de fa c ta  floating exchange ra te  regim es (n a tu ra l classification) show a per cap ita  G D P  grow th ra te  of 3.5% lower than  
developing countries using de fa c to  fixed regimes.
S ou rce: A u th o r’s estim ates.
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Table 3.15: Exchange Arrangements Performance on GDP Per Capita Growth
Natural LYS HMR De Jure
All Countries
Ranking from the Fixed Fixed Floating* Fixed
best to the worst Intermediate* Floating* Intermediate* Floating*
performance Floating Intermediate 
Advanced Economies
Fixed Intermediate*
Floating* Floating* Floating* Floating*
Fixed Fixed Intermediate* Intermediate*
Intermediate* Intermediate* 
Emerging Economies
Fixed Fixed
Intermediate* Fixed Fixed Fixed
Fixed Floating* Floating* Intermediate*
Floating* Intermediate 
Developing Countries
Intermediate* Floating
Fixed Fixed Intermediate Floating*
Intermediate* Floating* Floating* Intermediate*
Floating Intermediate Fixed Fixed
Note: (*) insignificant variables. 
Source: Author’s calculations.
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associated with higher economic growth. On the other hand, intermediate exchange 
rate regimes appear to offer higher growth than floating and fixed regimes but only 
when we use the HMR classification in developing countries (see Table 3.16). Us­
ing the de jure classification, fixed exchange rate regimes are connected with slower 
growth rates in developing countries. This result is similar to previous findings by 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003b). Conversely, fixed arrangements are associ­
ated with higher economic growth in developing countries when we use the LYS 
classification.
Table 3.16: Economic Growth and Exchange Regimes in Developing Countries
G osh e t al. Levy-Yeyati H usain e t O ur results
(2002) & al. (2005)
S turzenegger
(2003)
N atu ra l LYS HM R Da Ju re
1970-1999 1974-1999 1970-1999 1974-1999 1974-1999 1974-1999 1974-1999
O bservations 956 1029 1228 731 589 304 727
M ethod Pool Pool Pool LSDV LSDV LSDV LSDV
R anking F loating F loating Fixed F ixed Fixed In te rm ed ia te F loating*
Fixed* In ter-F ixed In term edia te* In te rm edia te* F loating* Floating* Interm ediate*
In te rm ed ia te F loating F loating In term edia te Fixed Fixed
Note:  T he  resu lts  of H usain e t al. (2005) are based on th e ir  es tim ate  of countries w ith  fixed effects. (*) insignificant variables. 
S ource: G osh et. al (2002), Levy-yeyati and S turzenegger (2003), H usain e t al. (2005) and  A u th o r’s ca lcula tions.
To summarise, our empirical results, in contrast to the previous research from 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001, 2003b), Larram and Parro (2003) and Bailliu 
et al. (2001), document tha t fixed regimes can lead to higher per capita growth 
rates than floating and intermediate regimes particularly in developing countries, 
but this finding is valid only when we use Natural and LYS classifications. This 
study also finds evidence to suggest tha t floating exchange rate regimes could be 
associated with higher economic growth only in advanced economies, but this is less
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robust than our other results. Moreover, the results on floating and intermediate 
regimes are sensitive to regime classification; different classifications can lead to very 
different results. In all the samples, the results present tha t both the de jure and de 
facto classifications show virtually no relationship between floating exchange rate 
regimes and economy growth.
Foreign E xchange M a rk e t P ressu re  (M P I) . To test which exchange arrange­
ments are also associated with more foreign exchange market pressure, we regress 
the exchange Market Pressure Indicator [ MPI )  developed in Section 3.3 on macro- 
economic and financial variables. Independent variables are selected on the basis 
of observations on theoretical and empirical literature. These independent variables 
are per capita GDP growth, government balance as a percentage of GDP, the ratio of 
exports and imports to GDP (Openness), the ratio of short-term debt to total debt 
(Stdebtratio), the ratio of domestic financing to GDP (Domfin), the ratio of bank 
liquid reserves to bank assets (Bnkres), the ratio of total debt to Gross National 
Income (Debt), the ratio of reserves to total debt (Resdebt), the ratio of reserves to 
imports of goods and services (Resimp), international reserves, the ratio of debt ser­
vice to export of goods and services (Debtsx), current account balance (Cagni), the 
ratio of broad money to GDP (M2gdp), the ratio of money and quasi money to for­
eign reserves (M2res), the ratio of domestic credit to private sector relative to GDP 
(Dcrep), the US interest rate (Usirate), inflation, total unemployment (Unempl), 
and foreign direct investment to GNI (Fdigni). In addition to these explanatory 
variables, we include a dummy variable to account for the nature of the exchange 
rate regime and dropped fixed regimes.®® The vulnerability to crisis is represented 
by the ratio of total debt to Gross National Income; ratio of reserves to total debt; 
ratio of reserves to imports of goods and services; international reserves; and ratio 
of debt service to export of goods and services. Current account balance has also 
been used as a proxy for macroeconomic conditions and vulnerability to crisis. In
^°The dummy takes the value 1 if the exchange rate regime prevails in a country in a particular 
year; otherwise, it is assigned a value of zero.
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addition, the ratio of broad money (M2) to GDP is used like a proxy to financial 
sector development. Per capita GDP growth is a measure of the level of economic 
development.
The expected sign for the coefficient of per capita GDP growth is negative, 
because an increasing rate of growth may generate a rise in the domestic asset mar­
kets, attracting capital inflows and, therefore, supporting the currency. Conversely, 
a decline in per capita GDP growth leads to an increase in the foreign exchange 
market pressure and the probability of currency crises. Similarly, an increase in 
fiscal deficit (or decline in the government balance as a percentage of GDP) may 
generate a rise in the probability of currency crises.
On the other hand, we expect a positive sign in coeflQcients of the ratio of short­
term debt to total debt, the ratio of total debt to Gross National Income and the ratio 
of debt service to export of goods and services because grater external debt increases 
the pressure in the foreign exchange market and the probability of a currency crisis. 
Also, we expect a negative sign in coefficients of the ratio of reserves to total debt. 
Moreover, for some variables of financial sector development we expect a positive sign 
(the ratio of domestic financing to GDP, the ratio of broad money to GDP, the ratio 
money and quasi money to foreign reserves and the ratio of domestic credit to private 
sector to GDP) particularly because an expansion of domestic credit increases the 
likelihood of a speculative attack (Krugman’s effect),®^ while for the ratio of bank 
liquid reserves to bank assets we expect a negative sign. In addition, increases in 
foreign reserves reduce the probability of currency crises. Also, an import growth 
increases in advance of a speculative attack, then the expected sign on the ratio of 
reserves to imports of goods and services is negative. In the same way, the expected 
sign on trade openness is negative since more open economies are less likely to suffer
®^The model developed by Krugman (1979) suggests that, prior to a crisis, there will be a rapid 
growth of domestic credit relative to the demand for money, possibly in response to a need to 
finance the public sector. As such, credit to the public sector and fiscal imbalances could serve as 
a precursor to a crisis.
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a currency crisis, the benefits of trade openness outweigh the high vulnerability to 
external shocks. A positive balance in the current account reduces the probability 
of a currency crisis.
Foreign direct investment helps to add a productive capacity to the economy, 
because this type of capital flows go directly to real investment in plants, equipment 
and infrastructure. Hence, we expect a negative sign in the ratio of foreign direct 
investment to GNI. On the contrary, US interest rates can be related to currency 
crises, because higher US interest rates attract capital outflows and increase the 
likelihood to suffer a speculative attack particularly in emerging and developing 
economies. Similarly, high inflation increases the likelihood of exit into a currency 
crisis. Hence the expected sign is positive.®^ Equally, a high unemployment rate 
increases the vulnerability to currency crises, because a slump in economic activity, 
reflected in the rise of unemployment, makes the central bank more attentive to 
domestic objectives, compromising the exchange rate target.
Following the approach developed by Bird and Mandilaras (2006) we select a 
combination of fundamentals that best explains the M P I  in each group of coun­
tries. We estimate our LSDV model including all the above-mentioned variables 
simultaneously (not reported), but insignificant variables were gradually eliminated, 
until the most parsimonious representation of the data was achieved.®® Using the 
Hausman test we reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between the country 
effects and the explanatory variables in most of cases at a 1% level (see Table 3.17).
The main results for exchange market pressure indicators are summarized in 
Tables 3.18 and 3.19. Also, Table 3.20 shows a summary of the main coefficients and 
their economic interpretation. The signs of our indicators are mostly as expected.
Kumar et al. (2003) suggest that high inflation can increase vulnerability to crises through an 
impact on resource allocation, competitiveness, and macroeconomic stability. Also, Komulainen 
and Luklîarila (2003) and Tudela (2004) find that inflation explains currency crises rather well.
®^However, in some cases the dummy variables of exchange rates were statistically not significant 
but they are not excluded.
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Table 3.17: M P I  Data: Hausman Specification Test
C la a s if lc a tio n A ll C o u n tr ie s A d v a n c e d E m e rg in g D e v e lo p in g
N atu ra l X“ (9) =  7 8 .3 5 (0 .0 0 0 0 ) X ^ 6 ) =  2 4 .5 3 (0 .0 0 0 4 ) X ^ ( l l )  = 3 7 .0 9 (0 .0 0 0 1 ) X ^ ( 6 )  =  1 2 .3 9 (0 ,0 5 3 8 )
LYS X ^(9) =  8 0 .2 2 (0 .0 0 0 0 ) X ^ 6 ) =  1 8 .0 4 (0 .0 0 6 1 ) X ^ ( l l )  =  2 9 .0 2 (0 .0 0 2 3 ) x ^ (0 )  =  2 3 .3 8 (0 .0 0 0 7 )
IIM R X ^(9) =  8 1 .1 4 (0 .0 0 0 0 ) X ^ ( 6 ) =  2 2 .6 8 (0 .0 0 0 9 ) X ^ ( l l )  =  2 6 .9 9 (0 .0 0 4 6 ) X^(G) =  1 6 .7 8 (0 .0 1 0 1 )
X ^(9) =  6 7 .5 7 (0 .0 0 0 0 ) X ® ( 6 ) =  2 0 .4 5 (0 .0 0 2 3 ) X - ( l l )  =  5 2 .4 0 (0 .0 0 0 0 ) X ® ( 6 )  =  1 6 .1 9 (0 .0 1 2 8 )
S ource: A u th o r’s ca lcula tions.
Regarding individual indicators, we find tha t exchange market pressure increases 
along with the ratio of domestic credit to private sector to GDP, the ratio of debt 
service to export of goods and services, the ratio of domestic financing to GDP 
and inflation. On the contrary, it increases in the rest of the explanatory variables 
associated with a lower foreign exchange market pressure.
On the other hand, the impact of exchange arrangements on foreign exchange 
market pressure is analysed we find that there are positive and significant asso­
ciations between foreign exchange market pressure and floating and intermediate 
exchange regimes in most classifications. Fixed regimes show the best performance 
against an increase in the foreign exchange market pressure, particularly in devel­
oping countries.
In emerging and developing countries intermediate exchange rate regimes are 
more prone to increase the foreign exchange market pressure in most classifications. 
However, when we use natural classification in emerging countries, floating regimes 
show a positive and statistically significant impact on exchange market pressure 
as its coefficient is bigger than under fixed and intermediate regimes. Similarly, 
floating regimes present the worst performance when we use the HMR classification 
in developing countries (see Table 3.21).
We identified certain emerging and developing countries which kept floating ex­
change rate regime, both de jure and de facto, when speculative attacks and respec-
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Table 3.18: 
Economies
The Impact of Exchange Arrangements on M P I  in All and Advanced
All A dvanced
N atu ra l LYS H M R De Ju re N atu ra l LYS HM R De Ju re
C on stan t 4.281 8,125 9.694 7.257 0.872 -1.248 0.186 -0.411
(1.387) (2.609)* (2.682)* (2.721)* (0.821) (-0.536) (0.121) (-0.347)
P er c a p ita -0.324 -0.314 -0,606 -0.366 -0.171 -0.289 -0.307 -0.162
G D P (-2.965)* (-3.318)* (-2.524)** (-3.519)* (-2.425)** (-1.774)** (-2.528)** (-2.272)**
Gov. balance -0.304 -0.449 -0.332 -0.339
(-2.624)* (-2.685)* (-1.256) (-2.867)*
Dcrep 0.206 0.223 0.267 0.208 0.027 0.045 0.029 0.029
(2,908)* (3.359)* (2.728)* (3.017)* (2.520)** (2.604)* (2.584)** (2,834)*
Resim p -0.252 -0.334 -0.398 -0.265 -0.134 -0.128 -0.136 -0,129
(-5.371)* (-5.294)* (-5.193)* (-5.506)* (-4.967)* (-3.977)* (-4.872)* (-5.107)*
R esdebt 0.053 0.058 0.100 0.054
(3.754)* (3.149)* (2.726)* (3.850)*
Inflation 0.008 0.004 0.013 0.009 0.129 0.148 0.143 0.133
(3.038)* (1.248) (4.845)* (3.213)* (2.255)** (1.541) (2.334)** (2.007)**
O penness -0.094 -0.124 -0.155 -0.117
(-4.908)* (-5.053)* (-3.923)* (-5.760)*
F loating 6,475 2.513 11.109 1.954 -0.082 -0.434 0.548 0.811
(4.267)* (1.735)*** (1.124) (1.115) (-0.097) (-0.417) (0.546) (0.683)
In te rm ed ia te 2.533 5.807 4.913 4.759 -1.199 -0.345 -0.447 0.024
(1.651)*** (3.061)* (3.727)* (2.213)** (-1.861)*** (-0.321) (-0.484) (0.028)
O bservations 1370 1168 706 1345 581 418 472 581
F -te s t prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
A dj. R-sq 0.21 0.17 0.30 0.20 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.13
Notes:  T he  tab le  reports  least squares dum m y variables resu lts  of unbalance panels w ith  fixed effects. T he d ependen t variable is 
M P I .  T he  s tan d a rd  errors of th e  estim ates are ro b u s t to  cross contem poraneous correlation , t-s ta tis tic s  are displayed in brackets. 
(*) deno te significance a t  th e  1 per cen t level, (**) a t  th e  5 per cent and  (***) a t  th e  10 per cen t level.
Source:  A u th o r’s estim ates.
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Table 3.19: The Impact of Exchange Arrangements on 
veloping Countries
M P I  in Emerging and De-
Em erging Developing
N atu ra l LYS IIM R De Ju re N atu ra l LYS IIM R Da Ju re
C o n s tan t 11.948 15.632 11.542 14.026 -2.863 -2.134 -0.347 -2.209
(1.913)*** (2.397)** (2.513)** (2.168)** (-1.88)*** (-1.216) (-0.071) (-1.434)
P er C ap ita -1.032 -1.077 -0.788 -1.166
G D P (-3.470)* (-2.854)* (-1.727)*** (-3.596)*
Gov. balance 0.759 0.143 0.089 0.495 -0.446 -0.329 -0.910 -0.459
(1.324)*** (0.261) (0.113) (1.043) (-2.581)* (-1.962)** (-1.67)*** (-2.764)*
Dcrep 0.217 0.256 0.280 0.228
(3.404)* (3.619)* (4.638)* (3.599)*
Domfin 1.346 1.593 0.779 1.318
(2.603)* (2.497)** (0.803) (2.115)**
Resim p -0.425 -0.557 -0.408 -0.447 -0.064 -0.102 -0.276 -0.071
(-4.526)* (-4.222)* (-5.383)* (-4.979)* (-2.532)** (-2.805)* (-3.785)* (-2.880)*
R esdebt 0.154 0.132 0.119 0.122 0.008 -0.032 0.055 0.011
(2.303)** (2.649)* (2.594)** (2.331)** (1.065) (-1.85)*** (1.622) (1.558)
D ebt -0.937 -0.806 -0.254 -0.496
(-2.494)** (-1.818)*** (-0.799) (-1.293)
D ebtsx 0.138 0.171 0.155 0.135
(1.990)** (2.565)** (1.168) (2.149)**
Inflation 0.008 0.001 0.058 0.009
(0.956) (0.665) (4.035)* (1.084)
O penness -0.122 -0.121 -0.224 -0.133
(-2.653)* (-2.160)** (-4.798)* (-2.327)**
F loating 19.395 4.418 -3.677 2.569 2.006 3.308 15.822 1.597
(3.496)* (1.651)*** (-0.474) (0.471) (0.819) (2.355)** (3.789)* (1.351)
In te rm ed ia te 5.658 6.806 7.427 7.929 1.510 5.183 1.829 2.153
(2.626)* (1.8102*** (3.881)* (2.073)** (1.241) (2.459)** (1.711)*** (1.076)
O bservations 388 318 261 377 1210 1021 437 1191
F -te s t prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj. R-sq 0.30 0.28 0.53 0.39 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.06
Notes:  T he  tab le  rep o rts  least squares dum m y variables resu lts  of unbalance panels w ith  fixed effects. T he  dependen t variab le is 
M P I .  T he  s tan d a rd  erro rs of th e  estim ates are robust to  cross contem poraneous correlation , t-s ta tls tic s  are displayed in brackets. 
{*) deno te  significance a t  th e  1 per cen t level, (**) a t  th e  5 per cen t and  {*»*) a t  th e  10 per cen t level.
S o u r c e :  A u th o r ’s e s t im a te s .
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Table 3.20: The Impact of Exchange Arrangements on M P I :  Main Coefficients
All A dvanced
N atu ra l LYS IIM R De Ju re N atu ra l LYS HM R Do Jure
F loating 6.47S 2.513 11.109 1.954 -0.082 -0.434 0.548 0.811
(4.267)* (1.735)*** (1.124) (1.115) (-0.097) (-0.417) (0.546) (0.683)
In te rm ed ia te 2.533 5.807 4.913 4.759 -1.199 -0.345 -0.447 0.024
(1.651)»** (3,061)» (3.727)* (2.213)** (- (-0.321) (-0.484) (0.028)
1.861)***
F-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0,000 0.000 0.000
Em erging Developing
N atu ra l LYS IIM R N atu ra l LYS HM R Dc Jure
F loating 19.395 4.418 -3.677 2.569 2.006 3.308 15.822 1.597
(3.496)* (1.651)*** (-0.474) (0.471) (0.819) (2.355)** (3.789)* (1.351)
In te rm edia te 5.658 6.806 7.427 7.929 1.510 5.183 1.829 2.153
(2.626)* (1.8102*** (3.881)* (2.073)** (1.241) (2.459)** (1.711)*** (1.076)
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes:  T he  tab le  repo rts  the leas t squares dum m y variables resu lts  of unbalanced panels w ith  fixed effects. T h e  dependen t variable 
is M P I .  T he  s tan d a rd  errors of th e  es tim ates  a re  robust to  cross contem poraneous correlation , t-s ta tis tic s  are  displayed in brackets. 
(*) denote significance a t  th e  1 per cent level, (**) a t the 5 p e r cent and (***) a t  th e  10 per cen t level.
S u m m a r y :  In developing and  em erging coun tries in te rm ed ia te  exchange ra te  regimes are m ore prone to  increase the foreign exchange 
m arket pressure. Em erging countries using de ju r e  in te rm ed ia te  exchange ra te  regimes show a  exchange m arket pressure ra te  of 
79.3% bigger th a n  em erging countries using de ju r e  fixed regim es.
S ource: A u th o r’s estim ates.
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Table 3.21: Exchange Arrangements Performance on Exchange Market Pressure 
Indicator
Natural LYS HMR De Jure
All Countries
Ranking from the 
best to the worst
Fixed
Intermediate
Fixed
Floating
Fixed
Intermediate
Fixed
Floating*
performance Floating Intermediate 
Advanced Economies
Floating* Intermediate
Intermediate
Floating*
Floating*
Intermediate*
Fixed
Intermediate*
Fixed
Intermediate*
Fixed Fixed
Emerging Economies
Floating* Floating*
Fixed
Intermediate
Fixed
Floating
Floating*
Fixed
Fixed
Floating*
Floating Intermediate 
Developing Countries
Intermediate Intermediate
Fixed
Intermediate*
Fixed
Floating
Fixed
Intermediate
Fixed
Floating*
Floating* Intermediate Floating Intermediate*
Note: {*) insignificant variables. 
Source: Author’s calculations.
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tive currency crises occurred. These countries are Czech Republic in 1997; Ecuador 
in 1982; Georgia in 1998, Ghana in 1992; Guatemala in 1990; Guinea-Bissau in 1996; 
Honduras in 1993; Jamaica in 1992; Lebanon in 1986; Madagascar in 1994; Nigeria 
in 1986 and 1992; Paraguay in 1992; South Africa in 1982 and 1996, among others.
To conclude, our results yield positive and significant associations between float­
ing and intermediate regimes and exchange market pressure, particularly in emerging 
and developing countries. As a consequence, fixed arrangements are less likely to 
generate pressure in the foreign exchange market. These results are similar to find­
ings by Ghosh et al. (2002); Peltonen (2006); Falcetti and Tudeia (2006); Haile and 
Pozo (2006) and Jakubiak (2001).
C u rren cy  C rises. In order to examine which exchange arrangements are more 
prone to a currency crisis we use a probit model where the dependent variable is the 
probability of a currency crisis and the independent variables are the same as in the 
estimates with the M P I  because currency crises are, by its nature, connected with 
speculative attack against the exchange rate.
The impact of exchange regimes on the probability of currency crises is shown 
in Tables 3.22 and 3.23. In addition. Table 3.24 shows a summary of the main co­
efficients and their economic interpretation. The signs of independent variables are 
mostly as expected. Also, the statistical characteristics of the models are favourable. 
Most variables are significant to the level of 10%. The LR statistic shows the gen­
eral statistical significance of the models (zero hypothesis of no significance of all 
the coefficients in the models was rejected with a significance of 1%).^^ However, 
McFadden E? indicates relatively low goodness-of-fit in the models (between 5% and 
28%).
In order to evaluate the goodness-of-fit in the models, we carry out two goodness- 
of-fit tests: the power of the models in predicting a currency crisis in the sample and 
the Hosmer-Lemeshow test. The standard method of a probit model to evaluate its
statistic is analogous to the F statistic in the models estimated OLS.
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Table 3.22; The Impact of Exchange Arrangements on Currency Crieses in All and 
Advanced Economies
All A dvanced
N atu ra l LYS HMR De Ju re N atu ra l LYS HM R De Ju re
C onstan t -1.258 -1.686 -1.082 -1.203 -1.579 -1.150 -0.859 -1.329
(-6.801)* (-8.313)* (-4.999)* (-7.080)* (-4.938)* (-3.231)* (-2.461)** (-4.586)*
P er cap. G D P -0.010 -0.015 -0.039 -0.019 -0.053 -0.089 -0.095 -0.056
(-1.004) (-1.280) (-2.845)* (-1.842)*** (-2.305)** (-2.016)** (-2.459)** (-2.405)**
Gov. balance -0.028 -0.036 -0.036 -0.033
(-2.609)* (-3.009)* (-2.226)** (-3.035)*
Dcrep 0.005 0.002 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004
(2.315)** (0.599) (2.916)* (2.052)** (1.754)*** (1.149) (1.466) (1.424)
Resim p -0.022 -0.023 -0.018 -0.022 -0.026 -0.029 -0.038 -0.024
(-4.841)* (-4.114)* (-2.916)* (-4.972)* (-3.285)* (-2,832)* (-3.412)* (-3.082)*
R esdebt 0.004 0.001 -0.003 0.004
(2.347)** (0.305) (-0.441) (2.155)**
Infia tion 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.015 0.014 0.017 0.018
(2.118)** (1.448) (1.636) (2.576)* (1.546) (1.277) (1.666)*** (1.913)***
O penness -0.004 -0.000 -0.004 -0.004
(-2.342)** (-0.183) (-1.68)*** (-2.276)**
F loating 0.525 0.736 -0.034 0.398 0.189 0.159 -0.089 0.104
(3,805)* (4.560)* (-0,089) (2.629)* (0.649) (0.679) (-0.376) (0.451)
In te rm ed ia te 0.091 1.009 0.178 0.365 0,339 -0.426 -0.449 -0.055
(0.645) (6.319)* (1.068) (2.834)* (1.392) (-1.329) (-1.88)*** (-0.258)
O bservations 1370 1168 706 1345 581 418 472 581
O bs.= 0 1260 1079 644 1236 540 388 436 540
O bs. =  l 110 89 62 109 41 30 36 41
L R  S ta t. 85.558 95.553 58.586 79.946 25.644 23.243 31.088 23.987
P rob . LR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
M cFadden 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.08
Note s:  T he  dependen t variable is cu rrency  crises, z -s ta tis tic s  arc displayed in brackets. {*) denote significance a t  the 1 per cent 
level, (**) a t  th e  5 per cent and  (***) a t  th e  10 per cent level.
S o u rc e :  A u th o r ’s e s tim a te s .
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Table 3.23: The Impact of Exchange Arrangements on Currency Crises in Emerging 
and Developing Countries
Em erging D eveloping
N atu ra l LYS HMR De Ju re N atu ra l LYS HM R De Ju re
C onstan t -0.437 -1.726 -0.348 -0.321 -1.524 -1.519 -1.523 -1.458
(-0.887) (-2.473)** (-0.595) (-0.659) (-10.952)* (-9.762)* (-6.162)* (-11.088)*
P er cap. G D P -0.0874 -0.104 -0.097 -0.061
(-3.589)* (-3.319)* (-2.614)* (-2.556)*
Gov. balance -0.0874 0.024 0.102 0.064 -0.031 -0.026 -0.066 -0.032
(-3.589)* (0.384) (1.056) (1.137) (-3.419)* (-2.525)** (-3.993)* (-3.575)*
D crep 0.008 0.004 0.007 0.006
(2.360)** (0.908) (1.569) (1.417)
Domfin 0.045 0.059 0.101 0.035
(0.705) (0.842) (0.991) (0.539)
Resim p -0.055 -0.044 -0.033 -0.053 -0.012 -0.019 -0.006 -0.013
(-4.314)* (-3.073)* (-2.402)** (-4.247)* (-2.471)** (-2.973)* (-0.636) (-2.605)*
R esdebt 0.011 0.009 0.003 0.011 -0.0006 -0.004 -0.015 -0.0004
(1.273) (0.743) (0.207) (1.412) (-0.230) (-0.887) (-1.452) (-0.173)
D ebt 0.010 -0.029 -0.041 0.021
(0.297) (-0.646) (-0.734) (0.624)
D ebtsx 0.001 0.0002 0.004 0.003
(0.368) (0.040) (0.499) (0.894)
Infiation 4 .70e~ °° -0.0005 0.004 8.83e-0G
(0.221) (-0.775) (1.039) (0.044)
O penness -0.002 0.005 -0.0002 -0.002
(-0.540) (0.886) (-0.032) (-0.504)*
F loating -0.187 1.053 -9.987 0.256 0.353 0.554 0.894 0.221
(-0.523) (2.103)** (-0.880) (0.713) (2.622)* (3.094)* (1.289) (1.385)
In te rm edia te 0.411 1.265 -0.341 -0.184 0.127 0.903 0.485 0.166
(1.589) (2.407)** (-1.014) (-0.593) (0.879) (5.787)* (2.385)** (1.149)
O bservations 377 318 261 388 1210 1021 437 1191
O bs.= 0 345 294 241 355 1114 943 396 1095
O b s.—1 32 24 20 33 96 78 41 96
LR S ta t. 58.506 49.226 39.708 54.244 37.567 61.257 28.836 32.472
P rob. LR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
M cFadden 0.27 0.24 0.28 0,24 0.06 O i l 0.11 0,05
N atc si  T he  dependen t variab le is currency crises, z -s ta tis tic s  are d isplayed in brackets. (*) deno te significance a t  th e  1 per cent 
level, (**) a t  th e  5 p e r cent and  (***) a t  th e  10 per cent level.
S o u rc e ;  A u th o r ’s e s tim a te s .
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Table 3.24: The Impact of Exchange Arrangements on Currency Crieses: Main 
Coefficients
All A dvanced
N atu ra l LYS HM R De Ju re N atu ra l LYS H M R De Jure
F loating 0.526 0.736 -0.034 0.398 0.189 0.159 -0.089 0.104
(3.805)* (4.560)* (-0.089) (2.629)* (0.649) (0.679) (-0.376) (0.451)
In te rm ed ia te 0.091 1.009 0.178 0.365 0.339 -0.426 -0.449 -0.055
(0.645) (6.319)* (1.068) (2.834)* (1.392) (-1.329) (-1.88)*** (-0.258)
P-V alue 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Em erging Developing
N atu ra l LYS H M R De Ju re N atu ra l LYS H M R De Ju re
F loating -0.187 1.063 -9.987 0.256 0.363 0.554 0.894 0.221
(-0.523) (2.103)** (-0.880) (0.713) (2.622)* (3.094)* (1.289) (1.386)
In te rm ed ia te 0.411 1.265 -0.341 -0.184 0.127 0.903 0.485 0.166
(1.589) (2.407)** (-1.014) (-0.593) (0.879) (5.787)* (2.386)** (1.149)
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes:  T h e  dependen t variable is currency crises, z -s ta tis tic s  are displayed in brackets. (*) deno te significance a t  the 1 per cen t 
level, (**) a t  th e  5 p e r  cent and  (***) a t  th e  10 per cent level.
S u m m a v y :  D eveloping countries using fixed exchange ra te  regim es have a  lower likelihood of currency crises relative to  developing 
countries using floa ting  or in term ed ia te  exchange ra te  a rrangem en t. D eveloping countries using de f a c to  in te rm ed ia te  or floating ex­
change ra te  regimes (LYS classification) show a p ro bab ility  of currency crises of 90.3% and  55.4%, respectively, bigger th a n  developing 
countries using de fa c to  fixed exchange ra te  regim es.
Source:  A u th o r’s estim ates.
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predictive power is to compare the estimated probabilities of a crisis with actual 
occurrences. For this purpose, a probability threshold was set to serve as a criterion 
for the decision whether a model signals a crisis or not. In case the probability of a 
crisis exceeds the threshold or cut-off level, the model is considered to send a signal 
and vice versa. Using a cut-off level for the probability of a crisis as 50%, the models 
issue hardly any wrong signals, but they missed most of the crises in the sample. 
As shown in Tables 3.25 and 3.26, the probability threshold, as the value separating 
the crisis period from the tranquil period, was set at 15%.
Table 3.25: Goodness-of-Fit of the Probit Models: All and Advanced Countries
A ll C ountries All C ountries 
A ctual
T ranqu il Crises T ranqu il Crises
N atural
classification
P red ic ts  T ranqu il 1129 70 LYS
classification
P red ic ts  T ranqu il 938 49
P red ic ts  C rises 131 40 P red ic ts  Crises 141 40
All C ountries 
A ctual
All C ountries 
A ctual
T ranqu il Crises T ranqu il C rises
HM R
classification
P red ic ts  T ranqu il 567 37 De Ju re P red ic ts  T ranqu il 1120 76
P red ic ts  C rises 77 25 classification P red ic ts  Crises 107 33
A dvanced
A ctual
A dvanced
A ctual
T ranqu il Crises Tranquil Crises
N atu ra l
classification
P red ic ts  T ranqu il 511 29 LYS
classification
P red ic ts  T ranqu il 350 22
P red ic ts  C rises 29 12 P red ic ts  Grises 38 8
A dvanced A dvanced
A ctual
Tranqu il Crises T ranqu il Crises
HM R
classification
P red ic ts  T ranqu il 385 22 De Jure  
classification
P red ic ts  T ranqu il 522 32
P red ic ts  Crises 51 14 P red ic ts  C rises 18 9
S o u rc e* . A u th o r’s calcu lations.
Similar to the results surveyed by Berg and Pattillo (1999a) our diagnostic statistics reveal 
that the models rarely generate a predicted probability of crises above 50%.
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Table 3.26: Goodness-of-Fit of the Probit Models: Emerging and Developing Coun­
tries
Em erging
A ctual
Em erging
A ctual
T ranqu il Crises T ranqu il C rises
N atu ra l P red ic ts  T ranqu il 307 12 LYS P red ic ts  T ranqu il 253 7
classification P red ic ts  Crises 48 21 classification P red ic ts  Crises 41 17
E m erging
A ctual
Em erging
A ctual
T ranquil T ranqu il C rises
HM R P red ic ts  T ranqu il 213 10 De Ju re P red ic ts  T ranqu il 293 12
classification P red ic ts  Crises 10 10 classification Pred ic ts  Crises 52 20
D eveloping
A ctual
Developing
T ranquil Crises T ranqu il Crises
N atu ra l P red ic ts  T ranqu il 1029 79 LYS P red ic ts  T ranquil 837 48
classification P red ic ts  Crises 85 17 classification P red ic ts  C rises 106 30
D eveloping
A ctual
D eveloping
A ctual
T ranqu il T ranqu il Crises
HM R P red ic ts  T ranqu il 343 27 Do Ju re P red ic ts  T ranqu il 1028 81
classification P red ic ts  Crises 53 14 classification P red ic ts  Crises 67 15
Source:  A u th o r’s ca lcu la tions.
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Lowering the cut-off level to 15% leads to a strong improvement in the models’ 
ability to predict currency crises in the sample, while the number of wrong signals 
rises only moderately. Also, the majority of correct predictions are for tranquil 
p e r i o d s . G i v e n  the cut-off probability of 15% the models correctly call between 
15.5% and 70.8% of the crises and between 84% and 96.7% of the tranquil periods. 
Also, the count P? indicates a relatively good goodness-of-fit in the models (see 
Table 3.27).^^
Table 3.27: Measure of Goodness-of-Fit: The Count
Classification. A ll C ountries Advanced Em erging D eveloping
Natural =  0.85 =  0.90 R^ =  0.85 R? =  0.86
LYS =  0.84 =  0.86 =  0.85 R? =  0.85
HMR =  0.84 =  0.85 =  0.85 R? =  0.82
De Jure =  0.86 R'^  =  0.91 =  0.83 =  0.88
Source:  A u th o r’s ca lcu la tions.
Alternatively, if the average of the predicted values approaches the average of 
the observed outcomes successfully, a model is considered to be well fitted. The 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test statistics are commonly used to assess these properties. In 
order to calculate these test statistics the data  set is sorted in ascending order by the 
predicted probability of a currency crisis. The data set is then split into the subsets 
by grouping the first qiiantile of observations into the first set, and so forth. For each 
subset, the difference between the observed and predicted number of currency crises 
is determined on which the Hosmer-Lemeshow test statistics are b a s e d . M o s t
also used a cut-off level for the probability of a crisis as 25%, but the models accurately 
predicted crises in emerging and developing countries particularly using LYS and De Jure classifi­
cations.
^^The count is another comparatively simple measure of goodness-of-fit. It is defined as: 
CcmntlP  — o /  correct predictions
total number o f  observations 
^^For details on the Hosmer-Lemeshow test statistics see Appendix A.2.
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Hosmer-Lemeshow test statistics lead to not rejecting the null hypothesis of no 
difference between observed and predicted values a t 10% level (see Table 3.28).
Table 3.28: Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Test
C la s s if ic a t io n A ll C o u n tr ie s A d v a n c e d E m e rg in g D e v e lo p in g
N atu ra l X ^ ( 8 )  =  4.3194(0.8272) X=(8) =  8.6913(0.3690) X ‘ ( 8 )  == 9.2787(0.3193) X ^ ( 8 )  =  7.2858(0.5961)
LYS X ^ ( 8 )  =  2.7945(0.9466) X ® ( 8 ) =  2.5196(0.9608) X ® ( 8 )  =  3.7552(0.8785) X ^ ( 8 )  =  3.8201(0.8730)
HM R X ^ ( 8 )  =  5.9073(0.6546) X ^ ( 8 ) =  8.0773(0.4260) X ^ ( 8 )  =  4.4937(0.8101) X ^ ( 8 )  =  4.7221(0.7868)
De Jure X ® ( 8 )  =  9.9659(0.2674) X = = (8 ) =  7.9599(0.4374) X ^ ( 8 )  =  9.2468(0.3219) X ® ( 8 )  -  5.7138(0.6793)
S ource: A u th o r 's  ca lcu la tions.
Considering the results shown in Tables 3.22 and 3.23, can be pointed out that 
the probability of currency crises increases along with a low ratio of foreign reserves 
to import of goods and services, high inflation, increases in the ratio of domestic 
financing to GDP and the ratio of domestic credit to private sector to GDP, low 
ratio of international reserves to to tal debt and increases in the ratio of total debt 
to Gross National Income. As expected, increases in per capita GDP growth rate, 
among others, reduce the probability of currency crises. These results are similar to 
those obtained with the M P I .
In addition, our results suggest tha t floating and intermediate exchange regimes 
are associated with a higher probability of currency crises than fixed regimes (see 
Table 3.29). Developing countries using fixed arrangements have a lower likelihood 
of currency crises relative to similar countries using floating or intermediate regimes. 
An explanation is tha t countries with underdeveloped or weak financial systems are 
also likely to have problems accommodating large exchange rate movements under 
flexible regimes.
For advanced and emerging economies, our results are not clear. They are sen­
sitive to regime classification and different classifications can lead to very different 
results. Notwithstanding this, when the HMR classification is used in emerging
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Table 3.29: Exchange Arrangements Performance on Currency Crises
Natural LYS HMR De Jure
Ranking from the Fixed
All Countries 
Fixed Floating* Fixed
best to the worst Intermediate* Floating Fixed Intermediate
performance Floating Intermediate Intermediate* Floating
Fixed
Advanced Economies 
Intermediate* Intermediate Intermediate*
Floating* Fixed Floating* Fixed
Intermediate* Floating* Fixed Floating*
Floating
Emerging Economies 
Fixed Floating* Intermediate*
Fixed Floating Intermediate* Fixed
Intermediate* Intermediate Fixed Floating*
Fixed
Developing Countries 
Fixed Fixed Fixed
Intermediate* Floating Intermediate Intermediate*
Floating Intermediate Floating* Floating*
Note: (*) insignificant variables. 
Source: Author’s calculations.
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countries, floating regimes show the best performance (not statistically significant) 
while emerging countries using fixed regimes increase the probability of currency 
crises. Conversely, when our model is applied to all the samples the results sug­
gested tha t fixed arrangements are less prone to currency crises. These result are 
similar to findings by Chosh et al. (2002); Falcetti and Tudeia (2006) and Haile 
and Pozo (2006), and contrary to Bubula and Otker-Rober (2003). However, when 
we use the LYS classification is found tha t intermediate exchange regimes are more 
prone to currency crises in all countries, as well as, in emerging and developing 
economies. These results could show a lower popularity of intermediate regimes, ac­
cording to Rogoff et al. (2003). As a consequence, our results do not clarify whether 
floating or intermediate exchange arrangements are more prone to currency crises.
To summarise, currency crises tend to occur more frequently in countries using 
floating or intermediate regimes than those countries using fixed regimes, but it 
is not clear which exchange rate regime is more prone to currency crises. These 
results tend to suggest tha t the affirmations on emerging and developing countries 
should allow for more exchange rate flexibility as a means to reduce the probability 
of currency and financial crises is not well founded.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
The academic debate on the most appropriate exchange rate regime for a country 
or group of countries has been one of the most controversial topics in theoretical 
and empirical literature. Notwithstanding its increasing relevance to policy, the lit­
erature offers relatively few empirical studies about the impact of the exchange rate 
regime on a currency crisis and macroeconomic performance in developed, emerging 
and developing countries, separately. This chapter has provided an empirical analy­
sis of the impact of different exchange rate regimes on inflation and growth, as well 
as their impact on currency crises in advanced, emerging and developing countries.
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To this end, we have attem pted to make two contributions. Firstly, we distinguish 
between the de jure and the three de facto classifications system. We have used 
the IMF de jure classification and checked the robustness of our results with three 
different de facto classifications: the LYS classification based on a clustered analy­
sis, the natural classification based mainly on market determined dual and parallel 
exchange rates, and the HMR classification based on exchange rate regimes and 
taking into account external shocks and revaluations. The most complete de facto 
exchange rate classifications are made by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004),
Secondly, we have used a least squares dummy variables regression technique and 
a probit model to study whether a particular exchange rate regime affects macro- 
economic performance (inflation and economic growth), the probability of currency 
crises and the experience of more foreign exchange market pressure.
Our empirical findings indicate clear support for fixed regimes. It provides sup­
port for the role of fixed exchange rate regimes as a credible nominal anchor for 
the evolution of price levels without a high cost to economic growth, particularly 
in emerging and developing countries. Emerging and developing countries with a 
lower budget deficit, higher central bank independence, higher ratio of exports plus 
imports to GDP and fixed regimes show better inflation and economic growth per­
formances than others. Conversely, fixed regimes are associated with more inflation 
in advanced economies when we use the de jure classification only. Our empirical 
results also provide evidence suggesting th a t floating exchange rate regimes will be 
associated with higher economic growth only in advanced economies, but it is less 
robust than our other results.
In addition, countries with fixed exchange rate arrangements are associated with 
significantly lower exchange market pressures than countries with floating or inter­
mediate exchange rate regimes. In emerging and developing countries the interme­
diate exchange rate regimes are more prone to increase the foreign exchange market 
pressure in most classifications.
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Our results also suggest th a t currency crises tend to occur more frequently in 
developing countries with floating or intermediate regimes and, also, with higher 
ratio of domestic financing to GDP, higher ratio of domestic credit to private sector 
to GDP and lower ratio of international reserves to imports, among other indica­
tors, than developing countries adopting fixed arrangements. However, the results 
are not clear in terms of which exchange rate regime is more prone to currency 
crises. Conversely, our results on which exchange rate regimes increase the proba­
bility of currency crises in emerging and advanced economies th a t already have well 
developed financial sectors, are not clear. They are sensitive to regime classification 
because different classifications can lead to very different results.
In light of these results, it can be concluded that a fixed exchange rate arrange­
ment is superior to another exchange rate regime in delivering better macroeconomic 
performance particularly in developing countries. The credibility associated with 
fixed exchange rates may play an im portant role in promoting financial stability 
since this regime can discipline policy-making and minimises discretion. As a conse­
quence, a fixed exchange rate arrangement provides lower foreign exchange market 
pressure and lower probability of currency crises. An im portant part of literature 
considers adopting a foreign currency (dollarization) as the domestic currency to 
buy a credible policy of price stability, eliminate the role of short-run discretionary 
government policies tha t can give rise to policy inconsistencies and avoid speculative 
attacks and currency crises. On the other hand, part of the literature suggests that 
speculative attacks and currency crises are related to inconsistent macroeconomic 
policies. Weak fiscal policy leads to rapid monetary growth in finance government 
debt, high inflation and downward pressure on the exchange rate. The next two 
chapters evaluate the adoption of dollarization in a developing country and whether 
a fiscal sustainability indicator can predict currency crises in emerging and develop­
ing countries.
CHAPTER 4
The Case for Dollarization: Measuring the Synchronisation of 
Business Cycles with Regime Switching Models
4.1 Introduction
The financial crises of the 1990s drove some emerging economies to consider adopt­
ing a strong supranational currency as a form of combating financial contagion and 
currency crises as well as achieving the credibility of low inflation policies and eco­
nomic growth. The unilateral adoption of a strong supranational currency as legal 
tender has been called “official dollarization”.^  Countries which adopt an official 
{de jure) dollarization buy into a credible policy of price stability because short- 
run discretionary government policies tha t can give rise to policy inconsistencies 
are eliminated. Official dollarization also avoids speculative attacks on domestic
“^Dollarization” is the generic name used to define the replacement of a national currency by a 
foreign currency as legal tender, which could refer not only to the use of the dollar, but also for 
instance to the use of the euro. Yet some economists refer to “euroization” in the instance of a 
country adopting the euro.
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currency resulting from fundamental policy inconsistencies.
In light of the OCA literature, the dollarization^ process takes place on condition 
tha t a country tha t gives up its own currency to adopt a foreign currency should 
experience synchronisation of business cycles with the owner’s currency country. 
Synchronisation exists when two countries are in the process of recession or expan­
sion at the same time. When a country gives up its own currency, it foregoes the 
ability to conduct monetary policy which can be used to help stabilise the business 
cycle and hence it is im portant th a t the country’s business cycle is synchronous 
with that of the country whose currency it has adopted.^ In other words, when a 
country adopts the dollar as a replacement for its own currency, tha t country would 
automatically adopt the United S tates’ monetary policy stance. As a consequence, 
if business cycles are not synchronised there would be an asymmetry in the effects of 
monetary policy in the two countries. If business cycles are asymmetric the cost to 
dollarize would exceed the benefits, because it would be possible for the US to apply 
restrictive monetary policy precisely when the dollarized economy is going through 
a recession.^ In summary, countries with a high degree of synchronisation between 
their business cycles with those of the US are more likely to adopt the dollar.
The usefulness of the traditional OCA approach in the context of dollarization 
depends greatly on whether past data  can be relevant in influencing the decision to 
adopt a foreign currency. Ex ante evaluations of which countries are more likely to 
dollarize might ignore the Lucas critique. While traditional OCA literature treats 
the synchronisation of business cycles as something exogenous, recent developments 
reveal tha t the synchronisation of business cycles is endogenous. Prankel and Rose
^in the rest of the chapter, the term dollarization will be used instead of official dollarization.
^Henceforth, we will assume that this country is the US.
^Some characteristics of currency unions, such as a high degree of international labour mobility, 
fiscal transfers, and flexible wages and prices, may reduce the costs of forming part of a monetary 
union even when there is no synclironisation of business cycles. However, dollarization is not a 
monetary union per se. Neither labour mobility nor fiscal transfers apply when a country uni­
laterally decides to adopt another foreign currency (to dollarize) without a formal agreement or 
even the informal approval of the issuing country. Flexible wages and prices can help, but in most 
developing countries wages and prices are usually not flexible in downwards direction.
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(1998) find empirical support for this proposition; their results suggest that the 
adoption of a foreign currency as legal tender increases trade with the country owning 
the currency, and tha t increased trade integration leads to a higher level of business 
cycle synchronisation. This implies tha t countries with asymmetric business cycles 
with the US are less likely to adopt the dollar ex ante, but if they unilaterally adopt 
the dollar it could satisfy this criteria ex post
This chapter addresses the question of dollarization in the Dominican Repub­
lic by empirically evaluating the degree of asymmetry in business cycles between 
the Dominican Republic and the United States and, for the purpose of comparison, 
between Ecuador, El Salvador and Panam a with the United States, using a Markov- 
switching model. We have focused on the last three Latin American countries be­
cause they adopted the dollar as their official currency.^ Then we can evaluate the 
endogenous optimal currency area hypothesis (that adopting the dollar may result 
in more correlated business cycles with the US). The inclusion of the Dominican 
Republic in this study serve to evaluate whether a common cycle with the US ex­
ists. Prom this point of view, the intention of this chapter is to consider whether an 
official dollarization is feasible or not.®
Of interest here are the differences between recessions and expansions (which are 
separated further into “normal growth” and “high growth” periods) with respect to 
their persistence and duration, identifying common regime shifts and common cy­
cles. The Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm proposed by Hamilton (1990) 
is used in this instance. The classical EM algorithm consists of two parts. The 
first part use population parameters including estimate on the joint probability den­
sity of unobserved states. The second part uses a nonlinear and smoother filter 
to make probabilistic inferences about unobserved states. The stylised facts of the
^Panama in 1904, Ecuador in 2000 and El Salvador in 2001.
® Other economic considerations become particularly important when countries consider giving 
up their national currencies to dollarize such as the loss of the lender of last resort and the loss of 
seignorage, among other considerations. However, the inclusion of these considerations is beyond 
the scope of this chapter.
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business cycles in each country are studied separately by employing a variety of 
Markov-switching autoregression (MS-AR) models. In order to analyse the degree 
of synchronisation in the business cycles between these countries Markov-switching 
vector autoregression (MS-VAR) models are used, of which some or all of the para­
meters are allowed to change with the regime. Also, in order to determine whether 
the level of real GDP converges between the Latin American countries under study 
and the United States, we use different measures of comovement.
We have three m ajor findings. Firstly, contractions (recessions) are persistent but 
have a shorter duration than expansions in all countries considered. Secondly, the 
cycles are asymmetric between regimes and thirdly, on an international perspective, 
our results suggest tha t there exists some evidence about common regime shifts and 
common cycles for some Latin American countries and the United States, but there 
is not a higher degree of synchronisation in business cycles. These results contrast 
with the endogenous optimal currency area hypothesis.
The organisation of this chapter is as follows; Section 4.2 presents a discussion 
of the literature on international business cycle correlations in light of the Opti­
mal Currency Area theory. The methodological framework is presented in Section 
4.3. Section 4.4 presents a macroeconomic overview of some dollarized countries 
and the Dominican Republic. Section 4.5 analyses the data and descriptive statis­
tics. Section 4.6 presents results from the Markov-switching models, and finally our 
conclusion is presented in section 4.7.
4.2 Literature on International Business Cycle Syn­
chronisation
The establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the dollarization 
process has drawn special attention to the analysis of international business cycles 
synchronism in the currency union research agenda. A pioneer study on the topic
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belongs to Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994). These authors attem pt to gauge the 
asymmetry of contemporaneous shocks employing a Structural Vector Autoregres­
sion (SVAR) system of inflation and output growth. They use the decomposition 
method developed by Blanchard and Quah (1989) as their basic tool to identify 
permament and transitory demand and supply shocks in order to assess the relative 
importance of aggregate supply and demand shocks in different countries. They 
use annual data (for the period 1960-1990) on real and nominal GDP for three re­
gions: Western Europe, East Asia and the Americas.^ The results are compared 
with those using regional data for the United States, which could be considered an 
optimal currency area. They conclude tha t there are three regional groupings; the 
Northern European block, the North-East Asian block and the South-East Asian 
block. They suggest there is a potential relative cost to the Americas to create a 
monetary union.
On the other hand, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) develop a procedure for 
applying the core implications of the theory of optimum currency areas in some 
European countries. Their results show European countries are divided into three 
groups: those exhibiting a high level of readiness, those with a tendency to con­
verge and those in which little or no convergence is evident. Panizza et al. (2003), 
following the OCA index developed by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) evaluate 
the dollarization for Central American countries and the Dominican Republic using 
the experiences in Panama. They use GDP annual data for the period 1966-1996 
and measure asymmetric business cycles between the United States and these Latin 
American countries using a simple criterion of standard deviation in the first differ­
ences of logarithms of relative output between countries. Their results show that 
the business cycles of Belize and Panam a are more asymmetric with the US than 
the other countries.
In the same way, Hailwood et al. (2001) investigate the case for official dollar-
^Not including Central America and the Caribbean.
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ization in a selection of Latin American countries.® Using a SVAR model for the 
period 1990Q1-1998Q4 and find tha t there are asymmetric shocks between their 
sample countries and the US suggesting tha t an official dollarization in those coun­
tries would be completely weak. Similar results are found by Hailwood et al. (2004) 
using VAR techniques as well as GDP data  and prices for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Uruguay and Venezuela for the period 1980Q1-2002Q2.
Fielding and Shields (2001) modify Blanchard and Quah’s method in order to 
estimate a structural VAR model appropriate for a small open economy. In this 
way, they identify shocks in output and prices in the members of the Communauté 
Financière Africaine (CFA) Franc Zone. Their conclusion points out tha t there is 
a large and positive degree of correlation between inflation shocks in the different 
member countries of the CFA. On the contrary, when using output growth their 
results show tha t there are two groups of countries within which output growth 
shocks are highly positively correlated, and others, where output growth shocks, are 
negatively correlated.
Stock and Watson (2003) use a Factor Structural Vector Autoregression (FS- 
VAR), specified in terms of the growth rates of quarterly GDP for G7 countries, to 
provide quantitative estimates of the resources of changes in cyclical co-movements 
for the G7. Their model (FSVAR) is a conventional structural VAR, where the iden­
tifying restrictions come from imposing an unobserved-component factor structure 
on the VAR innovations. Their main conclusions are that there is no general in­
crease in international synchronisation among G7 business cycles. Historically there 
have been two groups in the G7, one group composed of Euro-zone countries and 
the other of English speaking countries (UK and North American).
Karras (2003) examines the prospect of dollarization in nineteen American coun­
tries. Firstly, using annual GDP data from the Penn World Tables (PW T), ex­
pressed in PPP-adjusted to constant 1985 prices for the period 1950-1992 and then
* Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay.
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using annual real GDP from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) for the pe­
riod 1968-1997. The author estimates a linear autoregressive model, showing that 
country-specific shocks in the Americas are both large and generally asynchronous. 
This implies that the Americas, as a whole, are not an optimum currency area. 
However, he ranks individual countries in terms of stabilisation costs and the results 
suggest that Canada, Honduras and Colombia are among the best candidates for 
dollarization, while Peru and Argentina are among the worst. Interestingly, when 
Karras (2003) uses PW T data, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Panam a show 
a negative correlation with the United States. On the contrary, when using IFS data, 
only Panam a presents a negative correlation with the US.
Another way to evaluate the criteria suggested in the optimal currency area 
literature® is based on a technique known as cluster analysis, as used by Artis and 
Zhang (1997). The basis of cluster analysis is the measurement of similarity or of 
dissimilarity or distance between countries. Artis and Zhang (1997) explore the idea 
of group-specific business cycles in Europe. In this study, cyclical components of 
industrial production are obtained using several detrending methods, after which 
the cross-correlation of the cyclical components of these series with the US series 
and the German series are calculated. A European business cycle is confirmed and 
the results are shown to be robust with the detrending method employed. Crowley 
(2002) employs a similar methodology to evaluate which American countries might 
be most suited as candidates for dollarization. In his study, cyclical real GDP 
(annual) for each country is correlated to the US’ real GDP using a band-pass filter. 
The results show tha t the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Trinidad and Canada 
are the most appropriate candidates for dollarization.
Alternatively, Mejia-Reyes (2004), using a classical business cycles approach, 
evaluates the synchronisation between seven American countries (Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and the US). He uses a methodology as proposed
^This criteria are explained in Chapter 2 pages 20-21.
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by Artis et ai. (1997) th a t is based on Pearson’s corrected contingency coefficient 
as a measure of correlation. His results suggest tha t national business cycles are 
largely idiosyncratic, except for the US and Canada. Thus, according to him, the 
international coordination of macroeconomic policies may not be effective, at least, 
in the short-run.
On the other hand, there are some empirical international business cycle studies 
based on modern non-linear time series models. These are inspired by the semi­
nal work of Hamilton (1989). The Hamilton paper addresses whether asymmetric 
movements occur systematically enough to be counted as part of the probabilistic 
structure of the US output time series. The underlying idea is th a t business cycle 
expansions and contractions should be viewed as different regimes. The first analysis 
using Markov-switching models to study international business cycles was under­
taken by Phillips (1991), Filardo and Gordon (1994) and Krolzig (1997a). Phillips 
(1991) estimates a bivariate version of Hamilton’s (1989) regime switching model to 
study symmetric business cycles in two countries in which the unconditional means 
of real GDP growth are driven by a four state Markov process. Filardo and Gor­
don (1994) extend their analysis to a trivariate two regime model by using leading 
indicators for the prediction of turning points. Krolzig (1997a) evaluates the sustain­
ability of Markov-switching vector autoregressions for the analysis of international 
co-movement in output growth rates.
In his paper, Krolzig (1997a) analyses regime shifts in the stochastic process 
of economic growth in six major OECD countries over the last three decades and 
his results show evidence of common shocks as the source of international business 
cycles, validating in this way the use of the MS-VAR model for the identification of 
international business cycles.
In the same way, Krolzig (2 0 0 1 b) uses a Markov-switching vector autoregression 
of real GDP growth rates for eight member countries of the EMU and shows that 
while business cycles in the Euro-zone have not been perfectly synchronised over
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the last two decades, the overall evidence for the presence of a common Euro-zone 
business cycle is strong. Similarly, Artis et al. (2004) estimate a univariate Markov- 
switching model autoregression for nine individual European countries. They find 
evidence of considerable synchronicity between business cycles. As a consequence, 
they extend the procedure to fit a MS-VAR model, identifying a common European 
business cycle. These authors also propose a dating of business cycles, both for an 
index of industrial protection and real GDP, and both chronologies appear to be 
consistent for identifying the different phases of recessions and expansions.
Generalising the Hamilton model of US business cycles to a three regime MS-VAR 
model, Krolzig (2001a) analyses regime shifts in the stochastic process of economic 
growth in the US, Japan and Europe over the last forty years. His results show 
the presence of a structural break in the expansionary GDP growth for the US and 
Japan based on an output employment MS vector equilibrium correction model, and 
a structural break in European business cycles.
On the other hand, Mejfa-Reyes (2000), using data for per capita annual real 
GDP from international comparisons in the Penn World Table for the period 1950- 
1995, estimates, first, a MS-AR model for the eight largest Latin American economies 
(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela) and 
then a MS-VAR model together with the United States. His results suggest that 
there is not a common Latin American business cycle. He finds only some evidence 
about common regime shifts and common cycles between Brazil and Peru, and Chile 
and United States. Mejfa-Reyes (2000) also points out tha t the direction of some 
asymmetries support the idea tha t business cycles in Latin America are different to 
business cycles in the United States and individual business cycles are independent 
within Latin America.
In summary, this literature review has derived the following conclusions: first, 
there is no general consensus about the methodology to evaluate business cycle 
synchronisation between countries. Second, Latin America, as a whole, is not a
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good candidate for dollarization. Third, there are few studies on business cycles 
synchronisation between developing economies and the US for full dollarization to 
take place and between the US and those Latin American countries potentially good 
candidates for a full dollarization scheme. Finally, there are virtually no studies 
tha t formally evaluate the theory on endogenous synchronisation of business cycles 
in officially dollarized economies.
In the next section, the methodology used in this study is presented.
4.3 M ethodology
This section is divided into two parts. Firstly, the presentation of Hamiton’s (1989) 
model. This model will be used to identify some characteristics relevant to the 
business cycles in each country. In the second part, Hamilton’s model is generalised 
to a bivariate Markov-switching vector autoregressive time series model, as in Krolzig 
(1997b). This model proves to be a useful tool to evaluate the presence of common 
features or common cycles between countries.
4.3.1 Univariate Analysis of Business Cycles
The Hamilton (1989) model of US business cycles is an empirical tool for character­
ising macroeconomic fluctuations.^® We employ the Hamilton model as a statistical 
device to separately collect some stylised facts of the business cycles in each country 
under study.
In his seminal paper, Hamilton (1989), based on Goldfeld and Q uandt (1973), 
models the growth rate of real GDP (yt) following an autoregressive (AR) process 
with a switching mean. In other words, he shows a univariate two regime (state)
definition, the Hamilton model is only able to capture some of the stylised facts of the 
business cycle. The model can represent the non-linearity or asymmetry stressed in some parts 
of the literature, but obviously, they are unable to reflect the idea of co-movement among time 
economic series.
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mean switch model of order four:^^
— T s t  — Oil — Mst-i) + ........ +  0^ 4 { ^ y t - 4  — T s t - 4 ) +  (4.1)
where £t ~  N I D  (0, and the conditional mean, i^st, switches between two regimes 
(states):
{/ii <  0  if Sf =  1 , (contraction) (4-2)^ 2  >  0  i f  St =  2 , ( e x p a n s io n )
In other words, the param eter fist (in. this case the growth rate of output) depends 
on a stochastic unobservable variable St, which can take two values (1 or 2). Thus, 
contractions^^ and expansions are modelled as switching regimes of the stochastic 
process generating the growth rate of real output. The variance of the disturbance 
term, , is assumed to be same in both regimes =  Œg).
The regime generating process is an ergodic Markov chain with a finite number 
of states S i =  1 , M  which is defined by the transition probabilities:^^
Pi* “  j  I  1 “  5^ St—2 — h ,  } — Pr {st =  j  I Si_i =  i)- =  pij (4.3)
where gives the probability th a t state i will be followed by state j .  It must
t h e r e f o r e  s a t is f y  P a + P i2 +  + P iN  ~  1 , w h ic h  im p l ie s  t h a t  p n  — 1 — ( p *2 + .......+  P î n )-
The current regime St depends only on the regime one period ago, Si_i. The effect of 
the regime St on the variable yt is given by the conditional probability P  [s* =  j  | y^.Krolzig (1997b) establishes a common notation to provide simplicity in expressing the models 
in which various parameters are subject to shift with the varying regimen. With regard to Krolzig’s 
classification, this is an MSM(2)-AR(4) model based on Hamilton’s model. Table (B .l) gives an 
overview of the MS-VAR models used in this chapter.
^^We preferred to refer to declines in real GDP as contractions rather than recessions, because 
a recession is usually identified when real GDP falls for two or more successive quarters. The idea 
is to include short-term events from a broader downturn.
^^The notation Pr (.) refers to a discrete probability measure, while p  (.) denotes a probability 
density function.
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One advantage of using a Markov c h a i n i s  tha t it allows one to generate meaningful 
forecasts prior to the change th a t takes into account the possibility of the change 
from regime 1 to regime 2 .
The transition probability Pij can be interpreted as a regime persistence measure 
in the sense that it gives information about the probability of the economy contin­
uing in the same regime in the next period. In the Hamilton model the transition
probabilities are constant:
Pi2 — P r (contraction in t/expansion in t  — 1)
P2 i =  P r (expansion in ^/contraction in t  — 1)
where pi2 gives the probability of a transition from a contraction into an expansion 
and p2 i denotes the probability of leaving the contractionary state. These transition 
probabilities can be collected in a {N  x M ) irreducible transition matrix/® denoted 
as P. Each element in the transition m atrix Pij represents the probability that event 
i will be followed by event j .
P  =
P n  P21 ' ' ' P m
P 12 P22 ' ■ • PN2
PlM P2M ■ ■ • Pn m
with
Hamilton (1994) presents a comprehensive discussion of the theory of Markov chains with 
application to Markov-switching models.
Markov chain is called irreducible if all states are accessibles from all other states. That is, if 
P i i  1 — P22a 2x2 transition matrix P  = is upper triangular, then state 1 is an absorbing1 — P i i  V 2 2
state: once the process enters state 1, it will never leave it, since pn  =  1. The Markov chain in this 
case is said to be reducible. If both p n  and P22 are strictly less than unity, the chain is said to be 
irreducible. This generalises to an n-state chain: if the transition matrix is block-upper triangular, 
with k X k block in the upper left corner, then once the process enters one of those states, it will 
not leave it. Since every column of the transition matrix, P , must sum to unity, P 'l  =  1 where 
1 is a n X 1 vector of ones. This implies that P  must have one unit eigenvalue, with associated 
eigenvector 1. If all other eigenvalues of P  are inside the unit circle, the Markov chain is said to 
be ergodic.
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Pü =  1 Vi, j  =  l , 2  M  (4.4)
The expected duration of regime j  is given by (1 —Pij)~^ . This model could
allow us extend the number of regimes to M  regimes St G {1 , the model
could be generalised to a vector process and we could model the dynamics of Ayt.
4.3.2 Markov Switching Vector Autoregression
In this section, following Krolzig (1997b), we generalise Hamilton’s model of the 
US business cycle into a bivariate model. MS-VAR models provide a convenient 
framework to analyse bivariate representations with changes in regimes. They ad­
mit various dynamic structures, depending on the value of the state variable, s*, 
which controls the switching mechanism between various regimes. In these models, 
business cycles from two different countries are treated as a joint stochastic process, 
so tha t we can identify common regime shifts and consequently common cycles.
We consider the MS-VAR process in its most general form:
{st) +  A i (st) A  2/t_i + .....+  Ap (st) A  y^^p 4- £t (4.5)
where A%/t =  (A ^/u, ,A y ja )  is a AT-dimensional time series vector, for t =
1 ,.....,T , ly is the vector of intercepts, A i ,  ,Ap are the matrices containing the
autoregressive parameters and St is a zero-mean white noise vector process with 
a variance-covariance matrix E, which is usually assumed to be Gaussian: s  ~  
N I D  (0,E).
In equation (4.5) the intercept term is assumed to vary with regimes beside 
other parameters. A Regime-dependent intercept term is used in cases where the 
transition to the mean from one state to another is assumed to follow a smooth 
path. Similar to the Hamilton model detailed in Section 4.3.1, the MS-VAR model 
might be considered as a general regime-switching framework. The assumptions of
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ergodicity and irreducibility of the transition m atrix are essential for the theoretical 
properties of MS-VAR models (see Krolzig, 1997b). As in the previous section, we
assume tha t the process switches between two or more states, 5 * =  1 ,  M , and tha t
St follows an ergodic Markov chain according to expression (4.3) with joint transition
probabilities pij for i , j  =  1 , ....... ,M , which can be arranged in a transition matrix
P.
We impose a strong restriction on equation (4.5) which requires th a t both coun­
tries switch regimes simultaneously. This model allows the identification and analy­
sis of the latent common business cycle. Regime shifts, however, can affect some 
countries earlier than others due to the autoregressive dynamics in the model. The 
structure of the MS-VAR model also allows some countries (but not all) to remain 
unaffected by a shift in regimes.
In a Markov-switching VAR model for international business cycles, the dynamic 
mechanism of propagation has two components: Firstly, one linear vector autoregres­
sion (country to country) and intertem poral (lag) transmission of specific country. 
For a given regime, the co-movement of the growth rates is represented by a vector 
autoregressive model. Thus the international (from country m to country n) and 
intertemporal (lag k) transmission of country-specific shocks Smt is determined by 
the autoregressive coefficients anm.k which are collected in matrices Ak = 
conditional on the state of the joint economy St.
Secondly, the regime shift generated by the Markov process, which represents 
large contemporaneously occurring common shocks; regime shifts are represented 
by the switches in the intercept vector Uat . These two sources of fluctuations are 
not necessarily independent. Thus, changes in a regime can simultaneously affect 
the state of common business cycles and the international transmission of country 
specific shocks.
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4.3.3 Classical Business Cycles and Growth Cycles
In this chapter we identify classical business cycles and growth cycles. The classical 
business cycles are characterised by recurrent moves between periods of expansion 
and contraction in the level of macroeconomic activity, while growth cycles are 
fluctuations in macroeconomic activity characterised by phases of high and low 
trend rates of growth. The periods of high, normal or moderate growth and the 
recessionary phase will be considered in the classical business cycles category when 
fjL\ < Ii2  < T hat is, when regime 1 is negative. On the contrary, the three 
regimes will correspond to the phases of the growth cycle when Q < fii < <
/i3 . When the growth rates vary across countries, the distinction between classical 
and growth cycles can be more difficult. In general, we will require tha t at least 
some country-specific mean growth rates are negative during recessions in classical 
business cycles.
Before turning to the empirical analysis, the next section presents a brief de­
scription of the macroeconomic fundamentals of the Latin American countries under 
study.
4.4 M acroeconom ic Overview
The purpose of this section is to briefly analyse the macroeconomic record of the 
Dominican Republic and those dollarized Latin American countries (El Salvador,
Ecuador and Panama) in the last decade.
The programme for stabilisation and structural reform in the D o m in ic a n  R e ­
public^ initiated in the early 1990s, helped to triple the average annual real GDP 
growth rate from 2.25% per year in the first half of the decade to 7.75% per year in !
the second half. Growth was supported by rising investment, including substantial |
foreign direct investment in the electrical, telecommunications, free trade zone and |
tourism sectors. However, in 2001 the economy was aflfected by two external shocks 1
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(the economic slowdown in the United States and Europe and the September 1 1 th  
terrorist attacks). These shocks broadly coincided in response to an overheating 
of the economy in the run-up to the 2 0 0 0  presidential election. As a result, the 
economic growth rate fell by two-thirds to 3.6% in 2001. The weakness of economic 
activity, and declining international oil prices, contributed to a halving of the infla­
tion rate to 4.4% at the end of 2001, while the unemployment rate rose to 15.6% 
(from 13.9% in 2000).
Table 4.1: Dominican Republic: Selected Economic Indicators
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Real GDP (%) 8.1 3.6 4.4 -1.9 2.0
Money Growth (%) -1.1 16.4 6.1 64.5 5.7
Consumer Price Index {%) 7.7 8.9 5.2 27.4 51.5
Inflation Differentials (with the US) 4.3 6.1 3.6 25.2 48.8
Current Account -1,026.5 -740.8 -797.9 1,036.2 1,047.1
Current Account (% of GDP) -4.5 -3.0 -3.6 6.4 3.6
Exports to the US 4,383.3 4,183.4 4,168.8 4,455.2 4,527.1
Exports to the US (% of GDP) 19.0 17.2 19.0 27.6 15.4
Import from the US 4,472.8 4,397.4 4,250.1 4,205.4 4,358.3
Import from the US (% of GDP) 19.4 18.1 19.4 26.1 14.8
Tï ade Balance with the US -89.5 -214.0 -81.3 249.8 168.8
Trade Balance with the US (% GDP) -0.4 -0.9 -0.4 1.5 0.6
Remittances 1,688.0 1,807.0 2,112.0 2,217.0 2,438.0
Remittances (% of GDP) 7.3 7.4 9.6 13.7 8.3
N ote:  R eal G D P, Money G row th and  C onsum er P rice Index in annua l percen tage change, rest of variables in m illions of US dollars, 
unless o therw ise ind icated . Infla tion  D ulTerentials is defined like natio n a l C P I minus CPI of th e  U nited S ta tes .
Source: IM F.
Falling oil prices led to the narrowing of the external current account deficit in 
2001 (to 3.0% of GDP from 4.5% of GDP in 2000). A large decline in oil imports 
was partly offset by a fall in export and tourism receipts (as a result of external 
shocks). Net capital inflows remained strong as sovereign bond proceeds and rising 
foreign direct investment (directed mainly at the electrical, tourism, and financial
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sectors) more than offset a reversal of short term capital inflows (possibly owing 
to the decline in domestic interest rates). External public sector debt remained 
manageable a t 19.5% of GDP, Excluding the US$500 million in proceeds from the 
sovereign bond issue, Net International Reserves (NIR) fell short for the end of 2001 
target (US$600 million), reaching US$462 million. Including the bond proceeds, 
by the end of 2 0 0 1 , gross official reserves stood at 1 .8  months of imports of goods 
and services and 96% of short-term debt by residual maturity. In 2001, remittances 
helped finance 51.8% of the trade deficit and equalled 150.3% of the Dominican 
Republics’ short-term external debt as well as 97.4% of its external debt service and 
oil combined. Remittances have been one of the stable variables in the balance of 
payments to the Dominican Republic. Despite an economic slowdown in the United 
States, remittances (from Dominican workers in the US) in 2002 totalled US$2.1 
billion, an 16.7% increase over the US$1 . 8  billion received in 2001.
Towards the end of 2001, and early 2002, the authorities tightened their posture 
on monetary policy, reflecting concerns over pressures on the exchange rate from 
the liquidity in the banking system. Furthermore, central government curtailed 
spending in January and the first half of February 2 0 0 2 . The central bank sold 
american dollars in order to ease the pressure on the dominican peso. As a result, 
NIR fell by over US$200 million in January and February, compared with an average 
decline of less than US$ 1 0 0  million in the corresponding period of the previous 
five years. On 2nd April, 2002, the Monetary Board issued a resolution ordering 
the official exchange rate be set equal to a weighted average of the previous day’s 
markets rates, and immediately devalued the official exchange rate by 2.5%, since 
then the dominican peso has shown a depreciating trend. Exports and tourism have 
recovered so far in 2003 and imports have fallen as a result of the downturn in 
domestic demand and the sharp real depreciation of the dominican peso (see Table 
4.2). The external current account has shifted into a surplus of about 1% of GDP 
in the first half of the year, from a deficit of 3.6% in 2002. The financial account
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was weakened sharply, despite the placement of a US$600 million sovereign bond 
in early 2003; foreign direct investment declined and there were capital outflows. 
Not international reserves fell by about US$65 million in the first half of the year 
bringing gross international reserves to around US$500 million by the end June, or 
less than one month of imports.
Table 4.2; Devaluation of Exchange Rate
Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Panama
1990 79.02 35.44 60.60 0.00
1991 11.54 44.68 0.62 0.00
1992 -0.67 45.15 13.49 0.00
1993 1.52 10.82 -5.45 0.00
1994 2.33 11.02 0.92 0.00
1995 3.07 28.85 0.06 0.00
1996 4.43 24.34 0.00 0.00
1997 2.16 21.82 0.00 0.00
1998 9.90 54.13 0.00 0.00
1999 1.59 196.60 0.00 0.00
2000 3.96 23.50 0.00 0.00
2001 2.85 0.00 -0.06 0.00
2002 23.59 0.00 0.00 0.00
2003 75.76 0.00 0.00 0.00
2004 -16.49 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note'. Appreciation is negative. Data in percentages. 
Source: IMF.
Nonetheless, the country faced a bigger shock in 2003 with the failure of a large 
private bank following revelations of fraud. Banking problems contributed to pres­
sures on the dominican peso and to a sharp rise in public sector debt. Economic 
activity weakened and inflation increased to an annual rate of 27.4% in 2003 reflect­
ing the weaker exchange rate. W ith a drop in consumer confidence and investment, 
economic activity declined to -1.9% in 2003 after rising to 4.4% in 2002. In 2004, the 
real GDP grew to about 2%, however, consumer price inflation increased to 51.5% 
and unemployment grew to 18.4%, while money (Ml) increased to 5.7%.
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To compensate for the assistance and liquidity of banks with problems, the Do­
minican Central Banks issued large amounts of certificates, leading to increases in 
quasi-fiscal losses in the central bank, the public sector debt, and combined fiscal 
deficit. Public sector debt increased to around 45% of GDP in 2003, from around 
26% in 2 0 0 2 , raising concerns about debt sustainability. To address these concerns, 
the authorities took a number of measures to contain the deterioration in public 
finances, including expenditure cuts and new revenue measures, including a tax on 
cheques, an import surcharge, and other temporary measures.
On the other hand, the United States is the Dominican Republic’s main trading 
partner. The Dominican Republic exported US$4.5 billion in goods to the United 
States in 2004. In the same year, the Dominican Republic imported US$4.3 billion 
in goods, almost the same value as exports. The Dominican Republic merchandise 
exports to the United States grew 1.6% in 2004. However, exports to the United 
States totalled US$4.38 billion in 2000. As a consequence, exports to the US in­
creased 3.28% between 2000 and 2004. The trade balance between the Dominican 
Republic and the US was positive in 2004.
In 2004, over US$2.4 billion in remittance money was sent by Dominican living 
in the US; this is equivalent to 9.5% of the Dominican Republic’s GDP. In general, 
remittances from Dominicans living in the United States contributed an additional 
US$2 billion per year to the country’s stock of foreign exchange. On the other hand, 
the United States direct investment in the Dominican Republic reached US$7.6 
billion in 2004; this is equivalent to 2.7% of the Dominican Republic’s GDP of 
US$28.3 billion.
In the case of E l Salvador^  following the end of the civil war in 1992, author­
ities maintained a sound fiscal policy, which helped reduce public debt from about 
50% of GDP in 1992 to about 30% in 2000. They also implemented a comprehen­
sive structural reform process, including privatisation, trade liberalisation, new civil 
service and pension reforms.
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In recent years, the authorities introduced official dollarization to reduce do­
mestic interest rates, exchange rate risk, transaction costs and also to reinvigorate 
private investment and exports. The new monetary regime, introduced in January 
2 0 0 1  with the US dollar as legal tender in parallel with the c o l o n , h a s  contributed 
to the appreciation of the real exchange rate and the reduction of domestic interest 
rates (see Figure 4.1). However, dollarization has raised the cost of living. Struc­
tural reforms have strengthened public banks and financial supervision, expanded 
the role of the private sector, and further progress has been made regarding trade 
integration.
Table 4.3: El Salvador: Selected Economic Indicators
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Real GDP (%) 2.2 1.7 2.3 2.3 1.8
Money Growth {%) -6.6 11.1 -8.8 2.4 12.6
Consumer Price Index (%) 2.3 3.8 1.9 2.1 4.5
Inflation Differentials (with the US) -1.1 0.9 0.3 -0.1 1.8
Current Account -430.5 -150.3 -405.2 -702.2 -631.8
Current Account (% of GDP) -3.3 -1.1 -2.8 -4.7 -4.0
Exports to the US 1,933.0 1,880.3 1,982.3 2,019.8 2.052.2
Exports to the US (% of GDP) 14.7 13.6 13.9 13.4 13.0
Import from the US 1,780.2 1,759.4 1,664.1 1,820.9 1,867.7
Import from the US (% of GDP) 13.6 12.7 11.6 12.1 11.8
H ade Balance with the US 152.8 120.9 318.2 198.9 184.5
Trade Balance with the US (% GDP) 1.2 0.9 2.2 1.3 1.2
Remittances 1,765.0 1,911.0 2,206.0 2,316.0 2,548.0
Remittances (% of GDP) 13.4 13.8 15.4 15.4 16.1
N ote :  Real Q DP, M oney G row th  and  C onsum er P rice Index in annua l percen tage changes, res t of variables in m illions of US dollars, 
unless o therw ise ind ica ted . Infla tion  D ulferentials is deflned like n a tio n a l O PI minus C PI of th e  U nited  S ta tes .
Source: IM F.
Partly due to adverse shocks, growth has weakened in recent years. These shocks 
include the earthquakes in 2 0 0 1 , adverse terms of trade developments (coffee and oil)
Colon is the currency used in El Salvador.
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and the global economic slowdown. Economic growth was 2.3% in 2002, consumer 
price inflation remained under control (1.9% in 2002) and domestic interest rates 
declined. Civil service reform has created room for the public sector wage bill to 
decline and tax revenues increased to 11.2% of GDP in 2002 on account of measures 
to broaden the tax base and improve tax administration and enforcement.
Figure 4.1: Deposit Interest Rates in some Latin American Countries and the United 
States
Dominican Republic Ecuador
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Note: Deposit rates usually refers to rates offered to resident customers for demand, time or savings deposits. 
Source: IMF
The fiscal deficit increased to 4.6% of GDP in 2 0 0 2 , largely because of recon­
struction expenditure following the 2001 earthquakes. Hence, public debt reached 
almost 40% of GDP by the end of 2002 and it increased to over 40% in 2003. In 2004, 
the economic growth showed a reduction from 2.3% in 2003 to 1.8%, while inflation
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picked up to over 4.5% (from 2.1% in 2003), owing to high oil prices. The money 
(M l) grew to 12.6% in 2004 from 2.4% in 2003. The public sector deficit declined 
to 3% of GDP in 2004 (from nearly 4% in 2003), although public debt remained 
a t 45% of GDP and the debt of the non-hnancial public sector at 40.7% of GDP. 
International reserves remained at around US$1.7 billion, covering close to 30% of 
bank deposits. The negotiations for a Dominican Republic-Central American Free 
Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) with the United States is expected to encourage 
new investments as exporters start to position themselves for an expansion in trade.
The United States is El Salvador’s main trading partner, purchasing 60% of its 
exports and supplying 50% of its imports. Total exports in 2004 grew 5.4% while 
total imports grew 8.9%. The external current account was negative in 2004 (see 
Table 4.3). As in previous years, the trade deficit was offset by family remittances. 
Remittances from Salvadorans working in the United States sent to family mem­
bers are a major source of foreign income and offset the substantial trade deficit. 
Remittances transferred through the banking system increased steadily in the last 
decade and reached an all-time high of US$2.5 billion in December 2004 (approx­
imately 16.1% of GDP). Exports to the US grew 1 .6 % in 2004. As a results, the 
trade balance with the US was positive in 2004.
On the other hand, the real GDP of P a n a m a  grew to about 7.6% in 2004, 
compared with 4.2% in 2003, 2.2% in 2002, and 0.6% in 2001 (2.7% in 2000, and 
3.2% in 1999). Earlier years reflected the slowdown in the global economy and a 
deceleration in domestic demand, which resulted mainly from the winding-up of 
large investment projects and the sharp deceleration in bank credit to the private 
sector, following an unsustainable acceleration in 1998-1999. The recovery in 2004 
was led by a boom in construction (stimulated by temporary tax incentives) and by 
export-orientated services (in particular the Colon Free Zone and ports), however, 
the external current account deficit increased to 83.2% in 2004. Unemployment 
declined modestly in 2004 (from 13.1% in 2003 to 11.8% in 2004) despite high real
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GDP growth. Inflation remained low in 2004 (0.4%) as has been the tradition in 
Panama.
Table 4.4: Panama: Selected Economic Indicators
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Real GDP (%) 2.7 0.6 2.2 4.2 7.6
Money Growth (%) 2.9 10.3 2.0 10.1 10.8
Consumer Price Index (%) 1.5 0.3 1.0 0.1 0.4
Inflation Differentials (with the US) -1.9 -2.5 -0.6 -2.2 -2.3
Current Account -672.5 -170.3 -95.5 -579.5 -1,061.5
Current Account (% of GDP) -5.8 -1.4 -0.8 -4.5 -7.5
Exports to the US 307.1 290.7 302.5 301.4 315.9
Exports to the US (% of GDP) 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.2
Import from the US 1,305.2 1,039.8 1,104.1 1,547.3 1,519.5
Import from the US (% of GDP) 13.9 11.3 11.5 14.3 12.9
Trade Balance with the US -1,305.2 -1,039.8 -1,104.1 -1,547.3 -1,519.5
Trade Balance with the US (% GDP) -11.2 -8.8 -9.0 -12.0 -10.7
Remittances 16.0 73.0 84.6 220.0 231.0
Remittances (% of GDP) 0.1 0.6 0.7 1.7 1.6
N ote:  Real G D P, M oney G row th and G onsum er Price Index in  an n u a l percen tage changes, rest of variables in m illions of US dollars, 
unless otherw ise ind icated . In fla tion  D uflerentials is defined like n a tio n a l C PI minus C PI of th e  U nited  S ta tes .
S ource: IM F.
Fiscal policy in Panam a is guided by a fiscal responsibility law, enacted in May 
2 0 0 2 , which limits the non-financial public sector deficit to no more than 2 % of 
GDP and targets a gradual reduction in public debt to 50% of GDP. The deficit 
limit was observed in 2 0 0 2 , and official data  indicated continued compliance with 
the fiscal law in 2003, with a deficit of 1.9% of GDP. The fiscal deficit tha t is 
comparable with data  for periods prior to the implementation of fiscal rules is 3.6% 
of GDP, despite spending cuts in the last quarter of 2003, as higher revenues from 
a tax reform in late 2 0 0 2  were ofi'set by lower non-tax receipts and substantially 
lower capital revenues than in 2 0 0 2 . Panam a’s fiscal performance deteriorated in 
2001, with the non-financial public sector deficit growing to 2.5% of GDP from 0.7%
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of GDP in 2000. The non-financial public sector deficit (excluding the Panama 
Canal Authority) increased slightly, to 5% of GDP in 2004 from 4.7% in 2003. The 
deterioration of the fiscal position reflected mainly negative cyclical factors that 
exacerbated existing negative structural trends in both tax revenue and the finances 
of the social security system.
Figure 4.2: Inflation in some Latin American Countries and the United States 
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The debt management strategy sought to improve the maturity structure of debt 
and deepen the domestic capital market. Three- and five-year treasury notes began 
to be issued in 2002, helping to define a Panamanian yield curve. Global bond 
issues, totalling US$3.7 billion since 1999, were used to meet fiscal financing needs 
and retired Brady Bonds. During 2001, an active public debt management policy led 
to the issue of US$1.1 billion of sovereign bonds to cover, not only the amortisation 
of external debt, but also the retirement of some domestic treasury notes, a buy-back
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of some Brady Bonds, and a pre-funding of the maturing US$500 million February 
2 0 0 2  global bond.
The banking system experienced some stress during 2002 as a result of the tur­
bulence in the financial markets of South America, but it started to recover in 2003. 
Large withdrawals of deposits by non-residents in 2 0 0 2  led to a scaling back of for­
eign credit operations, while domestic deposits and private sector credit contracted 
modestly and deposit spreads (over LIBOR) rose, particularly for local banks. Pri­
vate sector credit and bank deposits resumed growth in the second half of 2003, and 
falling deposit spreads gave further evidence of the banking sector’s recovery. In 
2004, the banking system experienced a second year of recovery. Domestic deposits 
rose by 9% and non-resident deposits remained stable. Domestic credit to the pri­
vate sector grew 9% in 2004 because of the rapid growth of credit in commerce and 
mortgages fuelled by the economic expansion.
In 2004, the US direct investment in Panam a reached US$5 . 2  billion; this is 
equivalent to 33,4% of their GDP of US$14.2 billion. The United States purchased 
over 43% of Panam a’s to tal exports in 2004, Panam a merchandise exports to the 
US grew from US$307.1 million in 2000 to US$315.9 million in 2004 (2.9%), while 
imports from the US grew from US$1.6 billion in 2000 to US$1.8 billion in 2004 
(13.8%). As a consequence, the trade balance between Panam a and the US is 
usually negative (see Table 4.4). In 2004, the trade deficit of Panam a with the US 
stood at US$1.5 billion. In the same year, over US$231 million in remittance money 
was sent by Panamanians living in the US; this is equivalent to 1.6% of their GDP.
E cu a d o r  went through a difficult period in the 1990s and per capita income 
stagnated. The 1998 oil price slump, damage from El Nino and disease in the shrimp 
industry further complicated the situation. As a result, Ecuador experienced severe 
economic stress, culminating in an accelerating inflation, which quickly resulted in 
a banking crisis, a deposit freeze and the closure of some eighteen banks, affecting 
half of total deposits and resulting in a currency crisis.
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The adoption of the US dollar in January 2000 stabilised expectations and eco­
nomic activity began to turn around. Oil prices recovered, while imports surged due 
to the boom in domestic demand associated with the exchange rate based stabilisa­
tion. In 2001, demand was given a further impetus by the start of the construction 
of a new private oil pipeline and higher public sector spending.
Table 4.5: Ecuador: Selected Economic Indicators
2QÜ0 2001 2002 2003 2004
Real GDP (%) 2.8 5.3 4.2 3.6 7.9
Money Growth (%) -0.9 45.7 -1.1 10.6 26.4
Consumer Price Index (%) 96.1 37.7 12.5 7.9 2.7
Inflation Differentials (with the US) 97.2 34.9 10.9 5.7 0.1
Current Account 920.9 -653.7 -1,271.8 -424.1 -550.5
Current Account (% of GDP) 5.8 -3.1 -5.2 -1.6 -1.8
Exports to the US 2,237.9 2,009.5 2,143.4 2,722.0 4,283.4
Exports to the US (% of GDP) 14.0 9.6 8.8 10.0 14.1
Import from the US 1,037.7 1,412.1 1,605.6 1,446.7 1,668.6
Import from the US (% of GDP) 6.5 6.7 6.6 5.3 5.5
H ade Balance with the US 1,200.2 597.4 537.8 1,275.3 2.614.8
Trade Balance with the US (% GDP) 7.5 2.8 2.2 4.7 8.6
Remittances 1,316.7 1,430.0 1,575.0 1,657.0 1,740.0
Remittances (% of GDP) 8.3 6.8 6.5 6.1 5.7
Wole: Real G DP, M oney G row th and C onsum er P rice Index in ann u a l percentage changes, res t of variables in m illions of US dollars, 
unless o therw ise ind icated . Infla tion  D uflerentials is defined like natio n a l C P I m inus C PI of the U nited S la tes .
S ource: IM F.
However, economic growth decreased again to 4.2% of GDP in 2002 from 5.3% 
in 2001 due to policy slippages and faltering confidence. Fiscal discipline weak­
ened with large increases in the wage bill, the granting of new revenue earmarking, 
and discretionary tax cuts. Consumer price inflation decreased from 96.1% in 2 0 0 0  
to 12.5% in 2002, but strong domestic demand (fiscal expansion), weak domestic 
supply (suspension of structural reforms), and wage-driven cost increases have pre­
vented it from dropping to international levels. Wages more than doubled since the
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dollarization in early 2 0 0 0  (led by the public sector), exceeding inflation over this 
period. The unemployment rate dropped by half since 2000, to 8.5% at the end of 
2 0 0 2  recovering by the end of 2 0 0 1 , its pre-crisis level.
The external current account deficit grew to 5.2% of GDP in 2002 from 3,1% in 
2001. While merchandise exports benefited from higher oil prices and the continued 
growth of non-oil exports, imports grew rapidly on strong domestic demand, and an 
appreciating real effective exchange rate.
The real GDP growth for 2004 was 7.9% (from 3.6% in 2003). This reflects a 
high output in the petroleum sector. Inflation was low (2.7% from 7.9% in 2003) 
and converged to the level of dollarized economies.
The United States is Ecuador’s main trading partner. The United States pur­
chased over 49% of Ecuador’s to tal exports in 2004. Ecuador exported US$4.2 
billion in goods to the US, primarily oil, bananas, and shrimp in 2004. In the same 
year, Ecuador imported US$1.7 billion in goods from the United States, with ma­
chinery, plastics, and paper products the leading items. The trade balance between 
Ecuador and the US was positive (see Table 4.5). Ecuadorians merchandise exports 
to the United States grew from US$2 . 2  billion in 2000 to US$4.28 billion in 2004, 
an increase of 91.4%. In 2004, over US$1.7 billion in remittances money was sent 
by Ecuatorians living in the United States; this is equivalent to 5.7% of Ecuador’s 
GDP. However, remittances as a percentage of GDP reduced from 8.3% in 2000. 
The US direct investment in Ecuador reached US$760 million; this is equivalent to 
2.1% of Ecuador’s GDP of US$30.3 billion in 2004.
In summary, trade relations with the United States are generally good in all 
countries analysed. However, the Dominican Republic show highest export to the 
United States. In 2004, the Dominican Republic exported US$4.5 billion to the US 
(15.4% of GDP), while Ecuador exported US$4.2 billion (14.1% of GDP); El Salvador 
exported US$2.0 billion (13.0% of GDP) and Panama exported US$335 million 
(2.2% of GDP). On contrary, El Salvador received the most im portant amount of
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remittances from the United States, US$2.5 billion in 2004 (equivalent to 16.1% of 
GDP). While the Dominican Republic received US$2.4 billion in 2004 (about 8.3% 
of GDP).
On the other hand, the dollarized countries under study have experienced signif­
icantly lower rates of inflation. Effectively, official dollarization has served to reduce 
interest rates and consolidated low inflation in El Salvador and Ecuador. Officially 
dollarized economies also eliminated the risk of devaluation. The inflation rate and 
interest rates of Ecuador, El Salvador and Panam a converged to the level of the 
United States. Conversely, the Dominican Republic increased its interest rates and 
inflation during the period in question.
The next section introduces data  and some descriptive statistics.
4.5 D ata D escription and D escriptive Statistics
The data  used in this paper is quarterly real GDP for the United States as well as 
real GDP for the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador and Panama^^ from 
January 1990 to December 2004. We focus on the period in which the economies 
of the Latin American countries under study are more linked with the external 
markerts, particularly with the United States. The data  for the US were drawn 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the US Department of Commerce, for 
Panam a from the Contralorfa General and for the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and 
El Salvador from central banks and the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the C a r i b b e a n . T h e  variables under consideration are plotted in Figure 4.3. 
They show a break in the trend of Ecuatorian GDP.
The data was tested for the presence of unit roots by using the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The null hypothesis of an unit root cannot be rejected at
^^Note that there are no quarterly observations available for Panama before January 1996.
All Latin American series were seasonally adjusted using the X-12-ARIMA method developed 
by Findley et al, (1998). The US Department of Commerce published seasonally adjusted GDP 
data.
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any of the reported significance levels (see results in appendix B.2). T hat is, each 
time-series used is integrated of order 1. Thus, the first differences of logarithms 
(100 times) are taken to achieve stationarity. The series are plotted in Figure 4.4 
(Figure B .l in the appendix shows the growth of real GDP by country, separately). 
The growth of real GDP of Ecuador again shows ocular evidence of a structural 
break in its dynamics. Tests for structural stability in GDP growth have been used, 
confirming structural changes in the Ecuatorian economy in the second quarter of 
1998 (see results of structural change tests in appendix B.2 ).
Figure 4.3: Growth in the Economies; Seasonally Adjusted Real GDP 1990-2004
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Note: Series in logarithms.
Some descriptive statistics including mean growth rates, skewness, kurtosis and 
the standard deviation of growth are presented in Table 4.6. It indicates that, 
from 1990 to 2004, the average quarterly growth rates of real GDP was of 0.12% 
in Panama, 0.14% in the Dominican Republic and 0.08% in the United States;
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while in El Salvador and Ecuador it was 0.06% and 0.04%, respectively. The real 
growth rate of the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Panam a display high degrees of 
volatility given tha t the standard deviations are always more than double the average 
real growth rates, particularly those in the Dominican Republic and Ecuador (see 
Figure 4.4). Interestingly, Ecuador has the poorest performance regarding growth 
(0.04% per quarters in the average) exhibiting a large variance. The maximum 
quarterly growth rate value is greater than the minimum quarterly growth rate 
value in absolute terms (except in the case of Ecuador). This implies that, the 
largest quarter upturns are more intense than the largest quarter dowturns.
Figure 4.4: Growth Rates of Real GDP: Quarter on Q uarter
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For the countries under study (aside from El Salvador and Panama) there is 
typical evidence of negative skewness in the real GDP growth rate cycle, indicating 
larger downward spikes in real GDP growth than upward spikes. Positive skew­
ness in El Salvador and Panam a implies tha t the average deviation of observations
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above the mean will exceed tha t of observations below the mean. Table 4.6 dis­
plays a positive kurtosis for all countries, implying an empirical distribution that 
has tails thinner than normal distribution (leptokurtic) for the Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Panam a and the United States, while for El Salvador the distribution is 
flat (platykurtic) relative to normal.
Table 4.6: Descriptive Statistics of First Difference of Real GDP
Dominican
Republic
Ecuador El Salvador Panama United
States
Mean 0.135 0.042 0.055 0.122 0.082
Maximum 1.275 0.281 0.165 0.787 0.193
Minimum -1.182 -0.307 -0.014 -0.278 -0.085
Std. Dev. 0.432 0.101 0.045 0.224 0.059
Skewness -0.099 -0.481 0.516 0.365 -0.491
Kurtosis 3.942 4.711 2.329 3.699 3.257
No. of Obs. 60 60 60 35 60
Note: Quarterly data.
Source: Author’s calculations.
The next section presents the results obtained from the application of a variety 
of MS-AR and MS-VAR specifications to capture the cyclical dynamics of the four 
Latin American countries and the United States, and the business cycle correlation 
between these countries during the period under consideration.
4.6 Empirical Analysis
This section is divided into three parts. The first part describes the business cycles 
in each country separately using univariate Markov-switching model analysis (as 
presented in Section 4.3.1). In the following we present an international business 
cycle model to identify the correlation between countries by Markov-switching vector 
autoregression. We will consider now MS-AR and MS-VAR specifications with three
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regimes, which might be able to reflect persistent positive and negative deviations 
in the mean growth rate. We tested for the order of the autoregression and the 
vector autoregression in various models with shifts in the mean or the intercept, 
and allowed for shifts in the va r i a nce . F i na l l y ,  some indications of international 
convergence between the Latin American countries considered and the United States 
are presented.
4.6.1 Business Cycle Analysis for Individual Countries
In the analysis of business cycles in the countries under study, we estimate a Markov- 
switching model with three regimes, each of them with a particular duration. 
Regime 1 corresponds to recessions or contraction; regime 2  represents normal or 
moderate growth and regime 3 denotes high growth episodes.
Three criteria were used to select the best model for each country; the statis­
tical significance of the estimated parameters, the ability of the model to path the 
observed periods of contractions and expansions (which is further separated into a 
“normal growth” and “high growth” periods) and criteria of Akaike (AIC), Hannah- 
Quinn (HQ) and Schwarz (SC). We applied these selection criteria both for univari­
ate and bivariate Markov-switching models. Then two specifications were chosen for 
estimation: firstly, in line with the literature, we employ a Markov-switching mean 
autoregressive (MSM-AR) model of order (p) as shown in equation (4.6), with three 
regimes for El Salvador and the United States.
p
A yt =  p  (st) -b ^  CKi A yt-i -\- St (4.6)
i=l
All the calculations reported in this chapter were carried out with the MS-VAR class, package 
version 1.31k, for Ox version 3.10. See Krolzig (1998).
^°As a first step, we estimated a Markov-switching model with two regimes, however, according 
to Akaike (AIC), Hannah-Quinn (HQ) and Schwarz (SC) criteria the model with three regimes in 
fact seems to be superior.
^^We use three regimes to capture stylised facts described by Sichel (1994). This author finds 
that there are typically three phases in a business cycle: recessions, high growth recoveries and 
moderate growth periods following theses recoveries.
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For the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Panam a a second specification when 
shifts in the intercept term  have been used (MSI-AR). In both specifications we 
assume homoscedastic errors, tha t is cr^  is assumed to be same in the three regimes 
(cTj =  <j| =  0 -3 ), and St ~  N I D  (0, o- )^.
The specification of the mean adjusted form and the intercept form are not equiv­
alent. They imply different dynamic adjustments in the observed variables after a 
change in regime. While a permanent regime shift in the mean causes an im­
mediate jum p of the observed times series vector into its new level, the dynamic 
response to a once-and-for-all regime shift in the intercept term (z/gj is alike to an 
equivalent shock in the white noise et (see Krolzig, 1997b). In the MSI-AR specifica­
tion business cycles are characterised by smoother transitions than in the MSM-AR 
specification. However, the MSI and the MSM specifications are equivalent only if 
the order of the autoregression is zero, e.g. the Ecuatorian case in this study.
As shown in Section 4.5, the Ecuatorian economy presents an issue of structural 
break. The literature illustrates different ways to handle the problem of structural 
b r e a k s . T h e  alternative chosen in this chapter to estimate a Markov-switching 
model in the presence of structural change, is to model the change in the log of 
GDP as a hidden Markov chain, setting the autoregressive process in equation (4.6) 
equal to zero {i — 0 ).^^
In addition to the two specifications above, we estimate an alternative specifi­
cation of Markov-switching model where the homoscedasticity assumption of the 
Hamilton model has been relaxed {of o \ ^  a |) .  We allow changes in the variance 
across regimes in order to capture different volatilities in contraction and expansions
McConnell and Pérez-Quiros (2000) find evidence of a structural break in the volatility of GDP 
growth in the US in the first quarter of 1984. They suggest augmenting the model by allowing the 
residual variance to switch between two regimes, and allow the mean growth rate vary depending 
on the state of the variance. That specification yields four possible states for the mean growth rate: 
low growth under high and low volatility states, and high growth under high and low volatility 
states.
Several authors have reported that the log first difference of GDP in the US and other countries 
is better modelled as a low autoregressive process (zero or one), including Albert and Chib (1993), 
McConnell and Pérez-Quiros (2000) and Chauvet (2001).
The Case for Dollarization: Measuring the Synchronisation of Business Cycles
with Regime Switching Models 128
(normal and high growth). The model we adopt (according to the criteria defined 
before) is a Markov-switching with regime-dependent intercept and heteroscedastic- 
ity (MSIH) to all countries. The number of lags used is the same of homoscedastic 
models. Also, we expect tha t <r| <  because episodes of rapid or recovery
growth are normally more volatile than periods of recession, which in turn are more 
volatile than periods of slow growth.
Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimations of the models has been conducted us­
ing the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm discussed in Hamilton (1990),^'^ 
in conjunction with the filtering algorithm of Hamilton (1990) and the smoothing 
algorithms of Kim (1994).
The appropriate numbers of lags were chosen according to Akaike (AIC), Hannah- 
Quinn (HQ) and Schwarz (SC) c r i t e r i a . A l l  models are tested for linearity by tak­
ing the linear model as the null hypothesis and the Markov-switching model as the 
alternative. In order to test between linearity versus non-linear Markov-switching 
specifications we suggested tha t the underlying distribution can be approximated 
by a X^{q) distribution where q represents the number of restrictions.^® Following 
this route, the LR test statistics are found to be highly significant. These results 
remains true when the test is adjusted in the manner advocated by Davies (1977). 
The test proposed by Davies (1977) is a modified form of the LR test which gives a 
corrected upper bound for the probability value. The estimation results are given in 
Tables 4.7 and 4.8, which also report measures of the persistence of difi'erent regimes: 
the unconditional (ergodic) probability and the expected duration of a particular 
regime. In addition, Table 4.9 shows a summary of the main coefficients and their 
economic interpretation. In the MSM-AR model the EM algorithm converged af-
Appendix B .l provides an overview of the EM algorithm.
^®The information criteria used are: A IC  =  —2 log T /T  +  2n/T; HQ  — —2 log L /T  +
2nlog(log(T'))/T and SC ~  —2 log L /T  +  n\og{T)/T ,  where L is the maximized likelihood, n 
is the number of parameters and T is the sample size.
Hansen (1992, 1996) and Garcia (1998) developed other tests for the Markov-switching model 
against linear alternative employing standardised likelihood ratio, but they are computationally 
demanding.
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ter 59 and 43 iterations to El Salvador and Panama, respectively. While for the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador and the United States the EM algorithm converged 
after 29, 31 and 40 iterations, respectively. Similarly, in the heteroscedastic model, 
the EM algorithm converged after 62 and 31 iterations for the Dominican Republic 
and El Salvador, respectively; and after 50 and 8 8  iterations for Panam a and the 
United States, respectively. On the contrary, in the MSIH model of Ecuador the 
EM algorithm was stopped after the maximum of 100 iterations, the EM algorithm 
did not converge because the number of iterations exceeded a previously specified 
upper bound (see appendix B .l).
LR statistics show tha t most models confidently reject the null hypothesis of 
linearity at marginal significance levels indicated in brackets. The exception is the 
MSIH model of the US, but rejecting the null of linearity at 5.1% level. Similarly, the 
Davies upper bound show tha t the null hypothesis model is rejected; the Markov- 
switching model with three regimes in fact seems to be superior. Furthermore, 
the homoscedastic specification in the Dominican Republic, Panam a and the US 
appeared to be statistically most satisfactory on the basis of the AIC, HQ and 
SC criteria. In Ecuador and El Salvador only the SC criterion shows tha t the 
homoscedastic model is most satisfactory. On the other hand, we find tha t the 
autoregressive parameters are not statistically significant in most cases.
All countries have experienced shorter durations of contractions than expansions, 
and mean growth is lower in absolute value than that for e x p a n s i o n s , b u t  the 
Dominican Republic and the US present more duration in contraction phases than 
high growth, and the US presents larger periods of contractions than normal growth 
in the MSM-AR model. At the same time, only the US shows more volatility in high 
growth period than contractions, but contractions (recessions) are not more volatile 
than periods of normal growth. The regime durations are consistent with traditional 
descriptions of the length of contractions (recessions) and expansions.^® The three
the homoscedastic model of Ecuador, the phase of growth are y i  <  0 < ys <  fj.2 - 
^®See Burns and Mitchell (1946).
The Case for Dollarization: Measuring the Sxjnchronisation of Business Cycles
with Regime Switching Models 130
Table 4.7: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Various MS-AR Specifications
Parametor MSI{3)-AR(0) MSI(3)-AR(0) MSM(3)-AR(3) MSI(3)-AR(2) MSM(3)-
AR(2)
Dom . Rep. Ecuador El Salvador Panam a USA
P i -0.036 -0.006
P2 0.032 0.057
M3 0.106 0.116
1^ 1 -0.527 -0.238 0.018
1^ 2 0.149 0.053 0.303
0.939 0.051 0.659
«1 0.146
(0.093)
-1.049
(0.105)
-0.261
(0.128)
« 2 0.125
(0.085)
-0.580
(0.109)
-0.034
(0.120)
0(3 -0.294
(0.084)
0-2 0.287 0.084 0.021 0.089 0.035
P ll 0.603 0.402 0.500 0.687 0.737
P22 0.962 0.734 0.941 0.587 0.700
P33 0.000 0.550 0.847 0.663 0.893
Duration of 2,52 1.67 2.00 3.20 3.81
recessions
Duration of 26.13 3.77 17.19 2.42 3.34
normal growth
Duration of 1.00 2.23 6.54 2.97 9.37
high growth
Erg prob Reg 1 0.071 0.032 0.000 0.288 0.125
Reg 2 0.867 0.615 0.724 0.439 0.230
Reg 3 0.061 0.352 0.275 0.272 0.644
Obs. Reg 1 6.8 2.1 1.0 8.4 9.1
Reg 2 48.5 36.1 35.4 14.6 14.9
Reg 3 4.7 20.8 19.6 10.0 34.0
Log-likelihood -23.877 55.703 117.187 10.192 92.375
AIC 1.129 -1.549 -3.721 0.109 -2.771
HQ 1.265 -1.411 -3.538 0.292 -2.605
sc 1.478 -1.197 -3.250 0.653 -2.345
LR linearity 20.814 7.709 27.028 11.307 8.680
Test (0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (0.003) (0.013)
Davies 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.043 0.012
N otes'. D a ta  in q uarters: 1990.01-2004.04. S tan d a rd  erro rs in  b rackets, except in LR le s t w hen values in b rackets ind icate  significance 
Sonrce- .A uthor’s calculations
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Table 4.8: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Various MSH-AR Specifications
Parameter MSIH(3)-
AR(0)
MSIH(3)-
AR(0)
MSIH(3)-AR(3) MSIH(3)-
AR(2)
MSIH(3)-
AR(2)
Dom . Rep, E cuador El Salvador Panam a USA
yi -0.521 -0.135 0.039 0.010 -0.024
1/2 0.150 0.044 0.066 0.299 0.072
1/3 0.953 0.226 0.142 0.657 0.071
a i -0.141 -1.020 0.083
(0.083) (0.082) (0.119)
«2 -0.004 -0.502 0.203
(0.075) (0.078) (0.112)
«3 -0.210
(0.070)
0.344 0.102 0.0158 0.082 0.037
«■i 0.281 0.060 0.0327 0.109 0.041
0.197 0.035 0.0247 0.057 0.071
P ll 0.593 0.200 0.958 0.674 0,725
P22 0.961 0.885 0.836 0.633 0.972
P33 0.000 0.163 0.888 0.181 0.027
Duration of 2.46 1.25 23.86 3.07 3.64
recessions
Duration of 25.88 8.74 6.10 2.73 36.39
normal growth
Duration of 1.00 1.20 8.95 2.76 2.43
high growth
Erg prob Reg 1 0.075 0.097 0.613 0.274 0.088
Reg 2 0.862 0.824 0.156 0.483 0.852
Reg 3 0.061 0.078 0.230 0.242 0.059
Obs. Reg 1 7.0 5.9 26.6 8.1 7.8
Reg 2 48.3 48.2 11.4 15.9 46.5
Reg 3 4.7 4.9 18.0 8.9 3.8
Log-likelihood -23.169 59.102 120.701 11.163 92.764
AIC 1.172 -1.596 -3.775 0.171 -2.716
HQ 1.336 -1.431 -3.564 0.385 -2.522
SC 1.591 -1.174 -3.232 0.806 -2.218
LR linearity 22.230 14.507 34.055 13.250 9.458
Test (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.010) (0.050)
Davies 0.003 0.080 0.000 0.012 0.044
iVoies: D a ta  in quarters: 1990.01-2004.04. S tan d a rd  errors in b rackets, except in  LR te st w hen values in brackets  ind ica te  significance 
level,
S o xirce:  A u th o r ’s c a lc u la t io n s .
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Table 4.9: Maximum Likelihood Estimates: Main Coefficients
Parameter MSI(3)-AR(0) MSI(3)-AR(0) MSM(3)-AR(3) MSI(3)-AR(2) MSM(3)-
AR(2)
Dom . Rep. Ecuador El Salvador Panam a USA
Coefficient -0.527 -0.238 -0.036 0.018 -0.006
Regime 1 (0.120) (0.066) (31.676) (0.035) (0.013)
Coefficient 0.149 0.053 0.032 0.303 0.057Regime 2 (0.046) (0.043) (0.006) (0.033) (0.012)
Coefficient 0.939 0.051 0.106 0.659 0.116
Regime 3 (0.152) (0.075) (0.011) (0.052) (0.018)
Davies 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.043 0.012
Parameter MSIH(3)- MSIH(3)- MSIH(3)-AR(3) MSIH(3)- MSIII(3)-
AR(0) AR(0) AR(2) AR(2)
Dom . Rep. Ecuador E l Salvador Panam a USA
Coefficient -0.521 -0.135 0.039 0.010 -0.024
Regime 1 (0.139) (0.095) (0.005) (0.034) (0.016)
Coefficient 0.150 0.044 0.066 0.299 0.072Regime 2 (0.048) (0.010) (0.011) (0.035) (0.014)
Coefficient 0.953 0.226 0.142 0.657 0.071
Regime 3 (0.109) (0.018) (0.012) (0.037) (0.059)
Davies 0.003 0.080 0.000 0.012 0.044
Notes'. D a ta  in quarters: 1990.01-2004.04. S tan d a rd  errors in brackets. Davies upper bound provides an  up p er bound for the correct 
p-value.
S u m m a ry : Regime 1 is the q u a te r grow th ra te  in con trac tion  p eriod . T he  con tractions are m ore deep in th e  D om inican Republic. 
T his coun try  shows a grow th ra te  of -2.08%  per year in regime 1.
Source'. A u th o r’s ca lcula tions
The Case for Dollarization: Measuring the Synchronisation of Business Cycles
with Regime Switching Models 133
regimes of Panam a correspond to the phases of the growth cycle in both estimations, 
while El Salvador shows growth cycles in the MSIH model. The different behaviour 
of duration and variances suggest tha t the cycles are asymmetric between regimes. 
Effectively, the results of formal tests for asymmetry in business cycles in relation 
to the cycle features of sharpness, deepness, and steepness confirm tha t (see Table 
B.2 and B.3 in appendix B).^® Sharpness determines whether troughs and peaks are 
sharp or rounded, deepness reflects troughs having a longer duration than peaks, 
while steepness is the property of reaching the peak faster than the trough. For all 
countries, the null hypothesis of non-deepness is accepted, while only El Salvador 
rejects the null of non-sharpness. The results also suggest non-steepnees for Panama 
and the Dominican Republic (only in the homoscedastic model).
The filtered and smoothed probabilities were used to construct the time paths 
for corresponding regimes. Filtered probabilities, Pr =  j  | are optimal
inferences about St conditional at time t  using only the information up to time t, 
where j  e  {1,2,3}; and smoothed probabilities, Pr (^yt,st = j  | are optimal
inferences about sj at time t using all the information available in the sample. The 
difference between these two measures indicates the amount of revisions required 
when new observations become available. The filtered and smoothed probabilities 
generated by the MS models are presented in the second to fourth and sixth to 
eighth graphics of Figures 4.10 to 4.14, respectively. The smoothed probabilities are 
depicted with a bold line, while the filtered probabilities are shown with a dashed 
line. They show graphically the contractions and expansions (normal and high 
growth) in each country.
Following the parametric approach presented by Krolzig (2003) we construct 
turning point chronologies based on the time paths of the smoothed regime prob­
abilities, which are derived from expression Pr (yt,St = j  | for each country
and presented in Table 4.6 to Table 4.10. The peak date denotes the period t just
’The null hypothesis being absence of sharpness, deepness, and steepness.
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before the beginning of a recession. We use the following threshold function:
P r (yt, s t = j \  yu G) =  I
1 , i i P  
0 if P
st==j \yt](^
st = j \  y t \G
> 0.5 (4.7)
< 0.5
It is im portant to note tha t, we have three regimes in the MS-AR models, hence 
we make a dichotomous distinction between expansion (normal and high growth 
phases) and recession. So if the economy is in recession we assign 0 and if it is 
in a normal or high growth phase we assign it 1. Thus, we can say that a peak 
occurs if the smooothed probabilities are greater than or equal to 50%. T hat is, the 
economy is assumed to be in a recession if Pr (^ St = 0 \  yt,0^ > Pr ^Sf — l  \yt, 6^ ■ 
The trough is the last period of the recession. The periods troughs and peaks (or 
peaks and trougths) are denoted as expansion (or contraction) phases.
U nited S ta tes .  The first six rows in Table 4.7 and 4.8 show the average growth 
rate for each regime. In the MSM(3)-AR(2) specification, the estimated quarterly 
growth rate is 0.06% in normal growth and 0 .1 2 % in high growth, while in recessions 
it is only -0.01%. Transition probabilities of regimes are 0.74 for recessions, 0.70 for 
moderate growth and 0.89 for high growth. Expected duration of regimes are 3.81 
quarters for recessions, 3.34 quarters for normal growth and 9.37 quarters for high 
growth. The results for the MSIH-AR specification, where the intercept and the 
variance are assumed to be state-dependent, shows that the conditional mean of the 
quarterly growth rate is 0.02% in recessions, 0.072% in normal growth and 0.071% 
in high growth, with transitions probabilities of 0.725, 0,972 and 0.027, respectively. 
The variances separating the three regimes are 0.037 for recessions, 0.041 for normal 
growth and 0.071 for high growth. Both models used for the US estimated long 
recessions, with an average duration of 3.81 and 3.64 quarters in MSM and MSIH, 
respectively.
Model selection procedures suggest an AR order 2 . AR coefficients are all nega­
tive in the MSI model, conversely, these coefficients are positive in the MSIH model.
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According to literature on the subject, regimes of high growth or recovery mainly 
occur after recessions (contractions). However, after the recession between 1990 and 
1991 we observed that there is a normal growth phase. The high growth period can 
only be contacted through the normal or moderate growth and not directly from 
a contraction phase, in other words, pis is close to zero (see transition m atrix in 
appendix B.3). This result is consistent with Sichel (1994); McConnell and Pérez- 
Quiros (2000) and Krolzig (2001a). Sichel (1994) pointed out th a t there was not 
a high growth recovery following the recession of 1990-91 and attributes this to a 
combination of both weak inventory investment and weak final sales. McConnell and 
Pérez-Quiros (2000) document the diminished role of inventories, that may serve to 
substantially weaken the high growth recovery phase in the US.
Table 4.10: United States: Dating of Business Cycles
Model Peak Trough Prob. Duration
MSM-AR 1990Q3 1991Q1 0.998 3
2000Q3 2001Q3 0.978 5
MSIH-AR 1990Q3 1991Q1 0.967 3
2000Q3 2001Q3 0.862 5
NBER
Peak Trough Duration
1990Q3 1991Q1 3
2001Q1 2001Q4 4
Note: Duration denotes the length of the recession in quarters.
Source: Author’s calculations and NBER data.
Dating of turning points based on the smoothed probability of being in a recession 
is shown in Table 4.10. In order to evaluate our Markov-switching model we should 
compare our results with those obtained using traditional techniques of dating busi­
ness cycle turning points. In the United States, the National Bureau of Economic
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Figure 4.5: United States: Regime-Probabilities in the Univariate MS-AR 
Q 2 MSM(3)-AR(2), 1990 (3) -  2004 (4)
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Research (NBER) is responsible for identifying the different phases of recessions and 
expansions occurring in the economy by a Business Cycle Dating Committee. Their 
results are formed from a set of reference chronologies for peaks and troughs that 
can be considered as a benchmark for testing hypotheses of business cycles. The 
turning points for the United States resulting from our Markov-switching models 
are very close to those identified by NBER. Table 4.5 shows the deeper contractions 
of 1990-1991, as well as the contractions of 2001.
D o m in ic a n  Republic .  Contractions in the Dominican Republic have an ex­
pected duration of 2.52 quarters and they show great persistence; the probability 
tha t a contraction will be followed by another quarter of contractions is 60%. These 
values remain similar when we relax the homoscedasticity assumption. In compar­
ison to the US business cycle, the contractions (recessions) are shorter (2.52 versus 
3.81 quarters), but more pronounced (-0.53% for the Dominican Republic versus 
-0.01% for the US).
The Dominican Republic exhibits relatively higher growth rates in the third 
regime (0.94%), with an estimated annualised growth rate of 3.76%. However, the 
probability that high expansion will be followed by high expansion is relatively low 
and not persistent. The unconditional probability of a normal growth period is about 
8 6 % in both specifications. On the other side, the behaviour of the variance of the 
Dominican Republic is asymmetric with respect to the rest of countries estimated. 
This country has a relative high volatility. The results of MSIH specification shows 
tha t the volatility of output growth during periods of contractions (recessions) are 
higher than expansions. In terms of the variance and duration of different regimes, 
there is clear empirical evidence for the asymmetry in the Dominican Republic 
business cycle, which is confirmed by formal tests.
Figure 4.6 reveals a very severe contraction in the Dominican Republic during the 
early 1990s. It can be seen that the first regime depicts very precisely the contraction 
of 1990, while the third regime characterises high growth (recoveries) episodes mainly
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occurring after recessions, these results are consistent with the literature (Sichel, 
1994). Consequently, the probability of transition from a high growth phase to a 
recession period is relatively high (46%) in both specifications. By way of contrast, 
the probability of transition from normal or moderate growth, pgi, to the recession 
phase is very low.
Table 4.11: Dominican Republic: Dating of Business Cycles
Model Peak Trough Prob. Duration
MSI-AR 1990Q1 1990Q4 1 .0 0 0 4
1995Q1 1995Q2 0.843 2
1995Q4 1995Q4 0.990 1
MSIH-AR 1990Q1 1990Q4 0.999 4
1995Q1 1995Q2 0.882 2
1995Q4 1995Q4 0.991 1
Note: Duration denotes the length of the recession in quarters.
Source: Author’s calculations.
Table 4.11 shows the dating of the business cycle turning points of the Dominican 
Republic using smoothed probabilities of MSI and MSIH models. Both models show 
a strong contraction in 1990, which could be considered as a recession because the 
real GDP fell for four successive quarters. This contraction also has a very high 
probability. In addition, this contraction (recession) coincides with a recession in 
the US during the same period.
It is interesting to note tha t the graph for the first regime (in the Figure 4.6) and 
Table 4.11 show a contraction (no recession) in this economy in 1995. This coincides 
with a small spike in the US in 1995 (see Figure 4.5). We could suggest tha t in 1995 
there was a low growth in the US which could have affected the dynamic of the 
Dominican Republics’ economy. On the contrary, the Dominican economy does not 
reflect the contraction in the US in 2001.
E cuador .  The Ecuatorian economy is characterised in the sample period by
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Figure 4.6: Dominican Republic: Regime-Probabilities in the Univariate MS-AR 
MSI(3)-AR(0), 1990 (I) -  2004 (4)
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one strong contraction in 1999. As illustrated in Figure 4.7. The results show that 
Ecuador has steeper and relatively more persistent contractions, but the contractions 
are shorter than expansions (the null hypothesis of non-deepness is rejected). Also, 
Ecuador is normal growth persistent. Transition probabilities of regimes are 0.40 for 
contractions, 0.73 for moderate growth and 0.55 for high growth. The implication 
is tha t the probability of a contraction generally followed by another contraction is 
40%. Interestingly, the probability of transition from contraction periods to normal 
and high growth periods are quite similar in both specifications (34% and 26% in 
the homoscedastic model and 30% and 50% in the heteroscedastic model, respec­
tively). While the probability from normal growth to high growth is 24% in the 
homoscedastic model, but only 2 % in the heteroscedastic specification.
Figure 4.7: Ecuador: Regime-Probabilities in the Univariate MS-AR
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Table 4.12: Ecuador: Dating of Business Cycles
Model Peak Trough Prob. Duration
MSI-AR 1999Q1 1999Q2 0.976 2
Note: Duration denotes the length of the recession in quarters.
Source: Author’s calculation.
The standard errors of each regime are 0.10, 0.06 and 0.04 for contractions, 
moderate and high growth, respectively. According to the results, Ecuador has 
larger volatilities in contractions than in expansionary periods.
El Salvador.  The state of recession displays a low average growth rate ( -0.15% 
per annum ), while the state of normal growth shows an average growth rate of only 
0.13% annually and the high growth state is characterised by a high production 
mean rate (0.43% per annum), as seen in Table 4.3.
Table 4.13: El Salvador: Dating of Business Cycles
Model Peak Ti'ough Prob. Duration
MSM-AR 1991Q1 1991Q1 0.988 1
MSIH-AR 1995Q3 1996Q2 0.881 4
1999Q2 2004Q4 0.998 2 2
Note: Duration denotes the length of the recession in quarters.
Source: Author’s calculations.
From the estimated transition probabilities, the measure of the persistence of 
the regimes can be deduced, normal and high growth regimes are more persistent 
and present more durations than recessions. The unconditional probability of nor­
mal growth is 72% for homoscedastic model. In the same way, the probability of 
transition from contractions (recessions) to recovery periods (high growth) is rela­
tively high (50%), while the probability from contractions to normal growth is very 
close to zero. In contrast, the Markov components of GDP growth in the MSIH
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Figure 4.8: El Salvador: Regime-Probabilities in the Univariate MS-AR 
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specification are positive. It is therefore more appropiate to think of this model as 
a representation of growth cycles. This is confirmed by the high expected duration 
of the low-growth regime (23.86 quarters).
P a n a m a .  The results for Panam a display a positive low mean and a shorter 
average duration in regime 1, which is associated with economic slowdowns. During 
slowdowns the Panam a’s economy shows a growth rate of 0.07% per annum, while 
during periods of moderate and high growth, it averages 1.21% and 2.64% per an­
num. Panam a presents a growth cycle in both models. AR coefficients are implying 
a negative serial correlation in the growth rate of GDP. The heteroscedastic model 
presents asymmetries in the volatility of the growth rate.
Table 4.14: Panama: Dating of Business Cycles
Model Peak Trough Prob. Duration
MSM-AR 1999Q4 2000Q1 0.984 2
2001Q1 2002Q1 0.996 5
2004Q4 2004Q4 0.972 1
MSIH-AR 1999Q4 2 0 0 0 Q1 0.960 2
2 0 0 1 Q1 2002Q1 0.987 5
2004Q4 2004Q4 0.916 1
Note: Duration denotes the length of the recession in quarters.
Source: Author’s calculations.
To summarise, comparing the results for the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador and Panam a with those of the United States, we note tha t contractions 
(recessions) are more pronounced in the Dominican Republic than the rest of the 
countries. In periods of normal growth, the estimated quarterly growth rate of the 
Dominican Republic and El Salvador are larger than tha t of the United States. The 
Dominican Republic and Panam a also present normal growth periods are charac­
terised by a relatively high mean growth rate and high volatility. Latin American 
countries, with the exception of El Salvador, present a higher disturbance variance
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Figure 4.9: Panama: Regime-Probabilities in the Univariate MS-AR
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than tha t of the US.
Most of the countries under study do not show asymmetry type sharpness in 
their business cycles, so the turning points of the business cycle in each country are 
similar in that respect. Similarly, in all countries troughs have a longer duration than 
peaks. Nevertheless, asymmetric type steepness is not similar in most countries.
In general, the results of the business cycle characteristics of each individual 
country suggest there is some evidence supporting common regime shifts particularly 
between the Dominican Republic and the US, and Panam a and the US. Thus, it is 
prudent for an investigation in common business cycles to be considered in the next 
section.
4.6.2 Common Regime Shifts and Common Business Cycles
In this section, we evaluate the international nature of business cycles by applying 
bivariate Markov-switching-VAR models. We use the same criteria defined in the 
previous section to select the best model for each pair of countries. The best repre­
sentation for the Dominican Republic-United States business cycle is a MSM-VAR 
model:
(sf) — A i  (sf) {yt-i — M + .....+  Ap (st) {yt-p — (^t-p)) +  St (4.8)
Alternatively, the MSI-VAR model is proven to be a better approximation for 
Ecuador-US, El Salvador-US and Panama-US business cycles. This specification is 
given by:
= ^  (st) +  Ai {sf) ?/t_i - f  -1- Ap {st) yt-p +  £t (4.9)
with £t ~  N I D  (0,a^) in both especifications. As in the analysis of univariate 
Markov-switching models, the number of autoregressive lags was determined ac­
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cording to Akaike (AIC), Hannah-Quinn (HQ) and Schwarz (SC) criteria, leading 
to some specifications not including any autoregressive components in the MS-VAR 
model. The implication is tha t there is neither international nor intertemporal trans­
mission of country specific shocks. However, it remains possible tha t the existence 
of common shifts might be explained by large contemporaneously occuring common 
shocks or by coincidental, but independent, domestic shocks and policies. Krolzig 
(1997a) suggests tha t this is especially true following the oil price shock in 1973.
As in the last section, we relax the homoscedasticity assumption, and estimate an 
heteroscedastic model. The number of lags used is the same as in the homoscedastic 
models. We accept tha t there exists a common cycle when there is a reasonable 
number of common shifts and regimes. Also, we check how well the MS-VAR models 
track common shifts and regimes, especially contractions.
The results of estimated MS-VAR and MSH-VAR models are shown in Table 
4.15 and 4.16. In addition. Table 4.17 shows a summary of the main coefficients 
and their economic interpretation. According to LR statistics and the Davies upper 
bound, all models confidently reject the null hypothesis of linearity (with significance 
levels indicated in brackets). Filtered and smoothed probabilities, and hence turning 
points, can be obtained from analogous expressions to those defined in the previous 
section.
D o m in ic a n  R ep u b lic -U n ited  S ta tes .  For the Dominican Republic and the 
United States the average growth rate in expansion periods (normal and high growth) 
is relatively greater than during contraction phases; the estimated transition prob­
abilities imply a higher persistence and duration in the high growth regime than 
the second regime (normal growth). In general, the transition probability matrix 
reveals th a t the regimes are persistent and there is an equal probability (about 19%) 
of moving from contraction (recession) periods to phases of normal and high growth. 
However, the converse is not true, the probability of moving from normal growth to 
contractions is only 7%, while the probability from high growth to contractions is
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Table 4.15: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Various MS-VAR Specifications
P aram eter M SM (3)- VAR(2) M SI(3)- VAR(O) M SI(3)- VAR(O) M SI(3)- V A R (l)
D om . U SA E c u a d o r U SA E l S a lvador U SA P a n a m a  USA
R ep.
Ml -0.339 0.019
M2 0.167 0.045
M3 0.215 0.106
0.063 -0.002 0.019 -0.001 0.089 0.046
W2 0.030 0.089 0.038 0.107 0.051 0.147
l>3 0.092 0.163 0.108 0.083 0.326 0.153
a i -0.681 0.047
(0.136) (0,156)
«2 -0.282 0.004
(0.134) (0.128)
0.311 0.044 0.098 0.038 0.028 0.043 0.166 0.036
P l i 0.618 0.807 0.803 0.891
P22 0.836 0.859 0.958 0.575
P33 0.951 0.000 0.940 0.708
D uration  of 2.62 5.20 5.08 9.23
recessions
D uration  of 6.11 7.12 24.25 2.36
norm al grow th
D uration  of 20.78 1.00 16.84 3.43
high grow th
E rg prob  Reg 1 0.046 0.122 0.137 0.328
Reg 2 0.257 0.769 0.656 0.322
Reg 3 0.695 0.108 0.206 0.349
O bs. Reg 1 4.6 10.1 10.4 11.1
Reg 2 16.8 43.0 31.7 10.8
Reg 3 36.6 5.9 16.9 12.1
C onlcinp. 0.395 -0.047 -0.121 0.268
C orrelation
Log-likelihood 75.598 145.256 213.832 65.680
AIC -1.813 -4.415 -6.740 -2.745
HQ -1.495 -4,209 -6.533 -2.455
SC -0.996 -3.887 -6.211 -1.892
LR  T est 12.852 19.819 60.903 14.175
(0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006)
0.014 0.010 0.000 0.090
N otes; D a ta  in quarte rs: 1990.01-2004.04. S tan d a rd  erro rs in brackets, except in LR  le s t when values in brackets ind ica te  significance 
level.
S o u rc e :  A u th o r ’s  c a lc u la t io n s .
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Table 4.16: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Various MSH-VAR Specifications
P aram ete r M SM H(3)- VAR(2) M SIH (3)- VAR(O) M SIH(3)- VAR(O) M SIH (3)- V A R (l)
D om . USA E c u a d o r  USA El S a lvador U SA P a n a m a  U SA
R ep.
Ml .0.007 0.030
M2 0.261 0.074
M3 0.224 0.106
v\ 0.007 0.013 0.021 0.016 0.047 0.037
M2 0.032 0.084 0.040 0.114 0.180 0.177
M3 0.087 0.131 0.108 0.083 0.154 0.105
a i -0.353 0.009
(0.086) (0.064)
Q2 -0.146 0.560
(0.098) (0.057)
- Î 0.507 0.037 0.146 0.051 0.020 0.050 0.162 0.042
a l 0.246 0.064 0.064 0.035 0.031 0.040 0.207 0.009
0.288 0.020 0.086 0.039 0.028 0.042 0.215 0,017
P l l 0.603 0.696 0,864 0,844
P22 0.328 0.704 0,056 0.000
P33 0.785 0.517 0.040 0.808
D uration  of 2.52 3.30 7.38 6.44
recessions
D uration  of 1.49 3.38 23.16 1.00
norm al grow th
D uration  of 4.66 2.07 16.72 5.23
high grow th
Erg prob  Reg 1 0.406 0.213 0.190 0.343
Reg 2 0.239 0.487 0.599 0.148
Reg 3 0.354 0.299 0.209 0.507
O bs. Reg 1 24.4 13.9 14.6 13.0
Reg 2 15.0 28.3 27.5 5.0
Reg 3 18.6 16.9 16.9 16.0
C onO orrl 0.975 -0.614 -0.026 0.195
C onCorr2 -0.698 -0.149 -0.066 -0.943
O onCorrS 0.736 -0.099 -0.328 0,469
Log-likelihood 97.736 146.475 216.2043 79.694
AIC -2.370 -4.253 -6.617 -3.217
HQ -1.968 -3.964 -6.328 -2,834
SC -1.340 -3.514 -5.877 -2.095
LR  T est 57,128 22.258 65.647 42.203
(0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000)
Davies 0,000 0.022 0.000 0.000
N otent D a ta  in  quarters: 1990.01-2004*04. S tan d a rd  errors in brackets, except in  LR te s t when values in b rackets ind icate significance 
S ource: A uthor^s ca lcula tions.
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Table 4.17: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of MS-VAR: Main Coefficients
P aram eter M SM (3)- V AR(2) M SI(3)- VAR(O) M SI(3)- VAR(O) M SI(3)- V A R (l)
U SA E cu a d o r U SA Ei Sa lva d o r USA P a n a m a U SA
fiep .
CoeBicient -0.339 0.019 0.063 -0.002 0.019 -0.001 0.089 0.046
Regime 1 (0.107) (0.037) (0.031) (0.015) (0.009) (0.019) (0058) (0.013)
Coefficient 
Regime 2 0.167 0.045 0.030 0.089 0.038 0.107 0.051 0.147
Coefficient (0.051) (0.025) (0018) (0.011) (0.005) (0.008) (0.099) (0.020)0.215 0.106 0.092 0.163 0.108 0.083 0.326 0.153
Regime 3 (0.074) (0.034) (0.080) (0.040) (0.006) (0.010) (0.110) (0.022)
Davies 0.014 0.010 0.000 0.090
P aram eter M SM II(3)- VAR(2) M SIII(3)- VAR(O) MS1H(3)- VAR(O) M SIH(3)- V A R (i)
D om . USA E cuador U SA Et Sa lva d o r U SA P a n a m a U SA
R ep.
Coefficient -0.007 0.030 0.007 0.013 0.021 0.016 0.047 0.037
Regime 1 (0.049) (0.018) (0.040) (0.014) (0.005) (0.014) (0.055) (0.012)
Coefficient 
Regime 2 0.261 0.074 0.032 0.084 0.040 0.114 0.180 0.177
Coefficient (0.048) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.006) (0.008) (0.109) (0.005)
0.224 0.106 0.087 0.131 0.108 0.083 0.154 0.105
Regime 3
(0.056) (0.017) (0.046) (0.022) (0.007) (0.010) (0.092) (0.006)
Davies 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.000
N otes: D a ta  in q uarters: 1990.01-2004.04. S tan d a rd  errors in brackets. Davies upper bound provides an  u pper bound  for the correct 
p-value.
S iim m a n y . Regime 1 is th e  q u a te r grow th  ra te  in con trac tio n  period . T h e  con tractions are m ore deep in  the  D om inican Republic 
th a n  the U nited  S la tes . T h is coun try  shows a grow th  ra te  of -1.3%  per year in regim e 1, while the US shows a grow th ra tes of 0.07% 
per year in the sam e regime.
Source:  A u th o r’s ca lcula tions
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zero. In the MSH-VAR specification, the probability of moving from contraction pe­
riods to normal and high growth periods are 40% and zero, respectively. While, the 
probability of transition from high growth and normal growth phase to contractions j
are 22% and 35%, respectively.
The Dominican Republic shows more volatility than the US. This result is con- |
I
sis tent with tha t found with univariate MS-AR model. In the heteroscedastic model j
the Dominican Republic shows high volatility in the third regime. However, the US I
shows high volatility in the normal growth regime. In general, most of the estimated 
parameters are similar to those obtained from MS-AR models, especially to those 
for the Dominican Republic.
Results of asymmetry tests (see Table B.4) show that the common cycles between 
the Dominican Republic and the US are characterised by contractions being less 
steep than expansions and the amplitude of troughs exceeds tha t of peaks. These 
results are not very different from the univariate cases.
The time paths of the smoothed and filtered probabilities are presented in Figure 
4.10. The graph corresponding to the MSMH model resembles more the regimes of 
the Dominican Republic than those of the US. Interestingly, both models path some 
episodes of low growth in both countries as contractions, which generates a lower 
mean in absolute value in the first regime than tha t estimated by the corresponding 
MS-AR model for the Dominican Republic and a positive mean for the United States.
According to the homoscedastic model (see Table 4.18), common contractions for 
the Dominican Republic and the US connect in 1990, but the cause is different for 
each.
It is interesting to note th a t the Dominican Republic has high levels of worker 
remittances from the US. Hence, an economic contraction in the United States
negatively affects the amount of money sent by migrant workers to their former ;
1homes. As a consequence, the effects of the US economy contractions in 1990-1991, ^
could be transm itted by this way, among others to the Dominican economy. Thus, I
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it seems tha t there exists a common recession for both countries and this implies 
the existence of common shifts in regimes and common cycles. Also, according to 
the results, it is plausible to think tha t low growth episodes in the US are associated 
with contractions in the Dominican Republic.
On the other hand, the results fail to capture either of the contractions in the 
Dominican Republic in 1995 and the US between 2000 and 2001, but show low 
growth like the contractions between 2 0 0 2  and 2003. The latter recession shown by 
the MSM-VAR model might be explained by the restrictive policies of the Dominican 
Republic, implemented to control the banking crisis.
Table 4.18: Dominican Republic-United States: Dating of Business Cycles
Model Peak Ti'ough Prob. Duration
MSM-AR 1990Q3 1990Q4 0.979 2
2002Q4 2003Q2 0.823 3
MSIH-AR 1990Q3 1990Q4 1 .0 0 0 2
1993Q1 1993Q3 0.995 3
1995Q1 1996Q1 0.999 1
1996Q3 1996Q4 0.969 2
1997Q4 1997Q4 0.988 1
1998Q2 1998Q3 0.746 2
1999Q2 1999Q3 0.899 2
2000Q3 2 0 0 1 Q1 0.997 3
2001Q4 2001Q4 0.999 1
2002Q2 2003Q1 1 .0 0 0 4
Note: Duration denotes the length of the recession in quarters.
Source: Author’s calculations.
E cu a d o r -U n ite d  S ta tes .  The estimated results from MSI-VAR specifications 
for Ecuador and the United States shown in Table 4.15 exhibit, only in the case of the 
United States, real GDP contractions in the first regime. While in the heteroscedas­
tic model both countries show a positive average growth rate for each regime (see 
Table 4.16). We can consider the heteroscedastic model as a representation of the
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growth cycle. Figure 4.11 only shows adequate contractions in real GDP growth 
from the US (the MSI specification of course).
In addition, the results of both models present asymmetries in magnitude, volatil­
ity, persistence and duration. Nevertheless, asymmetric tests show tha t troughs and 
peaks are of the same shape (see appendix B.4). In the MSI specification, the growth 
of the US in the third regime is greater than the growth in the second regime and 
falls in contractions. However, the value of the probabilitiy of continuing in a high 
growth period is close to zero. The transition matrix reveals tha t the high growth 
phase can only be contacted through the normal or moderate growth in both speci­
fications. Similarly, contractions (or low growth) phases can only be contacted from 
high growth periods.
The results do not show the im portant 1999 contraction in Ecuador. Hence, 
they are not consistent with the results obtained with the univariate MS-AR model. 
Therefore, the existence of a common cycle could be weak for these two economies.
Table 4.19: Ecuador-United States: Dating of Business Cycles
Model Peak Trough Prob. Duration
MSM-AR 1990Q2 1991Q1 0.999 4
2000Q3 2001Q4 0.918 6
MSIH-AR 1990Q2 1991Q1 0.996 4
1995Q1 1995Q2 0.893 2
1999Q1 1999Q2 0.982 2
2000Q3 2001Q3 0.997 5
Note: Duration denotes the length of the recession in quarters.
Source: Author’s calculations.
El S a lvador-U n ited  S ta tes .  The results of the homoscedastic model for El 
Salvador and the United States shows a positive mean of growth for El Salvador in 
the first regime (see Table 4.15). In other words, when the US is in recession, El 
Salvador is in a low growth period. From Figure 4.12 we can observe tha t during
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Figure 4.11: Ecuador-United States Business Cycle
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the US contractions between 1990 and 1991, El Salvador was in a low growth period 
at the same time. This result is not consistent with the result to El Salvador using 
the univariate MS-AR model.
The heteroscedastic model used for El Savador and the US is a representation of 
growth cycle. Both countries present a positive mean of growth in the third regime. 
In the heteroscedastic specification the first regime has an expected duration of 5.08 
quarters, while in the heterocedastic specification it has an expected duration of 7.38 
quarters. Interestingly, in the US, contractions and high growth phases are lower 
than normal growth phases (in absolute value).
The estimated transition probabilities in both specifications (homoscedastic and 
heteroscedastic) suggest tha t contractions (or low growth) are persistent but of 
shorter duration than normal and high growth periods. The probabilities of a move 
from normal or moderate growth periods to a high growth phase, and from a high 
growth phase to contractions (or low growth in the growth cycle) are zero in both 
specifications. The results on asymmetries presented in appendix B.4 show that 
the El Salvador-United States cycle is symmetric as one fails to reject the null hy­
pothesis of non-sharpness. Also, both specifications fail to reject non-deepness and 
non-steepness.
Table 4.20: El Salvador-United States: Dating of Business Cycles
Model Peak Trough Prob. Duration
MSM-AR 1990Q2 1991Q1 0.999 4
2000Q3 2001Q4 0.943 6
MSIH-AR 1990Q2 1991Q1 0.998 4
2000Q3 2003Q1 0.942 3
Note: Duration denotes the length of the recession in quarters.
Source: Author’s calculations.
P a n a m a -U n ite d  S ta tes .  The MS-VAR models for Panam a and the United
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Figure 4.12: El Salvador-United States Business Cycle
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States (both homoscedastic and heteroscedastic) represent fluctuations in macro- 
economic activity characterised by phases of high and low trend rates of growth. 
T hat is, both specifications are a representation of growth cycles. In spite of what 
was found before, the relationship between Panam a and the United States presents 
evidence of a possible common growth cycle for both economies. The results show 
asymmetry in the mean with a low growth regime being larger in magnitude than 
normal growth in Panam a (only in the homoscedastic model) and normal growth 
larger than low and high growth in the heterocedastic model. According to tran­
sition probabilities, we find tha t the low growth regime is more persistent and has 
more duration than normal and high growth in both countries. Also, there is clear 
evidence of asymmetric volatility.
According to the transition matrix, the high growth phase can only be contacted 
through normal or moderate growth and not directly from low growth phase. This 
is consistent with the univariate results for the United States.
The resulting regime probabilities are plotted in Figure 4.13, showing that, the 
MS-VAR model reflects common quarters of slow growth between 2000 and 2003.
Table 4.21: Panama-United States: Dating of Business Cycles
Model Peak Ti’ough Prob. Duration
MSM-AR 2000Q3 2003Q1 0.993 1 1
MSIH-AR 2000Q1 2000Q1 1 .0 0 0 1
2000Q3 2003Q2 0.997 1 2
Note: Duration denotes the length of low growth in quarters.
Source: Author’s calculations.
In brief, the results for the Dominican Republic and the United States present 
some evidence tha t a common cycle exists for both countries. Conversely, the rela­
tionship between Ecuador and the US suggests that there is not a common business 
cycle for these two countries. On the contrary, for El Salvador-US and Panama-
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US the average growth rate in the third regime is relatively larger than the second 
regime, but not for the United States. Their growth rate in the second regime is j
larger than  the third regime. All Latin American countries considered in this study |
(with the exception of El Salvador) present a higher disturbance variance than that !
of the United States. These results are consistent with those found with the uni- I
variate MS-AR models. i
The next section presents some indication of international convergence between ;
growth rates of real output between the Latin American countries considered and 
the United States.
4.6.3 Measuring Synchronisation
This section, analyses whether expansions and contractions in real GDP growth 
converge together in the instance of each Latin American country studied and the 
United States. We use two measures of co-movement: the concordance between 
the real output series and the contemporaneus correlation of growth rates of real 
output. First, the concordance index proposed by Harding and Pagan (2002) is 
used to measure the degree of concordance between the specific business cycle and 
the reference business cycle. Then, the contemporaneous correlation from MS-VAR 
model estimates is presented.
The degree of concordance is defined as the proportion of time both series (the 
reference cycle (r) and the specific cycle (j))  are simultaneously in the same regime 
of contraction {St = 0) or expansion {St =  1). We use the smoothed probability of 
being in a specific regime obtained from the univariate models in section 4.6.1, as 
a measure of the specific business cycle regime of each country. This measure will 
be denoted by the threshold function defined before (equation 4.8). T hat is, Sjt =
Pr =  0,1 I yt, ê j and Srt =  P r =  0,1 | y*, ê j are the smoothed probabilities of 
being in a contractionary or expansionary regime obtained from the MS-AR models 
for each individual country (Latin American and the US).
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The degree of concordance is given by:
D Cjr  =  i  [ H  {Sjt  =  1 , Srt  =  1)] +  ^  [H {Sjt  =  0, Srt  =  0)] (4.10)
where the symbol jj {Sjt =  k, Srt =  k) denotes the number of times in which both 
series, j  and r, are in the same regime k. The equation (4.11) can be written as:
T
D C jr  = T -^  { I  {Sjt =  1, Srt  =  1) +  /  {Sjt =  0 , Srt  =  0 )} (4.11)
i = l
~  T  I E (1 -  Sjt)  (1 — Srt) \
I  t = l  t=l )
where j  and r  are the indices for the different time series, T  is the sample size and Sjt  
is the regime of the time series j  at time i, {Sjt = 1,0). Equation (4.12) presents the 
degree of concordance in both regimes together (contractions and expansions). In 
addition, the concordance index can be rewritten and re-parametised in a different 
way to examine how often both series are in a particular regime. Harding and Pagan 
(2003) suggest that the equation (4.12) can be rewritten as
2  ”DCjr — 1 +  7^  — Asj — I^Sr (4.12)
t=i
=  1 +  2  {psàsjàs^ +  P'SjP’Sr) “  TSj “  TSr (4.13)
where ps is the estimated correlation coefficient between Sj  and 5^, and jlsjr amd 
are the estimated mean and standard deviation of Because of the binary nature 
of Sjt and Srt the estimated standard deviations have the form ~  The
index should be between 0 and 1, where 1 indicates maximum concordance. The 
estimated correlation coefficient, is defined by:
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y a  {Sit) { l - E  { S j t ) )  (Srt) { l - E ( S r t ) )
The expression E  {SjtSrt) is the joint density of (Sjt, Srt)- The usefulness of 
equation (4.14) is th a t it is made clear tha t the value of DCjr depends on both 
the correlation between the two series and on how often they are in the expan­
sion regime, (Sjt =  1). In other words, the degree of synchronisation of cycles 
depends upon two items: the characteristics of the specific cycles which are de­
termined by P r (sjt =  1 I ^  and P r Çsrt =  1 | and the probability of the 
event {Sjt = I, Srt =  1}. The la tter event is more likely to occur when the turn­
ing points in both cycles are located at the same point in time. Fi'om expression 
(4.15) we can say tha t the higher is ps the greater will be the probability that turn­
ing points will occur together, and so the greater will be the chance of observing 
synchronised cycles. The results are shown in Table 4.16.
Table 4.22: Business Cycles Concordance with the United States
Dom, Rep. Ecuador El Salvador Panama
DCjr 0.53 0.30 0.35 0.45
D c ;, 0.64 0.92 0.94 0.64
0.63 0.44 0.46 0.43
Note: MS-AR homoscedastic models used. * Include only expansion regime.
Source: Author’s calculations.
For the Dominican Republic, the index of concordance (relative to the US) in 
both regimes indicates that the real GDP growth of this country and of the US is in 
the same phase (that is, expanding or contracting together) 53% of the time. While 
Panama, El Salvador and Ecuador are 45%, 35% and 30% of the time respectively. 
On the contrary, the concordance index for only the expansion regime reports large 
values for Ecuador and El Salvador, implying tha t each country spends much of the
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time in the same state of expansion of their classical cycle with the US. However, 
these countries show correlations only of 0.44 and 0.46, respectively. Harding and 
Pagan (2003) note tha t it is often the case tha t a high value of DCjr coincides with 
a low value of ps. Smith and Summers (2005) document similiar phenomena when 
they examine cycles in GDP across six countries.
To characterise the degree of synchronisation in real GDP growth across Latin 
American countries and the US, we define arbitrary ranges for the concordance 
index. We consider that there exists a strong synchronisation when the index is 
greater tha t 60% and tha t there exists a mild synchronisation when the index lies 
between 40% and 60%. Otherwise we say tha t there is a low synchronisation between 
economic fluctuations. Thus, based on the results in Table 4.22 we can observe 
tha t there is mild level of synchronicity in recessions and expansions between the 
Dominican Republic-United States and Panama-United States. The rest of the 
countries have only low synchronisations with the US. Conversely, the concordance 
index for particular expansion regimes shows tha t all Latin American countries have 
a strong synchronisation with the US in expansion periods. Yet, the probability for 
turning points occurring together is mild for Ecuador, El Salvador and Panama 
(with respect to the US), hence the chance of observing a synchronised cycle in 
these countries with the US is moderate.
On the other hand, the contemporaneous correlations of smoothed probabilities 
obtained from homoscedastic MS-VAR models presented in Table 4.23 show that 
the Dominican Republic has a better synchronisation in business cycles with the 
United States than Panam a (40% versus 27%). In the same way, Ecuador and 
El Salvador present a weak negative correlation. The contemporaneous correlation 
from the heteroscedastic specification shows that periods of contractions (or low 
growth) in the United States are strongly and positively correlated with those in 
the Dominican Republic (98%) and positively synchronised with those in Panama 
(20%). By contrast, a strong negative correlation characterises Ecuador-US (-61%),
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while El Salvador-US shows a weak negative correlation (-2.7%). In terms of nor­
mal or moderate gowth, the synchronisation between the Dominican Republic-US 
and Panama-US changes, are both highly negative (-70% and -94%, respectively). 
Ecuador and El Salvador show a weak negative correlation. Finally, the degree of 
synchronisation in high growth across the Latin American countries with the United 
States displays the existance of a strong positive association between the Domini­
can Republic-US (74%), and a mild positive association between Panama-US (47%). 
The links between Ecuador-US and El Salvador-US are negative (see Table 4.16).
Table 4.23: Contemporaneous Correlation with the United States
MS-VAR MSH-VAR Karras (2003b) Crowley (2002) Panizza et. al. (2003)
Dom . Rep. 0.395 0.975 0.17 0.553 0.022
Ecuador -0.047 -0.614 0.07 -0.626 -
El Salvador -0.120 -0.026 0.19 0.054 0.016
Panarna 0.268 0.195 -0.25 0.346 0.024
Note: For heteroscedastic (MSH) specifications, numbers correspond to regime 1 correlations. Karras’ results are 
based on IPS data.
Source: Author’s calculations and Karras (2003b), Crowley (2002) and Paniza et. al (2003).
According to the results of the contemporaneous correlations, the real GDP 
growth of the Dominican Republic and Panam a has a positive association with 
those of the United States. The Dominican Republic has a better synchronisa­
tion of cycles with the US than Panam a with the US. It is im portant to note tha t 
Panam a has been dollarized for 100 years. These results coincide with the results 
presented by Crowley (2002), Karras (2003) and Panizza et al. (2003) (see Table 
4.23). Panizza et al. (2003) used the standard deviation of the differences in log­
arithms of relative output between countries. If the business cycle is the same in 
both countries, this index will be zero. For tha t reason, the value of the Dominican 
Republic (0.0225) is closer to zero than Panama. The results of contemporaneous
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correlations imply tha t the Dominican business cycle is more synchronised with the 
United States business cycle than Panama. In tha t case, the Dominican Republic 
would be a better candidate to adopt the dollar as legal tender. However, when we 
use the arbitrary ranges defined before, we find tha t in the homoscedastic model the 
Dominican Republic revels a mild level of synchronicity with the US, while Panam a 
presents low synchronisation. In the heteroscedastic specifications, the Dominican 
Republic shows a strong synchronisation with the US in contraction and high growth 
regimes, while Panam a presents mild and low synchronisations in high growth and 
contraction phases respectively. Both countries show a strong negative correlation 
with the US in normal or moderate growth regimes.
These results tend to suggest tha t the endogenous OCA argument has not ap­
plied in this instance. El Salvador, Ecuador and particularly Panam a do not appear 
to have developed synchronised business cycles from their dollarization. This im­
plies that the Frankel and Rose (1998) assertion (that, ex post, countries adopting 
a foreign currency could develop more synchronised movements of output with the 
currency-owning country) appears not to hold, especially when applied to the one 
large country to already have been officially dollarized in the region. On the con­
trary, these results provide support for the work of Calderon et al. (2003); they 
suggest tha t countries with more asymmetric structures of production (industrial- 
developing country pairs) exhibit a smaller business cycles correlation and the impact 
of increased trade integration on business cycle synchronisation, after the adoption 
of a same currency as legal tender, could be positive albeit significantly lower than 
for industrialized country pairs. On the other hand, the low correlation of business 
cycles of Panam a with the US, and the asynchronisity of business cycles of El Sal­
vador and Ecuador with the US are not enough to outweigh the credibility effect 
tha t the Panamanian, Salvadorian and Ecuatorian governments gains from using the 
US currency because dollarization provided policy credibility and time consistency 
and reduced domestic interest rate, inflation and exchange rate risks particularly in
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Ecuador and El Salvador. As a consequence, dollarization represents a commitment 
mechanism to anchor their inflation expectations and the reduction of exchange rate 
risks.
4.7 Concluding Remarks
This chapter addressed the question of dollarization in the Dominican Republic by 
empirically evaluating the degree of asymmetry in the business cycles between the 
Dominican Republic and the United States and, for the purpose of comparison, 
between three dollarized economies and the US. To do so, Hamilton model was em­
ployed to investigate fluctuations of real GDP growth in a number of Latin American 
countries and the United States, and to attem pt to identify international business 
cycle synchronisation, distinguishing between classical and growth cycles. The de­
gree of business cycle synchronisation is an essential criterion for determining the 
costs and benefits associated with adopting an official dollarization.
The regime identifications, in this chapter, distinguish between contractions (or |
i
low growth), normal (or moderate) growth, and high growth. Firstly, we estimate a |
Markov-switching regime process for univariate data series for the economies studied 
in order to extract relevant information on the business cycle of each country. All 
countries have experienced persistent but shorter durations of contractions (reces­
sions) than expansions and their mean growth is lower (in absolute values) than that |
for expansions. The different behaviour of their duration and variances, and the for- ;
mal test for asymmetry, suggests tha t the cycles are asymmetric between regimes.
In addition, this chapter documents structural changes in the volatility of real GDP |
growth in Ecuador, introduced perhaps by the official dollarization. Furthermore, |
there is some evidence of common regime shifts, particularly between the Dominican i
Republic and the US and Panam a and the US. |
A bivariate Markov-switching vector autoregressive model is also modelled in j
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order to determine whether there is common regime shift and common cycles for the 
Latin American countries considered, with the United States. The identification of 
the smoothed probabilities, turning points and the calculation of contemporaneous 
correlation between outputs suggest tha t there is some evidence about common 
regime shifts and common cycles particularly between the Dominican Republic and 
Panam a with respect to the United States.
Finally, the smoothed probabilities of being in a state of contraction (recession) 
and expansion obtained from the MS-AR models for each individual country are 
used in a cross correlation analysis, in order to detect any commonality among any 
of the Latin American countries and the US. The results suggest tha t there is a 
mild synchronisation between the Dominican Republic and the United States, and 
between Panam a and the United States. As a consequence, there is some weak 
evidence for the existence of a common cycle between these countries.
The observed dissimilarities of the business cycles in the Dominican Republic 
and the US could represent a source of warning for the Dominican Republic’s pol­
icymakers since the adoption of the dollar as legal tender is associated with the 
loss of domestic monetary policy as a possible stabilisation instrument to react to 
fluctuations in the business cycles th a t are not in line with those in the currency- 
owning country. The results obtained in this study appear to represent the view of 
dollarization in the Dominican Republic being an unsuitable measure. In addition, 
these results imply tha t the endogenous OCA hypothesis appears not to hold when 
applied to officially dollarized economies. The unsynchronised business cycles of El 
Salvador and Ecuador with the US, and the low business cycle correlation between 
Panam a and the US, does not invalidate their post-dollarization macroeconomic 
stability gains. However, emerging and developing countries with unsynchronised 
business cycles with the issuing country’s should carefully consider the option of 
relying on a suitable domestic anchor monetary policy before opting for unilateral 
dollarization, despite the la tte r’s alleged merits as a device for achieving macro­
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economic stability. As a m atter of course, a comprehensive evaluation of the costs 
and benefits of dollarization in a specific country needs to go far beyond the topics 
addressed in this chapter.
This chapter contributes to the empirical evidence on international synchronisa­
tion of business cycles, using methods commonly found in studies on the optimality 
of adopting a foreign currency as legal tender. Also, the turning points for the United 
States resulting from Markov-switching models are very close to those identified by 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Unfortunately, no committee cur­
rently exists in Latin American countries to identify the different phases of growth. 
In that way, this work provides tools, which could help guide development and act 
as a benchmark for future research.
CHAPTER 5
Prediction of Currency Crises using a Fiscal Sustainability
Indicator
5.1 Introduction
Exchange rate collapses and currency crises in developing countries have been the 
two main subjects in international macroeconomics in the last two decades. Conse­
quently, there has been a resurgence of interest in the early warning systems that 
can anticipate the occurrence of currency crises. The key to crisis prevention is 
the early recognition of economic vulnerability to currency crises. Therefore, it is 
desirable to identify some indicators of vulnerability in order to avert these crises. 
Some of the recent literature on the early warning systems (EWS) for currency crises 
employ leading indicators such as the stock market, sovereign ratings, among others. 
However, does a fiscal sustainability indicator (F S I)  really predict currency crises? 
Unfortunately, the literature on the subject has paid little attention to the role of 
F  S i s  in assessing the probability of currency crises.
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The aim of this chapter is primarily to assess fiscal sustainability and then as­
sess whether a Fiscal Sustainability Indicator can be used as a leading indicator in 
predicting currency crises. Firstly, to do that, the alternative approach proposed 
by Croce and Juan-Ramon (2003) is employed to measure the fiscal sustainability 
of each country. Secondly, different procedures are used to evaluate if a Fiscal Sus­
tainability Indicator helps to predict currency crises. To start with, the direction of 
causality between the F S I  and currency crises is investigated. Secondly, a probit 
model produces estimates assessing the predictive ability of Fiscal Sustainability In­
dicators in anticipating currency crises. To conclude, the Markov-switching model 
introduced by Albert and Chib (1993), and applying a Gibbs sampling approach is 
used to evaluate if the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator influences the transition prob­
ability of experiencing currency crises. In this sense, the two regimes are defined in 
the following ways: a tranquil regime as the regime with the smallest mean and a 
crisis regime as the regime with the highest mean.
In addition, three empirical definitions of currency crises are employed. Firstly, 
a crisis is defined as a nominal currency depreciation. Secondly, an exchange market 
pressure index is constructed as an indicator of currency crises. This indicator 
is calculated computing a weighted average of the nominal depreciation rate, the 
change in interest rates and international reserves using the United States as the 
country of reference. The quarter in which the index exceeds a certain threshold 
is taken to be the crisis period. Finally, a binary definition of currency crises is 
constructed.
Quarterly data for a sample of the following 18 developing countries is presented: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, the Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, 
Peru, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey. This selection of countries has been dic­
tated by data availability. Fiscal policy was also a relevant criterion in terms of 
public debt and composition and variability of public expenditures in the sample.
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Most of these countries have experienced episodes of currency crises in the period 
1990-2004. Therefore the countries and the period considered provide a good sample 
to test our hypothesis. The inclusion of Panam a allows an evaluation of whether 
official dollarization encouragement prudent fiscal policies and lowers public debt. It 
should be emphasised tha t this chapter does not intend to give a detailed overview 
of the causes and unfolding of currency crises; instead it concentrates primarily on 
highlighting if the F S I  helps to predict currency crises.
The chapter makes three im portant points. Firstly, tha t causality tests sug­
gest evidence of causality between the lagged Fiscal Sustainability Indicators and 
currency crises. Secondly, the probit approach indicates a positive relationship be­
tween the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator and the occurrence of a currency crisis. 
Finally, tha t the results from a time-varying transition probability (TVTP) Markov- 
switching model reveals tha t the inclusion of a Fiscal Sustainability Indicator in the 
transition probabilities improve the conditional probabilities of a currency crisis.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 5 . 2  provides a brief 
review of the literature discussing fiscal sustainability, the fiscal roots of currency 
crises and early warning systems. Section 5.3 discussess Fiscal Sustainability Indi­
cators and currency crises definitions, as well as measuring the degree of speculative 
pressure on the exchange rate (the Market Pressure Index) and presenting a frame­
work for the causality test, the probit and the TV TP Markov-switching models. 
Section 5.4 describes the sets of data  obtained and presents a series of descriptive 
statistics. Section 5.5 presents estimated results and an analysis of these. Finally, 
Section 5.6 presents the concluding remarks.
Prediction of Currency Crises using a Fiscal Sustanaibility Indicator 171
5.2 Fiscal Policy Sustainability and Currency Crises: 
Literature R eview
This section is broken down into three sub-sections: the first sub-section describes 
the importance of fiscal sustainability, the second sub-section presents a brief dis­
cussion on the role of fiscal policy in a currency crisis and the final sub-section, 
illustrates early warning systems approach.
5.2.1 Fiscal Sustainability
The idea of fiscal sustainability is intimately related with public debt dynamics. 
Rapid accumulation of debt (external and/or domestic) can lead to severe macro- 
economic problems, impeding the control of the fiscal deficit itself. One concept 
of sustainability relates to solvency. A fiscal policy is sustainable if it leads to sol­
vency, and solvency is defined as a situation in which the future paths of spending 
and revenue satisfy the inter-temporal budget constraint. In other words, solvency 
is the ability of the government to service its debt obligations in perpetuity without 
an explicit default (IMF, 2002; Croce and Juan-Ramôn, 2003). Another concept of 
fiscal sustainability relates to the government’s ability to maintain its current poli­
cies while remaining solvent (Burnside, 2004).^ The design of indicators on fiscal 
policy sustainability thus constitutes a key endeavour in economic analysis and is 
particularly relevant for developing countries. Numerous researchers have devoted 
considerable efforts in constructing appropriate indicators of fiscal policy sustain­
ability (see Horne, 1991).
Early literature on fiscal sustainability is produced by Buiter (1985); Hamilton 
and Flavin (1986); Blanchard (1990) and Blanchard et al. (1990). Measures of fiscal 
sustainability are proposed by Buiter (1985), estimating that the annuity value of
^Government solvency is a necessary but not sufficient condition for fiscal policies to be sustain­
able because of the necessary assumptions concerning private savings and investment behaviour 
(Horne, 1991).
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the discrepancy in the government’s ex ante balance sheet or the permanent adjust­
ment needed to maintain a constant ex ante share of public sector net worth to trend 
output. While Hamilton and Flavin (1986) study issues of fiscal policy sustainability 
and empirical testing for government intertemporal budget constraints. Moreover, 
Blanchard (1990) attem pts to assess whether the present value budget constraints 
could be met in an “ex ante” sense over the course of a specified planning period. 
Blanchard (1990) defines a sustainable fiscal policy as one which ensures that the 
government is inter temp orally solvent. Similarly, Blanchard et al. (1990) define sus­
tainable fiscal policy as a policy as such tha t the ratio of debt to GNP eventually 
converges back to its initial level. They suggest a set of indicators in the sustainabil­
ity of fiscal policy, designed to assess the extent to which governments can maintain 
current tax and spending programmes without experiencing a continued increase in 
public debt. According to these authors, a good indicator of sustainability is one 
which sends clear and easily interpreted signals when current policy appears to be 
leading to a rapidly growing debt to GNP ratio.^
While early literature on fiscal sustainability is mostly focused on industrial 
countries, more recent developments focus on fiscal sustainability in emerging mar­
kets, incorporating elements of financial frictions (Calvo et al., 2003; Galindo and 
Izquierdo, 2003) and stochastic methods (Chalk and Hemming, 2000; Xu and Ghezzi, 
2002; IMF, 2003; Barnhill and Kopits, 2003; Croce and Juan-Ramôn, 2003; Men­
doza and Oviedo, 2004a; Hostland and Karam, 2005).^ Calvo et al. (2003) argue 
tha t a sudden stop in capital flows is a key determinant of fiscal sustainability. A 
foreign or domestic shock triggers a sudden stop that can force abrupt adjustments 
in current account deficits tha t may require a large depreciation of the real exchange 
rate, and the la tter can compromise the ability to service public debt and result in
^For comprehensive surveys of fiscal sustainability, see Chalk and Hemming (2000); IMF (2002) 
and IMF (2003).
^Burnside (2004) and Dfaz Alvarado et al. (2004) survey recent literature on fiscal sustainability 
with special focus on emerging market countries. Mora (2004) applies and analyses three recent 
methodologies to assess the fiscal sustainability of the central government’s debt.
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sharp declines in sustainable debt-output ratios.^ Similarly, Galindo and Izquierdo 
(2003), based on work by Calvo et al. (2003), demonstrate tha t a large depreciation 
in the real exchange rate can lead to fiscal sustainability problems, particularly in 
relatively closed, highly indebted and heavily dollarized emerging markets. Hence, 
in the presence of large temporary fluctuations in the real exchange rate, a reading 
of the fiscal situation based on standard fiscal indicators may lead to a severely 
distorted assessment of fiscal sustainability. This suggests the need to develop alter­
native fiscal indicators. In tha t order, Talvi and Végh (2000) propose an indicator of 
fiscal sustainability based on a macro-adjusted deficit, which is defined as the level 
of primary deficit which would prevail under “normal” macroeconomic conditions.®
On the other hand. Chalk and Hemming (2000) demonstrate that in the presence 
of non-renewable resources, sustainability would require equalising a country’s net 
worth (including the value of non-renewable resources) to the present net value 
of primary non-resource deficits. This method highlights the fact tha t increasing 
resource exploitation to pay debt would not affect sustainability, Xu and Ghezzi 
(2 0 0 2 ) model the flows in government budgets as stochastic processes in order to 
estimate default probabilities. They develop a method for pricing government debt 
and calculating fair yield spreads. Moreover, the IMF (2003) proposes a stochastic 
simulation approach th a t computes the probability density function of possible debt- 
output ratios. The IM F’s stochastic simulation model is based on a non-structural 
time series analysis of the macroeconomic variables that drive the dynamics of public 
debt.
Barnhill and Kopits (2003) use a stochastic approach based on the value-at- 
risk model to address the ways in which macroeconomic volatility and contingent 
liabilities affect fiscal sustainability. It is applied to the case of Ecuador and shows 
tha t the volatility of the sovereign spread is a major source of fiscal vulnerability
4The excessive liability of “dollarization” in the domestic banking sector is a key determinant 
of sudden stops.
drawback of this model is how to define normal conditions for developing countries.
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and is more im portant than terms of trade shocks. In this sense, there are instances 
in which the behaviour of creditors is the determinant of sustainability.
Croce and Juan-Ramôn (2003) develop a stochastic model aimed at deriving a 
fiscal policy rule that is observable by external analysts and indicates whether a 
country is adopting a sustainable policy stance. They derive primary surplus and 
discount rate would prevail when a country reaches its target debt to GDP ratio 
and then construct a fiscal sustainability indicator allowing these variables to react 
to shocks tha t move the debt to GDP ratio out of its equilibrium value. Based 
on quarterly estimates of this algorithm in the 1990s, 12 developed and developing 
countries are ranked according to their degree of sustainability. For a number of 
countries, authors find evidence of causality between the fiscal policy stance and 
growth-adjusted real interest rates. They also explore how different types of pub­
lic expenditures affect fiscal sustainability. Their results show tha t unsustainable 
countries experienced larger increases in certain categories of public spending as a 
percent of GDP (wages, subsidies, and other current transfers) than countries clas­
sified as sustainable. Similar to Calvo et al. (2003), these authors indicate tha t 
currency crises are preceded by a period of real exchange rate appreciation. As 
a consequence, the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator falls, signalling an apparent im­
provement in the country’s sustainability position. However, when the real exchange 
rate correction takes place, the fiscal sustainability indicator increases abruptly.
Moreover, Mendoza and Oviedo (2004a) apply stochastic simulation methods in 
a dynamic general equilibrium modelling framework where co-movement between 
macroeconomic variables is determined by an explicitly theoretical structure. These 
authors demonstrate how the stochastic behaviour of revenue flows affects the av­
erage ability of a government to borrow.® Finally, Hostland and Karam (2005) 
apply stochastic simulation methods to assess debt sustainability in emerging mar­
ket economies and provide probability measures for projections of debt burden over
®See Mendoza and Oviedo (2004b) for a variant of the framework proposed by Mendoza and 
Oviedo (2004a), and an application for Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico.
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the medium term horizon. They show tha t the vulnerability of external debt is j
sensitive to the determining of the exchange rate and to the pricing of traded goods.
5.2.2 The Role of Fiscal Policy in Currency Crises
Existing literature on currency crises distinguishes between several crisis types ac­
cording to their causes, fundamentally classifying them into three generations of i
crises models. The first generation models, called speculative attack models, focus on ^
macroeconomic imbalances (Krugman, 1979, 1996; Flood and Garber, 1984; Flood ;
i
and Marion, 1996). The second generation models accentuate the self-fulfilling char- |
acteristics of a currency crisis and the occurrence of multiple equilibria (Obstfeld, |
1986,1996; Rangvid, 2001). Finally, third generation models stress the consequences 
of moral hazards in the banking system and the contagion effect as key determinants i
of a currency crisis (Chang and Velasco, 2001). Most of the literature on currency i
crises focuses on the role of monetary policy in a crisis. However, theoretical and |
empirical literature on currency crises provides an useful framework for the analysis ■
of fiscal causes.
First generation models indicate th a t an inadequate macroeconomic policy is the 
main cause of currency crises. According to Krugman (1979), one of the longstanding 
explanations of currency crises is tha t they result from immoderate fiscal policies. 
Inconsistencies between fiscal policy fundamentals and exchange rate regimes lead to 
the abandonment of certain exchange rate regimes (usually the fixed exchange rate). 
The idea is that a large monetized budget deficit is accompanied by a gradual fall 
in foreign reserves and tha t when the level of foreign reserves becomes low enough 
a speculative attack on the currency occurs. At this point speculators purchase the 
remaining amount of international reserves, forcing the central bank to change the 
exchange rate regime. Krugman (1979) claims that a currency crisis is caused by a 
large budget deficit tha t is financed by credit expansion.
Similarly, Van Wijnbergen (1991) demonstrates how the resulting fiscal inconsis­
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tencies lead to international reserve losses and forced devaluations as well as subse­
quent permanent increases in inflation. This author argues tha t external shocks can 
destroy consistency between fiscal programmes and inflation targets, causing for­
eign reserve losses, exchange rate changes and higher inflation. As a consequence, 
the balance of payments crises provides the mechanism through which fiscal imbal­
ances translate into higher inflation rates. Contrary to the analysis presented in the 
literature covering early speculative attacks, a domestic credit policy designed to 
prevent international reserve losses during a stabilisation programme is shown to be 
insufficient in preventing speculative attacks under fixed exchange rate regimes.
Recent contributions in the analysis of the fiscal dimension of a currency crisis in 
light of first generation models come from Daniel (2001); Corsetti and Mackowiak 
(2005, 2006); Burnside et al. (2003, 2006); among others.^ Daniel (2001) analyses 
the role of fiscal policy in generating exchange rate crises showing tha t a currency 
crisis occurs when the fiscal authority allows the present value of primary surpluses, 
inclusive of seigniorage, to differ from the current value of government debt at the 
pegged exchange rate. Once fiscal policy violates the constraints imposed by a fixed 
rate regime, there is no monetary policy consistent with the long-run viability of a 
fixed exchange rate regime. Similarly, Corsetti and Mackowiak (2005) construct a 
framework in order to study currency crises associated with fiscal imbalances. In 
contrast with most of the literature on speculative attacks and currency collapses, 
they find tha t the composition of public liabilities is a key determinant in the macro- 
economic dynamics surrounding a crisis, as well as the magnitude of exchange rate 
adjustments in fiscal imbalances. In the same way, Corsetti and Mackowiak (2006) 
present a simple framework to analyse the fiscal dimension of a currency crisis. Their 
analysis can be summarised as follows, with the expansion of domestic credit and 
seigniorage revenues being a sideshow, a fiscal imbalance can cause the abandonment 
of a currency peg independently of any need for seigniorage revenues. Their work
^These contributions are sometimes viewed as an alternative to the Krugman model.
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also illustrates how fiscal and interest rate policies interact to determine the mag­
nitude and the timing of speculative attacks and devaluations. Moreover, Burnside 
et al. (2003, 2006) use a general equilibrium model in which prospective government 
deficits trigger a currency crisis and explore the implications of different strategies 
for financing the fiscal costs associated with a currency crisis for inflation and de­
preciation rates.
To explain crises in light of second generation models some authors identify 
changed expectations as the main cause of a currency crisis. These models focus on 
the role of government choice in setting policy and in the potentially self-fulfilling 
nature of expectations in using models with multiple equilibria.® These models also 
emphasise how large scale capital inflows (often attracted by a speculative bubble) 
turn into pre-crisis outflows. Therefore, crises may occur without the worsening 
of fundamentals and without inconsistent policies. Attacks on the currency are 
prompted by a shift in investor sentiment, tha t is, a shift in market expectations 
from a good to bad equilibrium (Obstfeld, 1996). The attack takes place when in­
vestors obtain new information tha t the government’s net liabilities exceed a thresh­
old, or when the government decides to extract seignorage, instead of embarking on 
a fiscal adjustment, to meet intertem poral budget constraints. In other words, the 
immediate cause of a crisis is the signalling tha t the government can only resolve 
policy inconsistencies by abandoning exchange rate rules rather than attem pting to 
contain public sector imbalances. Daniel (1997) provides an alternative model to 
the self-fulfilling crisis explanation for episodes of exchange rate collapses, arguing 
that instantaneous collapses in exchange regimes can be the result of a policy tha t 
increases the government’s reliance on seigniorage revenues. His work addresses the 
predictability of exchange rate crises and finds tha t it is empirically difficult to a t­
tribute some recent exchange regime collapses to a preceding period of unsustainable 
government policies.
®The existence of multiple equilibria has been questioned, under specific conditions, by Krugman 
(1996).
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On the other hand, some authors attem pt to identify the fiscal roots of major 
currency crises using third generation models. These models introduce the role of 
moral hazards as a cause of excessive borrowing. The moral hazards based models 
stress the role played by government bailout promises in determining excessive risk- 
taking by financial intermediaries. Here, a sudden loss of confidence triggers a 
twin crisis, combining banking and currency problems, once m aturity and currency 
mismatches in banking balance sheets enter a zone of vulnerability. The idea is that, 
a banking system crisis will lead to a currency crisis using the first generation model 
mechanism, because government contingent liabilities (implicit guarantees) become 
commitments in the moments of crisis and result in unsustainable fiscal deficits, with 
central banks in the role of lenders of the last resort. However, the measures taken 
are inconsistent with the maintenance of fixed exchange rates. Marini and Piersanti 
(2 0 0 1 ) use an optimising general equilibrium model to investigate currency and 
financial crises in emerging markets. They show tha t a rise in current and expected 
future budget deficits generates a real exchange rate appreciation and a depletion 
of foreign reserves, leading to a currency crisis when reserves decline below critical 
levels. Similarly, Burnside et al. (2000) explain currency crises as the consequence 
of expected future budget deficits brought about by the implicit bailout promise for 
failing banking systems.
In this line of study, Nashashibi and Bazzoni (1993) investigate a sample of 
28 sub-Saharan African countries in the period 1980-1991. They find that in those 
countries where the tax base is highly dependent on imports and import substitutes, 
exchange rate movements in response to external shocks are critical in sustaining 
and improving fiscal performances. Eichengreen et al. (1994) present an empirical 
analysis of speculative attacks on pegged exchange rates in 2 2  countries between 1967 
and 1992. They find that there are links between budget deficit and public debt on 
the probability of a crisis but only in the non-Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
sample. Contrary, Frankel and Rose (1996) using panel data, for over 100 developing
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countries from 1971 to 1992, show tha t fiscal deficit tends to be small and shrinking 
in countries experiencing a crisis. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) examine currency 
and banking crises episodes in 2 0  countries (industrial and developing) for the period 
1970-1995. They find tha t fiscal deficit tends to be higher in the two years preceding 
a currency crisis, compared to tranquil periods. Similarly, Aziz et al. (2000) seek 
to identify common characteristics among a variety of macroeconomic and financial 
variables for a large sample of currency crises in industrial and emerging countries 
between 1975 and 1997. They find tha t fiscal deficit tends to be, on average, larger 
for two years before the crisis occurs across the whole sample.
Siwinska (2000) conducted a comparative analysis related to the fiscal imbalances 
leading to currency crises. She examined the behaviour of a number of fiscal variables 
before and during the crisis, compared to tranquil periods, in 50 developing and 
transition countries for the period of 1980-1999. For both developing and transition 
economies, the crisis was preceded by larger, than in normal times, fiscal deficits 
and higher level of public debt. Additionally, Mandilaras and Bird (2005) use panel 
data  (LSDV) and generalised methods of moments (GMM) for 28 Latin American 
and Caribbean countries showing tha t accumulated debts increase the pressures in 
the foreign exchange market. Similarly, Bird and Mandilaras (2006) find tha t fiscal 
imbalances have a significant effect on pressures in the foreign exchange market in 
Latin American and Caribbean countries but not in the East Asian and Pacific 
countries.
5.2.3 Early Warning System s for Predicting Currency Crises
More recent empirical research not only focuses on explaining the causes of a cur­
rency crisis, it is mainly motivated by the need to forecast and prevent currency 
crises and considers a wide range of variables th a t can help in constructing a sys­
tem for predicting a currency crisis. Numerous studies have attem pted to identify 
those variables tha t can be the best predictors of currency crises. Literature on
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early warning systems (EWS) attem pts to combine a number of indicators into a 
single measure of crises risks. Two approaches in constructing EWS models have 
become common in early empirical works: the non-parametric signalling approach 
(Kaminsky et al., 1998; among others)® and limited dependent variable probit-logit 
models (Berg and Pattillo, 1999a,b; Goldstein et a l ,  2000; among others).^® Kamin­
sky et al. (1998) construct an early warning system using a signal model approach. 
The ideal behind this model is tha t the indicators behave differently on the verge of 
a crisis. Therefore, when an observation exceeds a specific threshold, the indicator 
sends a signal. The more indicators flag signals, the higher the probability of a 
crisis. Alternatively, Berg and Pattillo (1999a,b) modify the probit model used in 
Fi’ankel and Rose (1996) and associate a set of variables with the probability of a 
currency crisis. This approach provides the possibility of evaluating a formal model 
of relationships between various indicators and a discrete occurrence of a currency 
crisis.
During the last decade probit models have therefore attracted much attention. 
However, in the last couple of years Markov-switching models became more and more 
popular. Markov-switching models, like probit models, can provide a measure of the 
probability of a crisis. Some studies have used the endogenous switching type model 
to examine several specific crises (Jeanne and Masson, 2000; Cerra and Saxena, 2002; 
Fratzscher, 2 0 0 2 ; Martinez Peria, 2002; among others) and to construct an EWS 
(Abiad, 2003; Arias and Erlandsson, 2005; Chen, 2005; among others). Abiad (2003) 
constructs an alternative early warning system to analyse East Asian crises using a 
Markov-switching model with time-varying transition probabilities. Similarly, Arias 
and Erlandsson (2005) develop a regime-switching model within the framework of 
EWS to study six South-East Asian countries. While Chen (2005), based on Smith
®This approach has been extended by Kaminsky (1998); Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999); Edison 
(2000); among others.
^°For useful overviews of literature on early warning systems see Kaminsky et al. (1998) and 
Abiad (2003).
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et ai. (2005), shows tha t a Markov-switching model can help predict currency crises 
when expanded to include a third state, the “vulnerable regime”, tha t found between 
tranquil and high volatility states.
On the other hand, there have been numerous empirical studies on currency 
crises, which attem pt to deduce the leading indicators tha t would make currency 
crises more predictable. Some researchers use exchange rate expectations, overval­
uation of currency, and capital controls, among others, as predictors of currency 
crises (Goldfajn and Valdés, 1997; Burkart and Coudert, 2002). Others studies use 
stock market and sovereign ratings as leading indicators of currency crises (Broome 
and Morley, 2004; Sy, 2004). Some of the studies listed employ more than one 
methodology. However, none of the above papers consider a Fiscal Sustainability 
Indicator.
The next section presents the theoretical framework to evaluate the effectiveness 
of fiscal sustainability indicator in predicting a currency crisis.
5.3 M ethodology
This section is divided into five sub-sections. The first sub-section, based on Croce 
and Juan-Ramôn (2003), presents a recursive algorithm derived from the law of 
motion of the debt to GDP ratio to analyse the sustainability of fiscal policy. The 
second sub-section introduces different currency crisis definitions. Furthermore, the 
Granger causality test and the probit model are presented. Finally, a Markov- 
switching model (with time-varying transition probabilités) is introduced.
5,3.1 Establishing Government Fiscal Sustainability
In this section the recursive algorithm developed by Croce and Juan-Ramôn (2003) 
is reviewed in detail. The starting point is government intertem poral budget con­
straints. To facilitate the analysis, it is assumed that net privatisation proceeds.
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public revenue from the creation of money (seigniorage) and revaluations of assets 
and liabilities are equal to zero. The financing needs of the public sector are defined 
as:
P S B R t  = {Dt -  D t- i)  -  PDt +  itD t-i  (5.1)
where Dt is the stock of to tal public debt (domestic and foreign), PDt is the primary 
deficit and it is the nominal rate of interest payments. Equation (5.1) shows tha t 
the change in the stock of public debt (domestic and foreign) is induced by the 
public sector borrowing requirement at time t to finance the primary deficit and the 
interest payments on public debt. Multiplying both side of equation (5.1) by -1, the 
following is obtained:
PSt = itD t-i — {Dt — D t-i)  (5.2)
where PSt = —PDt, th a t is PSt is the primary surplus of the public sector. Equation
(5.2) can be expressed as a fraction of the nominal Gross Domestic Product as:
dt = Ptdt-i -  pst (5.3)
in which dt is public debt as a proportion of GDP (the law of motion in the debt 
to GDP ratio), pst is the ratio of the primary surplus to GDP, and Pt =  Is
the real interest rate and gt denotes the rate of growth of real o u t p u t . E q u a t i o n
(5.3) states that, in the absence of shocks and corrective policies, public debt as 
a proportion of GDP {dt) increases over time in the presence of persistent primary 
fiscal deficits joint with a real interest rate higher than the growth rate of real GDP.^^
Intertemporal budget constraints for the public sector can be constructed from 
equation (5.3). For simplicity, it is assumed that pt+N — P  th a t is, the discount
^^ /3* >  1 implies r > P, and indicates that in steady states there is an efficient capital overaccu­
mulation (see Barro, 1976).
12 The formal derivation of equation (5.3) is presented in Appendix C.2.
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factor will be constant from time t to time t-p N ,  and solving equation (5.3) forward 
recursively for N  periods, we obtain:
d t  =  p  ^ p s t + i  +  P  '^ p s t+ 2  +  ■.. +  p ~ ^ p s t + N  +  P ~ ^ d t + N  (5'4)
This intertemporal budget constraint indicates that the initial stock of public 
debt should be equal to the discounted present value of the sequence of public 
primary surpluses from time t to time t  F  N .  Using equation (5.4) the following 
definition can be stated: the public sector is said to be solvent if the planned tra­
jectory of the primary deficit, from time t to time t +  N ,  satisfies the intertemporal 
budget constraint (equation 5.4). The above definition implies tha t dt+N = 0, that 
is, the public sector cannot be a net debtor in present value terms. This represents 
a strict condition for solvency, requiring the primary balance to become positive at 
some point. Alternatively, a less stringent condition for solvency can be derived by 
imposing weaker conditions on equation (5.4). We assume tha t dt+N = d*, where 
0 <  d* < dt. Thus, the present value of expected primary surplus ratios will reduce 
the debt ratio below the current level. To construct an indicator of fiscal sustainabil­
ity, Croce and Juan-Ramon (2003) suggest the equation (5.3) and two additional 
equations: target variables and the government reaction function. First of all target 
variables are defined as:
ps* = { p * - l ) d *  (5 .5 )
where ps*and p* are, respectively, the primary surplus ratio and the discount fac­
tor tha t would prevail once convergence to the target debt ratio (d*), is achieved. 
Secondly, the government reaction function is defined by:
pst =  ps* 4- Af {dt-i — d*) (5.6)
where the primary surplus ratio has two components: the primary surplus ratio
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associated with target debt ratio and the policy response to the gap between the 
observed debt ratio and the target debt ratio. The param eter \ t  indicates the 
intensity of the policy response a t time t, given the debt ratio gap in the previous 
period. Equation (5.6) characterises a fiscal rule or a policy reaction function.
Combining equations (5.3), (5.5) and (5.6), the public debt as a proportion of 
CDP including the policy reaction param eter Xt can be obtained:
dt =  {Pt — Xt) dt~i — {P* — Af —■ 1) d* (5.7)
In order to derive a simple expression for the index of fiscal sustainability, it is 
assumed tha t the debt ratio at time t  — 1 is higher than the long-term objective 
for tha t ratio (df_i >  d*). Hence equation (5.7) states tha t dt would converge to 
d*, if and only if \pt — Xt\ < 1. Therefore, we can use {pt — A*) as an indicator of 
fiscal sustainability. An alternative expression for the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator 
{F SI)  is accordingly:
This expression states tha t a persistently higher spread between the observed 
real interest rate and the observed growth rate of real CDP would, other than 
being equal, lead to higher public indebtedness (high parameter Pt)- '^  ^ The second 
param eter (A), measures the ratio between the deviation of observed and target 
values of the primary surplus and public debt ratios. In addition, a fiscal position 
would be sustainable if F S I t  < 1. In contrast, if F S I t  > 1 then the fiscal position 
is unsustainable.
The next sub-section presents the different currency crisis definitions employed 
in this chapter.
^^For mature stable economies the expected value of /? should be about 1, higher than 1 for 
economies with relative scarce capital and high financial intermediation costs, and much higher 
than 1 and more volatile in contexts of economic and political uncertainty.
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5.3.2 Defining Currency Crises
The definition of a currency crisis is of paramount importance in the process of 
identifying the leading indicators for predicting a crisis. Several approaches exist in 
the literature reviewed. In some theoretical work a currency crisis is predominantly 
defined only in the case of fixed exchange regimes, usually as the official devaluation 
or abandonment of the fixed exchange rate regime. However, this definition is not 
flexible enough to use in empirical studies.
Other empirical studies define a currency crisis as a large (either nominal or real) 
devaluation or depreciation of the domestic currency. However, this last definition 
does not consider th a t monetary authorities can fight a speculative attack by in­
tervening in the foreign exchange market or by increasing interest rates. In these 
circumstances a currency crisis (defined as a speculative attack) may not lead to an 
actual devaluation. As a consequence, unsuccessful speculative attacks should be 
included in the definition of a currency crisis since they point to the vulnerability 
of the system as seen in a fall in international reserves and a rise in interest rates 
(Girton and Roper, 1977; Eichengreen et al., 1996). This chapter employs different 
methodologies to define a currency crisis and compare their results. Firstly, an in­
dicator is constructed based on the movements in nominal exchange rates according 
to the definition of currency crisis proposed by Frankel and Rose (1996). This defin­
ition of a currency crisis only encompasses currency devaluation without a decrease 
in international reserves or an increase in interest rates. We define a crisis as a 
nominal depreciation of the domestic currency in any quarter greater than 6 %, but 
it also has to exceed the previous year’s depreciation level by at least 10%.^® In 
other words, this definition assumes tha t there are only successful speculative a t­
tacks. This definition is utilised to create a binary variable, a crisis indicator called 
Exchange Rate Depreciation {ERD),  equal to one if a crisis occurs and equal to
i^See footnote 13 in Chapter 3.
^^This definition is according to the definitions of currency crises given by Frankel and Rose 
(1996), which is a depreciation of the exchange rate greater than 25% in any given year.
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zero otherwise.
Secondly, a definition of a currency crisis is used to refer to an intense increase in 
speculative pressure on the country’s currency. Therefore, the measure of exchange 
rate pressure constructed in Chapter 3, Section 3.3, is used (see equation 3.1). The 
idea being tha t a successful speculative attack on a currency would show up in a 
change in the exchange rate, but th a t monetary authorities can fend off these attacks 
either by raising interest rates or by selling off international reserves. The advantage 
of using this index is that both successful and unsuccessful attacks on a currency can 
be asserted. Then, a given episode can be classified as a speculative attack or crisis 
period if the M P I  is greater in value than 1.5 standard deviation over the country’s 
own mean value. Mean values and standard deviations are country-specific. As a 
consequence, the binary variable defined by equation 3.2 is used, identifying the 
speculative attack regime in the sample.
Finally, currency crises are defined employing the Markov-switching approach 
(with time-varying transition probabilities). The parameters estimated with this 
method and the data  reveal the period of crisis in an economy.
The following three sub-sections present the framework for the Granger causal­
ity test, the probit model and the TV TP Markov-switching model. The Granger 
causality test will be used to evaluate the direction of causality between the FSI 
and currency crises, while the probit model will be utilised to assess the predictive 
ability of F S I  and the TV TP Markov-switching model will be employed to evaluate 
if the F S I  influences over the transition probabilities of currency crises.
5.3.3 Granger Causality Tests
Does a fiscal sustainability indicator {F SI)  predict currency crises? We attem pt to 
assess whether the F S I  leads or follows a currency crisis. To test for the causal
^^However, a major drawback in this approach is that the weights, as well as the threshold value 
used to identify the speculative attacks, are somewhat arbitrary.
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relationship between currency crisis and the F S I  the standard Granger test is em­
ployed. This test is used to see how much of the current currency crisis can be 
explained by lagged values of the F S I .  Thus, the F S I  is said to Granger cause 
currency crisis if the F S I  variable is statistically significant and therefore improves 
the forecasted value of a currency crisis. The test equation used is given by:
Ft =  ÛÎ 4- PiXt-i 4- Î >  1 (b'9)
where T  is a currency crisis, % is a leading indicator (in this case, the F S I) ,  and e* 
is the error term. If the inclusion of variable X  with lag i in the test equation helps 
in the prediction of Y ,  then Y  is said to be Granger caused by X t - i .
The next sub-section introduces the probit model utilised to assess the predictive 
ability of the F S I .
5.3.4 Probit M odel
In addition to the panels based on the Granger causality tests, binary time series 
are used where the value of one stands for currency crises and the value of zero for 
tranquil periods. It is estimated tha t a probit equation explaining the probability 
tha t a currency crisis occurs [Crisist — 1 ) by using a lagged indicator time series:
Proh {Crisist =  1) — F  (/?o 4- P iX t-p  (5.10)
where F  is the normal cumulative distribution function, the dependent variable is 
a dummy th a t equals 1  if the economy is in a speculative attack or currency crisis 
and equals zero otherwise, and X  is the only explanatory variable.
The next sub-section presents the Markov-switching model with time-varying 
transition probabilities employed to evaluate if the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator 
influences the transition probabilities of currency crises.
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5.3.5 Markov-Switching M odel of Crises with Endogenous 
Transition Probabilities
To evaluate the usefulness of a leading indicator in predicting a currency crisis, 
a Markov-switching model is fitted along the lines of Filar do and Gordon (1998), 
Building on Hamilton (1989) the fixed transition probability m atrix assumption is 
relaxed, allowing the probability to vary with economic fundamentals.^^ The model 
with time-varying transition probabilities is obtained by:
F i  —  CKq +  O i i S t  +  +  . . .  +  ( j } p X t - p  +  £ t i  E t  N  (0, cr^ ) (5.11)
where Yt denotes a change in the domestic exchange market, and ai  are scalar 
parameters, X t  is a vector of variables tha t influences the level of I t ,  and £t is a 
white noise disturbance term. Following the specifications of Filardo and Gordon 
(1998), the probit function defined earlier is incorporated to measure the transition 
probability m atrix at each time t. This way, the transition probabilities are a func­
tion of an economic indicator variable such as the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator, so 
tha t the probabilities are always between 0  and 1 .
The time-varying transition probabilities can be expressed as:
P  {S t  —  I  S t —I —  S f _ i ,  Zt)  — q {zt) 1 - p  {zt)
k )  p k )
and
(5.12)
^^The time-varying transition probabilities model allow the transition probabilities to rise just 
before a crisis or tranquil period begins, while the fixed transition probabilities model does not 
(Filardo, 1994).
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P {S t  = l)  = P { S i > 0 )
P { S t  =  0 )  =  P { S ;  < 0 )  
where S f  is a latent variable defined by the following equation:
( 5 . 1 3 )
S* =  To +  V t  +  IfaSt-i +  ut (5.14)
in which zt =  {zt, Z t - i , z t - n ]  is a vector of the variables that influence the tran­
sition probabilities with corresponding factor-loading determined by the % vector 
of parameters, 7 0  and 7  ^ are scalar parameters and Ut is a standard normally dis­
tributed white noise disturbance. The transition probabilities can then be derived 
by evaluating the conditional cumulative distribution function for Ut. Specifically, if 
the probability of the economy remaining in the crisis period at time t once it is in 
crisis {St- 1  ~  1 ), given the values of Zt, is p, then
p =  P r {St — 1 I St - 1  = 1) ^t}
=  Pr {ui >  - 7 0  -  j^zt  - 7 a} (5.15)
=  1  -  ^ u \ z  (70  -  % Z t  -  7 a )  
where (.) denotes the standard normal cumulative density function. Similarly, 
the probability of remaining in a tranquil regime at time t, given Zt and S t- i  — 0  
may be expressed as:
Prediction of Currency Crises using a Fiscal Sustanaibility Indicator 190
q =  P r {St — 0 I S t- i  — 0, Zt]
-  Pr {ut > -7o  -  %zt} (5.16)
=  ^ u \ z  ( t o  -  V t )
Finally, the time-varying transition probability matrix can be expressed as:
(70  -  7 l^  -  7s)
1 -  ^ u \z  (70 -  V t )  1 -  ^ n \z  (70 -  -  7s)
It should be noted tha t the time-varying transition probability m atrix describes 
how exogenous variables, represented here by Zt, affect the path of the transition 
probability remaining in a tranquil period (which corresponds to St = 0). Associ­
ating the crisis period with state 1 , p  becomes the probability of remaining under 
a crisis regime, where 1 — p represents tha t of switching to a tranquil regime. In 
these terms, exogenous variables inciting currency crises are expected to boost the 
probability of remaining in a crisis regime (p) as well as tha t of switching from a 
tranquil to a crisis regime {1 — q). On the other hand, estimates of the parameter 
vector (ao, 0 :1 , 7 0 , 7 ^, 7 s, (7^) , together with the estimated time series for unobserv­
able St, S^, Pt and q, can be carried out in a Bayesian context using an application 
of the Gibbs sampler, as suggested by Filardo and Gordon (1998).
5.4 D ata D escription and Summary Statistics
The empirical analysis of this chapter is implemented using quarter frequencies and 
covers the period from the first quarter of 1990 to the fourth quarter of 2004. For 
the analysis of fiscal sustainability in developing countries, data  was obtained from
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the World Bank’s Global Development Finance (CDF), the IM F’s Government Fi­
nance Statistics (GFS), the CD-ROM version of the IM F’s International Financial 
Statistics (IFS), and the respective Ministry of Finance websites. The macroeco­
nomic variables used for M P I  calculations were taken from the IFS CD-ROM of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics for M P I
C ountry M ean M edian M axim um M inim um S tandard
D eviations
Skewness K urtosis O bservations
A rgen tina 0.719 -1.856 131.121 -81.828 23.878 2.428 18.608 60
B razil 5.638 1.940 123.626 -78.876 23.404 1.442 14.359 60
Chile -0.326 -0.151 6.366 -9.064 3.017 -0.332 2.997 60
Colom bia 0.456 0.251 7.877 -6.276 2.576 0.283 3.586 57
C osta  Rica 1.363 1.183 7.110 -5.701 1.939 -0.186 6.037 60
Czech R epublic -1.084 -1.055 11.492 -7.881 3.163 0.947 6.970 47
D om inican R epublic 0.551 0.171 8.078 -5.789 2.801 0.448 3.381 57
El Salvador -0.245 -0.218 2.775 -3.556 0.916 -0.072 6.449 60
H onduras 0.217 -0.117 4.017 -2.878 1.290 0.822 4.036 60
H ungary 0.039 0.066 5.602 -4.841 1.758 -0.144 4.626 GO
-0.606 -0.950 13.789 -8.670 3.879 1.289 7.249 60Indonesia -0.127 -0.184 2.841 -3.706 0.902 0.159 8.909 60M alaysia
0.056 -0.834 26.327 -13.777 5.181 2.426 13.745 60Mexico -0.178 -0.410 69.533 -60.950 15.827 0.961 11.504 60Peru 0.128 0.073 9.484 -5.994 3.330 0.452 3.346 60P hilippines -0.561 -0.852 11.781 -7.433 2.786 1.485 8.615 60
T hailand
3.381 2.708 35.815 -31.467 9.427 0.402 7.706 60
T urkey
Developing C ountries 0.398 -0.166 131.121 -81.828 9.684 4.382 80.526 953
Note :  Q uarterly  d a ta . P anam a shows no specu lative pressure in its  exchange m arket. 
Source: A u th o r’s ca lcula tions.
In order to avoid a spurious regression situation, unit root tests are performed 
on the Market Pressure Index ( MP I )  and the exchange rate to investigate whether 
these variables are stationary or not. The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root 
test is used for this purpose. The results suggest tha t the variables are stationary.
The summary of statistics for the Market Pressure Index and the exchange rate
i^See Tables C.2 and C.3 in Appendix.
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Table 5.2: Summary Statistics for Exchange Rate Depreciation
C ountry Mean M edian M axim um  M inim um  S tandard  Skewness K urtosis O bservations
D eviations
A rgen tina r.583 0.000 195.147 -11.747 33.581 4.664 24.209 60
Brazil 34.339 2.964 274.715 -14.700 60.368 1.977 6.688 60
Chile 1.153 1.548 11.103 -9.879 4.257 -0.380 3.155 60
C olom bia 3.381 3.262 17.928 -10.525 5.440 0.345 3.788 57
C o sta  R ica 2.878 2.517 11.492 -1.784 1.866 1.995 10.279 60
Czech R epublic -0.366 -0.757 20.063 -16.991 5.623 0.277 5.589 47
D om inican R epublic 3.759 1.267 38.926 -5.608 8.252 2.778 11.207 57
B1 S alvador 1.117 0 .000 53.200 -4.798 6.972 7.125 53.694 60
H onduras 6.951 1.337 310.000 -50.000 40.531 7.094 53.935 60
H ungary 1.921 2.615 22.326 -11.627 5.425 0.321 5.424 60
3.987 1.197 79.032 -28.187 17.684 2.592 12.167 60Indonesia 0.690 0 .000 26.485 -8.851 5.244 3.285 15.764 60M alaysia
2.758 0.904 56.433 -7.455 8.889 4.204 24.341 60Mexico 29.157 1.651 1216.065 -3.731 158.675 7.172 53.986 60Peru 1.709 0.241 28.384 -10.842 6.021 1.778 8.651 60Philipp ines 0.955 -0.197 41.617 -17.869 7.694 3.108 17.452 60
T ha iland
11.823 10.856 53.116 -17.200 12.313 0.948 5.823 60
Developing C ountries 6.432 0.994 1216.065 -50.000 45.860 20.293 513.9536 953
N ote :  Q uarterly  d a ta . P an am a shows no deprec ia tion  in its  exchange m arket. 
Source: A u th o r’s ca lcula tions.
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Figure 5.1: Index of Speculative Pressure and Exchange Rate Depreciation 
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are listed in Table 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. In addition, the movements of these 
variables during the sampled period are depicted in Figure 5.1. The exchange rates 
are expressed as variations of the foreign currency per US dollar. According to 
Table 5.1 and 5.2, Brazil, Peru and Turkey show the highest average quarter of the 
M P I  and the depreciation in their exchange rates. Most of the countries considered 
displayed high degrees of volatility in their exchange market, given tha t the standard 
deviations are always more than double their mean value. Nonetheless, Table 5.1 
shows tha t Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Hungary have negative skewness (and 
only Chile in Table 5.2), which implies more tranquil periods in which the exchange 
rate remain more or less stable tend to occur more often than large speculative 
attacks or depreciations in their exchange markets. Similarly, in some countries, 
the maximum A4 P I  is recorded in the first half of the 1990s when the exchange 
rate depreciation reached its peak (see Figure 5.1). In contrast, in countries which 
presented currency crises in the late 1990s, the maximum of M P I  and exchange 
rate depreciation are recorded in the second half of the 1990s.
5.5 Empirical Results
This section starts with an analysis of the fiscal sustainability results, then Granger 
causality test and probit models results are presented, in addition to the calculated 
estimates using the Markov-switching model.
5.5.1 Sustainability Assessm ents
To construct a Fiscal Sustainability Indicator {FSI) ,  we use d* equal to the lowest 
value reached by the debt ratio during the period under study. The value of (3* 
represents the median of the distribution of the observed values of p  for the group
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of developing countries. Its value was set at 1.026.^®
Table 5.3: Analysis of Fiscal Sustainability Indicators
Country /? — A >  1
Frequency
P > P * A < 0
Argentina 87% 42% 95%
Brazil 62% 42% 60%
Chile 33% 3% 33%
Colombia 93% 37% 1 0 0 %
Costa Rica 1 0 0 % 2 % 1 0 0 %
Czech Republic 95% 2 0 % 84%
Dominican Republic 40% 2 0 % 40%
El Salvador 97% 3% 1 0 0 %
Honduras 98% 13% 1 0 0 %
Hungary 95% 30% 97%
Indonesia 50% 2 % 60%
Malaysia 47% 7% 77%
Mexico 83% 18% 85%
Panam a 84% 0 % 97%
Peru 80% 42% 93%
Philippines 98% 1 0 % 1 0 0 %
Thailand 38% 13% 38%
Turkey 1 0 0 % 50% 1 0 0 %
Developing Countries 76% 2 0 % 81%
Note:  Number of quarters as a percentage of total quarters.
Source: Author’s calculations.
Table 5.3 shows the countries with problems of fiscal sustainability during 1990Q1- 
2004Q4. Countries for which the F S I  was above the threshold of 1  a t least 75% 
of the time were classified as having been fiscally unsustainable (^ 0 — A > 1 ) dur­
ing the period considered. Also, Table 5.3 shows the frequency of p  values being 
higher than p*, and the frequency of A assuming a negative value (implying primary 
deficit). In general, the developing countries in the sample present an unsustain-
^®This implies that the expected value of the real interest rate is 2.6 percentage point higher 
than the real growth rate, in steady state.
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Figure 5.2: Debt to GDP Ratio in Some Developing Countries
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Figure 5.3: Fiscal Sustainability Indicators
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able fiscal stance explained mostly by government fiscal deficit rather than spreads 
between the real interest rates and the growth rates. In the same way, Figure 5.2 
shows debt to output ratios for each of the 18 developing countries, while Figure 5.3 
presents the results of the F S I  for each developing country, arranged alphabetically 
to facilitate the discussion. As shown in Figure 5.3, the higher F S I  reflect fiscal 
unsustainability.
According to the F S I ,  A rg e n tin a  shows an unsustainable fiscal position in 
87% of the period studied, explained by continuous primary fiscal deficit (A <  1). 
Also, the public sector debt to GDP ratio grew from about 40% in early 1992 to 
about 125% in the last quarter of 2004. Similarly, B raz il shows an unsustainable 
fiscal stance in about 62% of the period considered. Inadequate primary fiscal 
balances and relatively high spreads between the real interest rate and the growth 
rate contribute to this unsustainability. The public debt to GDP ratio of Brazil 
decreased in the first half of the 1990s (from about 350% in 1993 to about 43% in 
1995) and increased continuously, reaching about 85% towards the end of 2004. On 
the contrary, for C hile, the F S I  fluctuated above the threshold of 1  from 1999 to
2003, explained mainly by primary fiscal deficit. Specifically, the results show the 
impact on the Chilean economy of the Brazilian crisis in January 1999. However, 
the public debt to GDP ratio decreased from about 45% in 1990 to about 10% in
2004.
The F S I  for C olom bia, C o s ta  R ic a  and the C zech R ep u b lic  has consistently 
maintained an unsustainable fiscal position as a result of primary fiscal deficit and 
higher real interest rate-growth gap, respectively. The public debt to GDP ratio has 
increased in the three countries, especially since 1998. While in the D om in ican  
R ep u b lic  the F S I  fluctuated above the threshold of 1 during the period 1990- 
1991, in 1994, in two quarters of 1996, during the period 1999-2000 and from the 
third quarter of 2 0 0 2  to the first half of 2004. Consistent with this, the Dominican 
Republic showed primary fiscal deficit and a deep gap between real interest rates
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and growth rates in the same period. From 1990 to 2000, the debt to GDP ratio 
decreased (from approximately 80% to approximately 2 0 %) to increase thereafter 
reaching about 30% in the last quarter of 2004. For E l S alvador, H o n d u ra s  and 
H u n g a ry  the F S I  persistently presented an unsustainable fiscal stance, explained 
fundamentally by the primary government deficit. The public debt to GDP ratio 
decreased in Honduras, but increased in El Salvador and Hungary.
According to the F S I  In d o n es ia  shows a sustainable fiscal position during the 
final quarter of 1990 until the middle of 1991 and from 1993 to the second quarter 
of 1997. From the third quarter of 1997, the F S I  jumped to an unsustainable 
area (/? — A >  1) and remained in this area until early 2000, as a consequence of 
the October 1997 crisis. However, the F S I  decreased thereafter crossing into the 
sustainable area in the short period between 2000Q2-2001Q1. After this period, the 
F S I  returned to an unsustainable area. Between 1990 and 1996, the public debt 
to GDP ratio decreased (from about 35% to about 20%) but it increased abruptly 
from 1997 (about 45% in 2004). The results for M alaysia  show a consistently 
sustainable fiscal balance in the period 1990-1997 (with two exceptions, the first 
two quarters of 1991), but the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator fluctuated intensively 
above the threshold of 1  from the second part of 1998 to 2004. The debt to GDP 
ratio decreased from 1990 (about 80%) to 1997 (about 30%), but shows a gradual 
increase from 1998.
The F S I  for M ex ico  remained below 1 from 1991 to the first part of 1993, but 
from ther third quarter of 1993 and the end of the 1994 crisis the Fiscal Sustainability 
Indicator moved into the unsustainable area and remained there until 2004. Mexico’s 
public debt to GDP ratio decreased from 1990 (about 47%) to 1994 (about 25%) 
but increased to about 38% in 1995 and then decreased to about 21% in 2004. In 
most of the years under study, the F S I  for P a n a m a  presents an unsustainable 
fiscal position (84% of the time), and the public debt to GDP ratio has fluctuated 
to around 70%. On the other hand, the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator for P e ru
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shows an unsustainable fiscal stance during the period 1990-1993 and from the last 
quarter of 1995 to the first quarter of 2004. The public debt to GDP ratio decreased 
from about 200% in 1990 to about 40% in 2004. For the P h ilip p in es , the F S I  
exhibits an unsustainable fiscal position during 98% of the period considered, defined 
principally by primary fiscal deficit, while the public debt to GDP grew from about 
90% to about 102% between 1990 and 2004.
The F S I  for T h a ila n d  indicated sustainability until the crisis in 1997, when 
it moved to above 1. This is basically explained by primary fiscal deficit and high 
spreads between the real interest rate and the growth rate. In 2003, the F S I  re­
turned into the sustainable area. The public debt to GDP ratio decreased from 
about 21% in 1990 to about 3.8% in 1996. However, from 1997 it grew to about 
27% in 2004. The results of the F S I  for T u rk ey  showed an unsustainable fiscal 
position overall in the period studied, and the debt to GDP ratio increased from 
about 30% to about 90% during 1990 and 2004.
In summary, Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Hungary, Mexico, Panama, Peru, the Philippines and Turkey present 
large unsustainable fiscal positions in most of the period studied, which is explained 
basically by primary fiscal deficit.
The next sub-section presents results on the direction of causality between cur­
rency crises and the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator.
5.5,2 Testing for Granger Causality
In this sub-section, the issue of causality between the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator 
and currency crises is analysed, for each country and the whole sample. To do this, 
the Granger causality test is used,^° as well as using three different approaches to 
currency crises. Firstly, we use the Market Pressure Index {M P I)  defined earlier. 
Then, we use the binary definition of currency crises (defined to be one if the de-
the variables are stationary then the standard Granger causality test is appropriate.
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viation of the M P I  exceeds 1.5 standard deviation over the country’s own mean 
value). Finally, the binary definition of the exchange rate depreciation (equal to one 
if the nominal depreciation of the domestic currency is greater than 6 %, but also 
has to exceed the previous year’s depreciation level by at least 1 0 %) is used.
The results for the Granger causality test are very sensitive to the selection of 
lag lengths. If the chosen lag length is less than the true lag length, the omission 
of relevant lags can cause bias. If the chosen lag length is greater, the irrelevant 
lags in the equation cause the estimates to be inefficient. To deal with this problem 
we use the Final Prediction Error (F P E )  and the Akaike c r i t e r i o n . T h e  con­
ventional Granger causality tests are reported in Tables 5.4, 5.6 and 5.5. Panama 
is excluded because it presents no speculative pressure and/or depreciation in its 
exchange market, perhaps due to adopting the dollar as its official currency since 
1904.
The results show th a t causality runs one-way from currency crises to the F S I ,  
but not the other way, for the whole sample considered in this study (see Table 
5.4). On the contrary, when a definition of currency crises according to nominal 
exchange rate depreciation {ERD)  is used, the Granger causality test results show 
tha t the F S I  affects currency crises; a currency crisis or nominal exchange rate 
depreciation does not affect the F S I  in the whole sample (see Table 5.5). Similarly, 
the results demonstrate that there is one-directional relationship between the F S I  
and the index of speculative pressure (see Table 5.6). In A rg e n tin a ’s case, the null 
hypothesis tha t the F S I  does not Granger cause currency crises in both definitions 
is rejected, but not the other way. Similarly, the results in Table 5.6 show tha t there 
is causality only from the F S I  to the M P I .
The results of the bivariate Granger tests for B raz il show tha t the F S I  affects 
the M P I  and vice versa. However, the results suggest no evidence of causality from
estimated ten regressions according to equation 5.9 and compute F P E  for each regressionr+ jT i+ ias: F P E  =  ----- , where T  is sample size, m  is the lag length and R S S  is the residual sum
of squares. We choose the optimal lag length as the lag length which produces the lowest FPE.
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Table 5.4; Granger Causality Tests Between the F S I  and Currency Crises
Country Null Hypothesis Ohs. Lags F-Statistic Probability
All Countries F S I  does not Granger cause Crises 912 2 1.179 0.840
Crises does not Granger cause F S I 0.174 0.308
Argentina F S I  does not Granger cause Crises 56 4 2.714 0.041
Crises does not Granger cause F S I 0.496 0.738
Brazil F S I  does not Granger cause Crises - - - -
Crises does not Granger cause F S I - -
Chile F S I  does not Granger cause Crises 56 4 0.032 0.998
Crises does not Granger cause F S I 0.019 0.999
Colombia F S I  does not Granger cause Crises 53 4 3.837 0.009
Crises does not Granger cause F S I 0.458 0.765
Costa Rica F S I  does not Granger cause Crises 58 2 7.267 0.001
Crises does not Granger cause F S I 2.746 0.073
Czech Republic F S I  does not Granger cause Crises 42 2 0.488 0.617
Crises does not Granger cause F S I 0.093 0.911
Dominican Republic F S I  does not Granger cause Crises 55 2 2.567 0.086
Crises does not Granger cause F S I 0.983 0.381
El Salvador F S I  does not Granger cause Crises 58 2 0.369 0.692
Crises does not Granger cause F S I 1.264 0.290
Honduras F S I  does not Granger cause Crises 57 3 0.393 0.758
Crises does not Granger cause F S I 0.644 0.589
Hungary F S I  does not Granger cause Crises 55 5 1.917 0.110
Crises does not Granger cause F S I 3.364 0.011
Indonesia F S I  does not Granger cause Crises 56 4 1.185 0.329
Crises does not Granger cause F S I 2.208 0.082
Malaysia F S I  does not Granger cause Crises 56 4 4.611 0.003
Crises does not Granger cause F S I 18.658 3.0E-09
Mexico F S I  does not Granger cause Crises 55 5 0.734 0.602
Crises does not Granger cause F S I 0.698 0.627
Peru F S I  does not Granger cause Crises 59 1 78.501 3.0E-12
Crises does not Granger cause F S I 996.609 2.3E-37
Philippines F S I  does not Granger cause Crises 56 4 7.073 0.000
Crises does not Granger cause F S I 6.114 0.000
Thailand F S I  does not Granger cause Crises 56 4 6.567 0.000
Crises does not Granger cause F S I 1.843 0.136
Turkey F S I  does not Granger cause Crises 59 I 0.674 0.415
Crises does not Granger cause F S I 6.587 0.013
Note: Panam a shows no currency crises.
Source: A uthor’s calculations.
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Table 5.5: Granger Causality Tests Between the F S I  and the E R D
Country Null Hypothesis Obs. Lags F-Statistic Probability
All Countries F S I  does not Granger cause E R D 893 3 2.693 0.045
E R D  does not Granger cause F S I 0.924 0.428
Argentina F S I  does not Granger cause E R D 56 4 3.610 0.012
E R D  does not Granger cause F S I 0.365 0.832
Brazil F S I  does not Granger cause E R D 59 1 1.854 0.178
E R D  does not Granger cause F S I 5.172 0.026
Chile F S I  does not Granger cause E R D 56 4 2.521 0.053
E R D  does not Granger cause F S I 0.636 0.639
Colombia F S I  does not Granger cause E R D 54 3 0.142 0.934
E R D  does not Granger cause F S I 0.214 0.886
Costa Rica F S I  does not Granger cause E R D 55 5 24.306 1.2E-11
E R D  does not Granger cause F S I 15.746 7.1E-09
Czech Republic F S I  does not Granger cause E R D 40 4 0.593 0.670
E R D  does not Granger cause F S I 0,508 0.729
Dominican Republic F S I  does not Granger cause E R D 56 1 0.550 0.461
E R D  does not Granger cause F S I 2.900 0.094
El Salvador F S I  does not Granger cause E R D 58 2 0.399 0.672
E R D  does not Granger cause F S I 1.359 0.265
Honduras F S I  does not Granger cause E R D 59 1 0.518 0.474
E R D  does not Granger cause F S I 1.698 0.197
Hungary F S I  does not Granger cause E R D 59 1 0.235 0.629
E R D  does not Granger cause F S I 0.021 0.882
Indonesia F S I  does not Granger cause E R D 58 2 0.191 0.826
E R D  does not Granger cause F S I 2.455 0.095
Malaysia F S I  does not Granger cause E R D 57 3 6.489 0.000
E R D  does not Granger cause F S I 8.428 0.000
Mexico F S I  does not Granger cause E R D 56 4 3.720 0.010
E R D  does not Granger cause F S I 1.586 0.193
Peru F S I  does not Granger cause E R D 56 4 6.311 0.000
E R D  does not Granger cause F S I 19.301 1.9E-09
Philippines F S I  does not Granger cause E R D 58 2 2.650 0.079
E R D  does not Granger cause F S I 5.885 0.004
Thailand F S I  does not Granger cause E R D 56 4 4.865 0.002
E R D  does not Granger cause F S I 1.087 0.373
Turkey F S I  does not Granger cause E R D 58 2 3.492 0.037
E R D  does not Granger cause F S I 1.197 0.309
Note: Panam a shows no exchange ra te  depreciation.
Source: A uthor’s calculations.
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Table 5.6: Granger Causality Tests Between the F S I  and the M P I
C'ounlry Null Hypothesis Obs. Lags F-Statistic Probability
All Countries F S I  does not Granger cause M P I 855 5 5.547 0.000
M P I  does not Granger cause F S I 0.926 0.463
Argentina F S I  does not Granger cause M P I 59 1 6.490 0.013
M P I  does not Granger cause F S I 0.067 0.795
Brazil F S I  does not Granger cause M P I 56 4 5.112 0.001
M P I  does not Granger cause F S I 2.393 0.063
Chile F S I  does not Granger cause M P I 56 4 0.153 0.960
M P I  does not Granger cause F S I 2.561 0.050
Colombia F S I  does not Granger cause M P I 53 4 0.968 0.434
M P I  does not Granger cause F S I 2.083 0.099
Costa Rica F S I  does not Granger cause M P I 55 5 4.799 0.001
M P I  does not Granger cause F S I 2.309 0.060
Czech Republic F S I  does not Granger cause M P I 42 2 1.359 0.269
M P I  does not Granger cause F S I 0.428 0.655
Dominican Republic F S I  does not Granger cause M P I 53 4 2.742 0.040
M P I  does not Granger cause F S I 0.339 0.850
El Salvador F S I  does not Granger cause M P I 56 4 0.092 0.984
M P I  does not Granger cause F S I 0.998 0.418
Honduras F S I  does not Granger cause M P I 56 4 0.209 0.932
M P I  does not Granger cause F S I 1.066 0.383
Hungary F S I  does not Granger cause M P I 59 1 1.911 0.172
M P I  does not Granger cause F S I 0.042 0.838
Indonesia F S I  does not Granger cause M P I 56 4 0.689 0.603
M P I  does not Granger cause F S I 1.021 0.405
Malaysia F S I  does not Granger cause M P I 56 4 1.949 0.117
M P I  does not Granger cause F S I 2.858 0.033
Mexico F S I  does not Granger cause M P I 55 5 0.444 0.815
M P I  does not Granger cause F S I 0.999 0.429
Peru F S I  does not Granger cause M P I 56 4 4.527 0.003
M P I  does not Granger cause F S I 5.834 0.000
Philippines F S I  does not Granger cause M P I 57 3 4.666 0.006
M P I  does not Granger cause F S I 3.356 0.026
Thailand F S I  does not Granger cause M P I 56 4 4.088 0.006
M P I  does not Granger cause F S I 1.145 0.347
Turkey F S I  does not Granger cause M P I 58 2 2.797 0.070
M P I  does not Granger cause F S I 0.394 0.676
Note: Panam a shows no pressure in its exchange market.
Source: A uthor’s calculations.
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the F S I  to currency crises. On the contrary, for C hile , the Granger causality test 
results show that the F S I  causes E R D ,  but not the other way. In the case of Chile, 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the F S I  does not Granger cause currency 
crises. Similarly, the results for this country show no causality relationship from the 
F S I  to the M P I .  For C olom bia , the results of the Granger causality test show that 
the F S I  only causes currency crises, but not E R D  and M P I .  Meanwhile, for C o s ta  
R ica, the F S I  causes currency crises, exchange rate depreciation and speculative 
pressure in the exchange market. On the contrary, in the C zech  R ep u b lic  the 
results show there no relationship between the F S I ,  currency crises and the M P I .  
Results for the D o m in ican  R e p u b lic  show tha t causality runs from the F S I  to 
crises and from the F S I  to the M P I .
For E l S alvador, H o n d u ras , H u n g a ry  and In d o n es ia  the results show there 
is no causality between the variables considered, except from currency crises to the 
F S I  in Hungary and Indonesia, On the contrary, the results for M alay sia  show 
tha t the Granger causality runs both ways between the F S I  and currency crises, 
and between the F S I  and the E R D ,  However, it only shows causality from the 
M P I  to the F S I .  While the results for M exico  reveal that the Granger causality 
runs one-way from the F S I  to the E R D .
The results of the Granger tests using four lags for P e ru  show that there is 
bi-directional causality between the F S I  and the E R D ,  and between the F S I  and 
the M P I .  In addition, when one lag is used the causality runs in two-ways between 
the F S I  and currency crises. Similarly, the results for the P h ilip p in e s  show a 
bi-directional relationship between the F S I  and currency crises, the F S I  and the 
M P I ,  and the F S I  and E R D .  The Granger causality test results for T h a ila n d  
show tha t the F S I  affects currency crises, the M P I  and the E R D .  While for 
T urkey , the null hypothesis th a t the F S I  does not Granger cause currency crises 
cannot be rejected, but the results show tha t Granger causality from the F S I  to 
the M P I  and from the F S I  to the E R D ,
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On the other hand, it is possible tha t devaluation or depreciation worsens the 
debt burden and the fiscal sustainability through an increase in the real value of 
foreign currency debt. Similarly, an increase in the domestic interest rate (to defend 
the currency) may also affect the debt burden if it is variable-rate or short-term, in 
which case it has to be rolled-over regularly. Of course, a major concern here is the 
potential endogeneity of the explanatory variable. Then, the Davidson and MacK­
innon (1989) version of Hausman’s specification test^^ was performed as a formal 
test for endogeneity of the F S I .  To carry out the Hausman test, we run two simple 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions.^^ A set of potential instrumental variables 
tha t are correlated with the suspected F S I  variable is used, including lagged values 
of M P I .  In the first regression, we regress the potentially endogenous F S I  variable 
on instrumental variables and retrieve the residuals. Then, the residual was used as 
additional explanatory variable in a regression of the M P I  on the actual F S I .  A 
t-statistic was used to test the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients of the 
residual are jointly equal to zero. If they are, there is no endogeneity. The results 
show th a t most of the models pass the test (see Table C .l). The null hypothesis was 
not rejected at the 1% and 5% level. In the case of El Salvador, the test rejected 
the hypothesis of no endogeneity at the 5% level.
To summarise, the results suggest tha t there is causal linkage between the F S I  
and currency crises, independently of the criterion used to define crises. The analysis 
reveals interesting results, particularly for those countries with large unsustainable 
fiscal positions in the period considered. Results for Argentina show tha t there are 
deep connections among unsustainable fiscal positions (in 87% of the period studied) 
and currency crises (those occurring in 1990, 1995, and 2000). Similar results are 
drawn for Turkey (for the crises occurring in 2000 and 2001) and countries in South- 
East Asia, among others. Also, we no found endogeneity between variables in the 
most of countries.
22gee Hausman (1978).
These regression are not presented here, but are available upon request.
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In the next sub-section, the ability of the F S I  to explain a currency crisis is 
tested using a probit model.
5.5.3 Probit M odel
This sub-section explores whether a decline in fiscal sustainability or an unsustain­
able fiscal position (FSI t  >  1) increases the probability of a currency crisis and/or 
a speculative pressure in the exchange markets. Consequently, a probit model es­
timation corrected for robust covariances is used to assess the ability of the Fiscal 
Sustainability Indicator. The dependent variables are the binary currency crises as 
defined earlier (both definition in separate regressions), and the independent variable 
is the F S I .  If the F S I  uses all the available information on fiscal stances (govern­
ment budget deficit, the amount and composition of public debt, among others), 
then this indicator should help predict crises because (as shown in Chapter 3) fiscal 
indicators have some predictive power and the simple model should not be misspeci- 
fied. T hat is, others fiscal indicators should not be statistically significant, since that 
information would already presumably be reflected in the F S I  themselves. Thus 
the state of fiscal fundamentals should be captured in a single indicator, the F S I .  
Of course, we are excluding monetary variables because this probit model does not 
form a complete econometric test to currency crises but rather an initial exploration 
of the association between fiscal conditions and currency crises.
The Akaike criterion is used to select lags for the whole sample and each country. 
In addition, a modified version of McFadden’s IF  as proposed by Estrella (1998) is 
used to test how well a Fiscal Sustainability Indicator can predict a currency crisis. 
This measure computes a Log-Likelihood ratio of the model under study compared 
to another model, which does not take the information of the more general model 
into account. In this case the Log-Likelihood of equation 5.10, the model including 
the indicator, is compared to the Log-Likelihood of a model where the binary series 
is only regressed on a constant (unconstrained model). Specifically,
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Pseudo = V o g L J
■Î log to
(5.17)
where and L q are the unconstrained and constrained {Pi =  0 ) likelihoods, re­
spectively, and n  is the number of observations. The results of these estimates 
are presented in Tables 5.7 and 5.8, reporting the marginal effects, among others. 
The signs and magnitude of the marginal effects indicate the effect of the F S I  on 
the probability of a currency crisis. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 plot the probabilities of a 
currency crisis generated by the probit model.
Table 5.7: Probit Models: Do F S I s  Predict Currency Crises?
C ountry Independen t
V ariable
Coefficient S tan d a rd M arginal
BfFects
P ro bab ility  Pseudo-17^
All C ountries
A rgentina
Brazil
Chile
Colom bia
C osta  R ica
Czech R epublic
D om inican R epublic
Q1 Salvador
H onduras
H ungary
Indonesia
M alaysia
Mexico
P hilippines
T ha iland
Turkey
F S I i -1
F S I { - i
F S I ( - i
F S I ( - l
F S I{ -3
F S I{ -1
F S I{ -2
F S H -1
F S I{ -3
F S I ( -4
F S I( -2
F S I( -1
F ST (-1
F S H -2
F S I{ -2
F S / ( - l
F S I{ -4
F S I{ -1
0.189
0.412
1.179
0.430
0.777
1.939
-5.073
3.389
-4.399
-1.115
-1.363
1.084
-4.925
-1.215
0.109
2.528
-1.658
0.473
0.085
0.154
0.616
0.247
0.413
0.678
2.029
2.512
1.315
0.322
0.696
0.610
1.328
0.409
0.079
0.788
0,646
0.326
2.215
2.676
1.913
1.737
1.879
2.860
-2.499
1.349
-3.345
-3.461
-1.957
1.776
-3.707
-2.964
1.361
3.208
-2.564
1.452
0 .022
0.036
0,469
0.017
0.083
0.143
-0.035
0.337
-0.032
-0.086
-0.034
0.090
-0.016
-0.138
0.004
0.150
-0.189
0.056
0.026
0.007
0.055
0.082
0.060
0.004
0 .012
0.177
0.000
0.000
0.050
0.075
0 .000
0.003
0.173
0 .001
0 .010
0.146
0.141
0.601
0.050
0.430
0.332
0.624
0.734
0.323
0.710
0.310
0.618
0.341
0.821
0.243
0.520
0.674
0.333
0.242
Wo te : E stim ates are provided for each indiv idual country . T he  dependen t variab le is a  dum m y variab le w hich takes on a  value of 1 
if th e re  is a  currency  crisis in the qu arte r .
S o u rc e :  A u th o r 's  c a lc u la t io n s .
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Table 5.8: Probit Models: Do F S I s  Predict Exchange Rate Depreciation?
C ountry Independen t
V ariable
Coefficient S tanda rd
E rror
z -S ta tis tic M arginal
Effects
P robab ility Pseudo-R^
All C ountries F S J ( - l ) 0.451 0.096 4.689 0.174 0.000 0.052
A rgen tina F S J (-4 ) 0.412 0.154 2.676 0.036 0.007 0.501
Brazil F S H -1 ) 1.706 0.627 2.719 0.679 0.006 0.084
Chile F S I{ -1 ) 2.203 0.824 2.671 0.239 0.007 0.324
C olom bia F S /( -4 ) 0.017 0.329 0.053 0.127 0.967 0 .000
C osta  R ica F S / ( - l ) 8.779 4,478 1.960 1.59e-12 0.050 0.941
Czech R epublic F S J ( -2 ) -2.398 1.870 -1.282 -0.372 0.199 0.171
D om inican Republic F g f ( - l ) 6.492 2.033 3.406 1.081 0.000 0.310
El Salvador F S /( -3 ) -3.267 0.893 -3.655 -0.048 0 .000 0.679
H onduras F S / ( - l ) -0.646 0.335 -1.929 -0.164 0.053 0.043
H ungary F S / ( - l ) -0.219 0.300 -0.730 -0.055 0.465 0.008
Indonesia F S I i -1 ) 1.060 0.429 2.470 0.297 0.013 0.056
M alaysia F S f ( - l ) -4.648 1.402 -3.313 -0.020 0.000 0.804
Mexico F S/C -1) 0.657 0.660 0.995 0.139 0.319 0.045
P eru F S I ( -2 ) 14.307 3.310 4.321 3.489 0.000 0.748
P hilippines F S i ( - l ) 1.209 0.552 2.187 0.331 0.028 0.074
T ha iland F S / ( - l ) 2.718 0.889 3.054 0.182 0 .002 0.429
Turkey P S J ( - l ) 4.705 1.102 4.267 0.508 0.000 0.384
N ote:  E stim ates are provided for each ind iv idual country. T he  dependen t variable is a  dum m y variable w hich takes on a value of 1 
if the re  is a  currency crisis in th e  qu arte r .
Source:  A u th o r 's  ca lcula tions.
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Figure 5.4: Probabilities of Currency Crises
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Figure 5.5: Probabilities of Exchange Rate Depreciation
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For the whole sample, the coefficient of the F S I  is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level of currency crises, but with a marginal effect of 2.2% for 
currency crises. Interpretations of marginal effects in the model is tha t 1% change in 
the F S I  will induce 2 .2 % unit change in currency crisis. When the alternative binary 
specification of currency crises (exchange rate depreciation) is used, the coefiicient 
of the F S I  is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level with a marginal 
predictive contribution of 17.4%. An unsustainable fiscal position positively affects 
the probability of currency crises. The p s e u d o - o f  estimates are 14% and 5.23%, 
respectively. Similarly, the estimated results for A rg e n tin a  suggest tha t a Fiscal 
Sustainability Indicator helps to predict currency crises. The coefficients of the 
Fiscal Sustainability Indicator are statistically significant at the 1 % level with a 
marginal predictive contribution of about 3.6%.
In B ra z il’s case, the results indicate tha t the F S I  has a high effect on crisis 
probabilities, particularly on nominal exchange rate depreciation. While the re­
sults for C h ile  are statistically significant, but only when the E R D  is used, the 
marginal effect is im portant. For C o lom bia, the results obtained indicate tha t an 
unsustainable fiscal position increases the probability of a crisis. However, the es­
tim ated coefficients for the FSI^  when the exchange rate depreciation is used, has 
the anticipated positive sign but is statistically insignificant.
The estimated results for C o s ta  R ic a  show tha t coefficients are statistically 
significant but when the exchange rate depreciation is used, the marginal effect is 
negligible. On the contrary, the results of the C zech  R ep u b lic  indicate that the 
F S I  does not affect the probability of currency crises. Moreover, when we use the 
E R D j  the coefficients of the F S I  is negative but is statistically insignificant. For 
the D o m in ican  R ep u b lic , the estimated coefficients for the F S I  have the right 
sign, but it is not significant. Conversely, when an exchange rate depreciation is used 
the results suggest tha t the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator predicts the probability 
of currency crises.
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For E l S alvador, H o n d u ra s  and H u n g a ry , the coefficients of the F S I  have 
negative signs and are statistically significant. In most case their marginal contri­
bution is small. Similarly, the coefficients of the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator for 
M alay sia  are negative and significant but their marginal effects are small. On the 
contrary, the results for In d o n es ia  show tha t the F S I  predicts the probability of 
currency crises with a marginal predictive contribution of 9% and 30%, depending 
on which definition of a currency crisis is used.
The results for M exico  present a negative sign in the coefficient of the F S I  
when currency crises as defined in Section 5.3.2 are used. However, when the E R D  
is used, the coefficient of the F S I  is positive, but it is not significant. For P e ru , the 
results suggest tha t the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator predicts high probabilities of 
exchange rate depreciation. In the same way, the results for the P h ilip p in e s  show 
tha t the coefficients are statistically significant with an high marginal predictive 
contribution.
In the case of T h a ilan d , the results indicate tha t the Fiscal Sustainability Indi­
cator has a high effect on the probability of exchange rate depreciation. Similarly, 
the high significance of the coefficient of the F S I  and its high marginal effects 
in T urkey , suggest that the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator predicts exchange rate 
depreciation.
In summary, the estimated results suggests tha t the Fiscal Sustainability Indica­
tor in some developing countries is useful in predicting the probabilities of currency 
crises and the overall explanatory power is quite substantial given the high the 
pseudo-R^ measure was recorded above 20% for most specifications. Among the 
disadvantages of these estimates is that they do not take into account the influence 
of other variables, particularly from the monetary sector.
The following sub-section presents a Markov-switching model with time-varying 
transition probabilities.
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5.5.4 TV TP Markov-switching M odel
This sub-section tests whether the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator (FBI)  predicts the 
switch from tranquil to crises periods. The method used to estimate the Markov- 
switching model with time varying transition probabilités is the Gibbs sampling 
approach of Albert and Chib (1993).^^ Gibbs sampling is an estimated and a simu­
lation technique, based on the properties of Markov chains, for generating random 
variables from a distribution indirectly without having to calculate the density. 
This methodology possesses im portant advantages over the maximum likelihood 
framework given tha t the simulation output gives much more information about the 
parameters than the maximum likelihood approach.
The Bayesian Gibbs sampling approach is used to find the marginal posterior 
distributions of the parameters of the model given by equations from 5.11 to 5.16. 
Before that, it is necessary to assign initial values for some parameters, hence the 
Quasi Bayesian maximum likelihood algorithm proposed by Hamilton (1989, 1991) 
is used to estimate the priors parameters. The priors used are presented in Table 
5.9. The parameters cr^ , ckq and a i ,  denote the variances and the means in crisis and 
tranquil period respectively.^® Then, the model using Gibbs sampling is estimated, 
setting the priors to the values obtained from the Quasi Bayesian maximum likeli­
hood a l g o r i t h m . T h e  first 2000 iterations of the Gibbs sampling are discarded to 
ensure tha t approximate convergence is obtained. An additional 8 , 0 0 0  iterations are 
saved and used to draw inferences on the parameters and the switching states. We 
use the binary index of currency crises as the state variable, the Fiscal Sustainability
results presented in this section were estimated by Bayesian methods and Gibbs sampling 
using a modified version of the Pilar do and Gordon (1998) code written by Martin Ellison and 
available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economicss/staff/ellison/.
^^For a detailed demonstration of Gibbs sampling see Casella and George (1992) and Albert and 
Chib (1993).
^®In the long run initial values play no role, but good initial values can speed up the convergence 
of the Markov chain in its ergodic distribution,
^^The results of the Markov-switching model with fixed probabilities are plotted in Figure C.l 
in the Appendix.
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Indicator as the independent and the M P I  as the dependent variable.
The outcomes of the Gibbs sampling simulations, conducted for priors probabil­
ities, are shown in Tables 5.10 and 5.11, where the means (o:o and a i)  are negative 
and positive, repectively, suggesting tha t the phases represent tranquil and crisis 
periods. In addition, Tables 5.12 and 5.13 show a summary of the main coefficients 
and their economic interpretation. A crisis or speculative attacks are identified using 
the M P I  as time series subject to discrete shifts in regimes. We assume a “tranquil” 
regime takes places when exchange rates, foreign reserves and interest rates are sta­
ble, and a “speculative” or “crisis” regime is characterised by large depreciations in 
exchange rates, foreign reserve falls and interest rates increments. The parameter
denotes the variances; 7  ^ is state dependent slope parameter reflecting the lagged 
Fiscal Sustainability Indicator information about the likelihood of the economy re­
maining in or exiting from a crisis period; the parameters 7 0  and 7  ^ determine the 
unconditional mean duration of tranquil periods and crisis regimes. It was expected 
tha t 7 o > 7 s , which implies tha t the duration of tranquil state is greater than 
a crisis state; and 0 ’s are autoregressive parameters. Lags were selected accord­
ing to standard information criteria (Akaike, Hannah-Quinn and Schwarz) from the 
fixed transition probabilities used to estimate the prior parameters. The results are 
extremely encouraging in tha t all of the estimated coefficients are statistically sig­
nificantly different from zero and their sign in most cases accords with our economic 
intuition.^®
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 plot the smoothed probabilities of currency crises against 
time t. The timing of crises implied by Figures 5.6 and 5.7 are consistent with 
those reported using the Quasi Bayesian maximum likelihood algorithm (see Figure 
Similarly, Figures 5.6 and 5.7 parallel the results obtained using the probit 
models (see Figures 5.4 and 5.5).
sensitivity analysis is performed to determine if the posterior distributions of parameters 
are invariant under various sets of priors. The results are not dependent on the priors selected. 
^^See Table C.5 also.
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Table 5.9: Priors for the Parameters
P aram eters M ean S tan d a rd  D eviation P aram eters M ean S tan d a rd  D eviation
CÏQ
A rg e n tin a
-2.668 8.468 ao
H ungary
-2.136 0.167
15.-103 8.468 a i 0.545 0.167
- - <7^ - -
“ 0
B razil
-1.412 1.394 « 0
In d o n e s ia
-1.173 1.139
« 1 1.412 1.394 7.054 1.139
- - £7=* - -
ÛQ
Chile
-3.840 0.134 ao
M alaysia
-0.150 1.048
a i 1.770 0.134 “ 1 0.046 1.048
<7= - - - -
« 0
C olom bia
-0.717 0.932 “ 0
M exico
-0.793 5.272
« 1 3.724 0.932 a i 11.538 5.272
- - <7^ - -
“ 0
C oeia  R ica  
-1.599 0.347 « 0
P a n a m a
1.181 0.347 «1 -
- - «7= - -
“ 0
Czech R epublic  
-0.702 2.278 « 0
P e ru
-1.410 0.859
0=1 0.355 2.278 «1 1.410 0.859
o : - - £7 = - -
« 0
D o m in ica n  R epttb lic  
0.8 0 .8 « 0
P h ilip p in es
-0.211 0.257
a i 0.8 0 .8 a i 0.199 0.257
- - £7 = ' -
»ü
El S a lv a d o r  
-1.729 0.335 Û0
T h a ila n d
-0.467 0.928
“ 1 1.729 0.335 Ql 0.132 0.928
<7= - - - -
£»0
H onduras
-0.261 0.261 « 0
T u rkey
-2.210 5.250
a i 0.290 0.261 « 1 11.273 5.250
- £7^ - -
Afote: T he p rio r d is tr ib u tio n  of <7 is im proper. 
S ource: A u th o r 's  calcula.tions.
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Table 5.10: Gibbs Sampling Results for Currency Crises
A rgentina Chile C olom bia
Rep. Rep.
El S alvador H onduras
“ 0 -37.190 -8.046 -29.692 -1086.00 -5.440 -12.032 -504.065 -3.044 -4 .516
(3.378) (4.170) (248.797) (100383.835) ( 1 .10 2 ) (3.123) (467.242) (0.741) (816.793)
“ 1 34.126 9.819 5.112 1.138 6.704 10.936 1.873 2.749 -4.237
(3.421) (3.479) (28.052) (18.020) (1.070) (3.120) (3.425) (0.724) (239.974)
<I>1 0.048 -0.290 0.178 0.180 0.228 0.231 0.433 0.212 0.487
(f>2 0.015 -0.050 0.051 0.199 0.062 -0.044 0.071
-0.208 0.029 0.052 -0.218 0 .110 0.011 -0.067
<#>4 -0.005 0.133 -0.092 0.048
4>a -0.221
To 0.709 -0.017 12.124 0.315 1.284 -0.107 4.051 0.406 -0.085
(0.269) (0.327) (6 .122 ) (0.418) (0.286) (0.441) (0.354) (0.263) (0.358)
7a 0.842 -25.355 -2.062 0.917 -0.09 2.837 -2.906 0.915 1,302
(0.054) (0 .2 01 ) (0.079) (0.089) (0.95) (0 .2 2 2 ) (0.258) (0.103) (0.097)
7b -0.023 31.13559 -9.034 0.172 0.430 -1.660 0.659 0.279 0.040
(0 .2 00 ) (0.451) (6.060) (0.320) (0.187) (0.294) (0.349) (0.184) (0.247)
34.887 269.216 7.536 117.241 1.811 5.464 15.371 0.386 0.757
H ungary Indonesia M alaysia Mexico Peru P hilippines T h a ilan d Turkey
« 0 -39.560 -7.168 140.839 -16.883 -30.778 -4.384 -5.924 -39.068
(1761.187) (2.299) (8808.000) (4.186) (2.555) (5.723) (0.635) (10.370)
Û1 3.463 6.113 2.392 16.092 29.326 4.578 4.926 42.717
(9.261) (2.514) (0.382) (4.254) (2.612) (5.794) (2.259) (5.888)
<i>i 0.295 0.547 0.948 0.409 -0.288 0.356 0.831 0.536
<j>2 -0.004 0.159 -0.293 -0.204 0.010 -0.361 -0.145 -0.120
4>3 0.096 -0.142 -0.084 -0.06 0.294 0.360 0.041
<p4 -0.238 -0.337 -0.361 -0.077
<f>5
70 0.512 0.188 -0.348 -0.127 0.399 -0.185 0.153 -0.527
(0.314) (0.134) (0.378) (0.348) (0.291) (0.240) (0.130) (0.273)
7z 0.993 0.580 1.872 2.540 0.981 1.223 0.566 0.709
(0.094) (0.067) (0.141) (0.170) (0.038) (0.096) (0.074) (0.047)
7s 0.013 0.629 -0.053 -1.328 0.085 0.236 0.794 0.365
(0.215) (0.164) (0.265) (0.188) (0.241) (0.161) (0.166) (0 .21 2 )
0-2 1.559 4.807 0.349 9.619 17.570 7.178 2.657 49.474
N o te ;  S tan d a rd  errors are no ted  in  b rackets below  th e  coefTicient estim ates. Lags were selected according  to  Akaike, Ilaunali-Q uinn  
and  Schwarz criterion  from th e  fixed tra n sitio n  p ro bab ilities  used to  es tim ate  th e  prior param ete rs.
S o u rc e :  A u th o r ’s c a lc u la t io n s .
Prediction of Currency Crises using a Fiscal Sustanaibility Indicator 218
Table 5.11: Gibbs Sampling Results for Exchange Rate Depreciation
A rgentina Chile C olom bia C osta
R ica Rep. Rep,
El S alvador H onduras
« 0 -36.130 -120.430 -12.074 0.192 -5.440 -12.032 -504.065 -61.455 -217.963
(3.048) (32.769) (54.270) (1.581) (1 .1 02 ) (3.123) (467.242) (11707.152) (22594.468)
« 1 32.996 125.178 10.066 0.050 6.704 10.936 1.873 2.733 -2.704
(2.979) (32.550) (164.275) (1.731) (1.070) (3.120) (3.425) (0.883) (0.479)
■^>1 -0.128 0.165 0.144 0.163 0.228 0.231 0.433 0.211 0.331
<t>2 -0.056 -0.044 0.093 0.199 0.062 0.027 0.083
<t>3 -0.285 0.016 -0.218 0 .110 -0.049 -0.277
tj>4 -0 .002 0.133 -0.092 0.081 0.062
i>5 0.069 -0.221
70 0.708 3.201 1.107 -1.730 1.284 -0.107 4.051 -0.032 -0.027
(0.304) (1.151) (1.068) (0.141) (0.286) (0.441) (0.354) (0.259) (0.162)
7s 0.922 -1.146 -0.682 2.033 -0.09 2.837 -2.906 1.389 0.987
(0,058) (0.195) (0.188) (0.127) (0.095) (0 .22 2 ) (0.258) (0.104) (0.050)
7s -0.114 -0.109 1.938 0.079 0.430 -1.660 0.659 0.274 0.151
(0.227) (1.009) (0.959) (0.302) (0.187) (0.294) (0.349) (0.181) (0.116)
36.339 195.927 7.243 6.825 1.811 5.464 15.371 0.402 9.514
H ungary Indonesia M alaysia M exico P eru Philippines T ha iland T urkey
OfQ -29,268 -5.145 140.839 -19.487 -30.789 -3.838 -5.922 -39.121
(5606.896) (4.990) (8808.000) (2.336) (2.580) (4.610) (0.637) (10.602)
« 1 3.887 3.596 2.392 18.997 29.836 4.138 4.924 43.263
(2.956) (31.056) (0.382) (2 1 .111 ) (2.636) (4.669) (2.260) (10.597)
0 .111 0.691 0.948 -0.158 -0.290 0.407 0.882 0.553
02 0.191 -0.151 -0.293 -0.074 0.009 -0.481 -0.145 -0.084
03 0.071 -0,084 0.308 -0.061 0.362 0.360 -0.015
04 0.018 -0 .0 2 0 -0.346 -0.361 -0.109
05
-0.386
-0.026
-0.246
70 1.130 0.224 -0.348 0.732 0.155 -0.693 0.154 -0.532
(0.429) (0.299) (0.378) (0.429) (0.290) (0.219) (0.130) (0.226)
7s 0.832 0.728 1,872 -0.451 1.025 1.434 0.541 0.589
(0.151) (0.129) (0.141) (0.223) (0.038) (0.105) (0.074) (0.049)
7s 0.085 0.331 -0.053 1.920 0.089 0.155 0.807 0.259
(0.235) (0.225) (0.265) (0.323) (0.239) (0.123) (0.166) (0.149)
1.161 7.242 0.349 9.183 17.661 6.795 2.657 49.143
N ote:  S tan d a rd  errors are no ted  in b racke ts below th e  coefficient estim ates. Lags w ere selected according to  Akaike, H annah-Q uinn 
and Schwarz criterion  from the  fixed tra n sitio n  probab ilities  used to  es tim ate  the  p rior param ete rs.
S o u rc e :  A u th o r ’s c a lc u la t io n s .
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Table 5.12: Gibbs Sampling Results for Currency Crises: Main Coefficients
A rgentina Chile C olom bia C osta
R ica
Czech
Rep. Rep.
El Salvador H onduras
70 0.709 -0.017 12.124 0.315 1.284 -0.107 4.051 0.406 -0.085
(0.269) (0.327) (6 .12 2 ) (0.418) (0.286) (0.441) (0.354) (0.263) (0.358)
7s 0.842 -25.355 -2.062 0.917 -0.09 2.837 -2.906 0.915 1.302
(0.054) (0 .2 0 1 ) (0.079) (0.089) (0.95) (0 .2 22 ) (0.258) (0.103) (0.097)
7a -0.023 31.13559 -9.034 0.172 0.430 -1.660 0.659 0.279 0.040
(0 .2 0 0 ) (0.451) (6.060) (0.320) (0.187) (0.294) (0.349) (0.184) (0.247)
H ungary Indonesia M alaysia Mexico Peru P hilippines T ha iland Turkey
70 0.512 0.188 -0.348 -0.127 0.399 -0.185 0.153 -0.527
(0.314) (0.134) (0.378) (0.348) (0.291) (0.240) (0.130) (0.273)
7s 0.993 0.580 1.872 2.540 0.981 1.223 0.566 0.709
(0.094) (0.067) (0.141) (0.170) (0.038) (0.096) (0.074) (0.047)
7« 0.013 0.629 -0.053 -1.328 0.085 0.236 0.794 0.365
(0.215) (0.164) (0.265) (0.188) (0.241) (0.161) (0.166) (0 .212 )
N o te :  S tan d a rd  errors are no ted  in brackets below the  coefficient es tim ates .
S u m m a ry :  P a ram e te r To shows th a t  tran q u il periods are  longer th a n  currency crisis periods (7 s ) .  W hen p aram e te r 7 % is positive 
shows th a t  an u nsusta inab le  fiscal posilicion  is associa ted  w ith  a  h igher p robab ility  of sw itching to  a  crisis period .
5 o n 7-ce: A u th o r’s ca lcu la tions.
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Table 5.13: Gibbs Sampling Results for Exchange Rate Depreciation: Main Coeffi­
cients
A rgentina B razil Chile C olom bia C osta
R ica
Czech
Rep. Rep.
El Salvador H onduras
70 0,708 3.201 1.107 -1.730 1.284 -0.107 4.051 -0.032 -0.027
(0.304) (1.151) (1.068) (0.141) (0.286) (0.441) (0.354) (0.259) (0.162)
7z 0.922 -1.146 -0.682 2.033 -0.09 2.837 -2.906 1.389 0.987
(0.058) (0.195) (0.188) (0.127) (0.095) (0 .222 ) (0.258) (0.104) (0.050)
7a -0.114 -0.109 1.938 0.079 0.430 -1.660 0.659 0.274 0.151
(0.227) (1.009) (0.959) (0.302) (0.187) (0.294) (0.349) (0.181) (0.116)
H ungary Indonesia M alaysia Mexico Peru P hilippines T ha iland Turkey
70 1.130 0.224 -0.348 0.732 0.155 -0.693 0.154 -0.532
(0.429) (0.299) (0.378) (0.429) (0.290) (0.219) (0.130) (0.226)
7z 0.832 0.728 1.872 -0.451 1,025 1.434 0.541 0.589
(0.151) (0.129) (0.141) (0.223) (0.038) (0.105) (0.074) (0.049)
7s 0.085 0.331 -0.053 1.920 0.089 0.155 0.807 0.259
(0.235) (0.225) (0.265) (0.323) (0.239) (0.123) (0.166) (0.149)
N o te :  S tan d a rd  errors a re  no ted  in b racke ts below  th e  coefiicient estim ates.
S u m m a ry :  P a ram ete r to  shows th a t  tra n q u il periods are  longer th a n  currency crisis periods ( T s ) -  W hen p aram ete r 7 ^ is positive 
shows th a t  an  unsusta inab le  fiscal positicion  is associa ted  w ith  a  h igher p robab ility  of sw itching to  a  crisis period.
S ou rce: A u th o r’s calculations.
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Figure 5.6: Smoothed Probabilities of Currency Crises
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Figure 5.7: Smoothed Probabilities of Exchange Rate Depreciation
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The results for A rg e n tin a  show tha t a switch into a crisis regime entails a I
jum p of about 34%. W ith regards to the latent variable equation, the estimated 
coefficient for the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator is also strongly significant and 
shows, as expected, a positive sign. It is also found tha t a positive relationship 
between the probability of being in crisis and the F S I  when we use the binary 
definition of a crisis from the indicator of exchange rate depreciation is used. Based i
on the two binary crisis definitions used in this section, three currency crises have '
been identified for Argentina in the period under review (see Figures 5.6 and 5.7). i
Parameters 7 0  and 7  ^ capture the asymmetry tha t tranquil periods tend to last |I
longer than crises periods. In contrast, the results for B raz il show that there is !
no positive relationship between the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator and currency I
crises. In other words, the movements of the F S I  cannot be used to predict the ;
switch from tranquil periods to crises states. Similarly, for C h ile  an increase in the :
value of the F S I  reduce the probability of crises. At this point, it is im portant to 
point out tha t Brazil and Chile are not countries fiscally unsustainable during the 
period considered, according to the results in Section 4.5.1.
On the other hand, the results for C o lo m b ia  show that the estimated coefficient 
7 z is positive, which confirms tha t an unsustainable fiscal position is associated with 
a higher probability of switching to a crisis period. At the same time, the parameter 
7 js has an estimated coefficient of variation of about 0.17 when we use binary currency 
crises, and about 0.30 when we use the binary exchange rate depreciation. According 
to the parameters 7 0  and 7 ,^ tranquil periods are longer than currency crisis periods, 
but these results change when we use the exchange rate depreciation. In C o sta  
R ic a ’s case, the results indicate that a switch into the crisis regime entails a jum p of 
about 6.7%, but there is not a positive relationship between the probability of being 
in crisis and the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator. In contrast, the TV TP Markov- 
switching model for the C zech  R e p u b lic  yields a high value of a± (about 10.9% 
in both cases). Equally, the positive sign for 7  ^ is consistent with the belief tha t an
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increment in the value of the F S I  increases the probability of remaining in a crisis 
state and decreases the probability of a swicth to a tranquil period. The estimated 
results for the D o m in ican  R e p u b lic  show tha t coefficients of 7  ^ are negative and 
tranquil periods are longer than crises regime.
According to the results for E l Salvador, the F S I  helps to predict a switch 
from tranquil periods to crisis states. The parameters 7  ^ are significantly positive 
and have estimated coefficients of variations of about 0.10. In this way, about three 
currency crises have been identified for El Salvador in the period under study (see 
Figures 5.6 and 5.7). This country presents currency crises before adopting the US 
dollar as legal tender. While for H o n d u ra s , the parameter 7  ^ shows the right sign. 
However, the results do not present crisis periods.^® Conversely, for H u n g ary , 
the results indicate that there is a direct relationship between the probability of 
remaining in a currency crisis regime and the F S L
Results for In d o n e s ia  show th a t the mean of the regime zero is significantly 
negative, implying a tranquil regime (appreciation in currency or gains in reserves). 
While, regime one is significantly positive, indicating a crisis state (depreciation or 
losses in reserves). The positive sign in the param eter 7  ^ indicates tha t an unsus­
tainable fiscal position increases the probability of being in a currency crisis regime. 
In addition, the estimated parameters 7 0  and 7  ^ show tha t crisis periods are longer 
than tranquil states. Similarly, for M alay s ia  the estimates indicate that there is a 
positive relationship between the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator and the probability 
of currency crises. However, the results show no tranquil p e r i o d s . I t  is also ob­
served that using both crisis definitions leads to identical results. For M exico, the 
results show tha t the probability of being in a crisis state increases as the value of 
the F S I  increases. But this relationship is inversed when we use the exchange rate 
depreciation. While crisis periods are much deeper than tranquil regimes.
can say that the Honduras results show more tranquil and less tranquil periods. 
According to the results for Malaysia, it can be said that this country presents deep crisis and 
less deep crisis periods.
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According to the results for P e ru , an increase in the Fiscal Sustainability Indi­
cator decreases the probability of remaining in a tranquil period and increases the 
probability of remaining in a crisis state. Also, tranquil periods are longer than 
currency crises regimes. Similarly, the results for the P h ilip p in e s  indicate that the 
F S I  can predict the probability of being in a currency crisis state. In addition, the 
parameters 7 0  and 7 5  indicate tha t crises regimes are longer than tranquil periods.
In T h a i la n d ’s case, the results show tha t there is a positive relationship between 
the F S I  and currency crises. Also, the mean average duration of the crisis regime is 
almost 5 quarters. According to the estimated parameters 7 0  and 7 ,^ crisis periods 
are longer than tranquil regimes. Similarly, for T urkey , the results indicate that 
there is a positive relationship between the probability of being in a crisis regime 
and the F S I .  In addition, the parameters 7 0  and 7  ^ present that crises states are 
longer than tranquil period.
In brief, the results of the Markov-switching model using Gibbs sampling are 
more or less in line with those of the probit models. In most cases, the estimated 
parameters are quite robust. The Fiscal Sustainability Indicator, in most countries, 
influences the probability of being in a currency crisis period. These results could 
reflect the nonlinear effect of lagged Fiscal Sustainability Indicator on currency 
crises.
5.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter addresses the issue of the leading indicators tha t can anticipate the 
occurrence of currency crises. None of the previous empirical studies have focused 
on whether a Fiscal Sustainability Indicator may predict a currency crisis. This 
work attem pts to bridge this gap. Firstly, a Fiscal Sustainability Indicator has 
been constructed for 18 developing countries and classified the countries for which 
the F S I  was above the threshold of 1 at least 75% of the time as having been
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fiscally unsustainable, and then different measures of currency crises are defined, 1 2  
countries were identified as presenting large unsustainable fiscal positions in most 
of the period studied, explained basically by primary fiscal deficit. Interestingly, 
Panam a presents an unsustainable fiscal position in 84% of the time, and a high 
public debt to GDP ratio. These results suggest tha t there is no evidence tha t 
officially dollarized country have run more prudent fiscal policies than non-officially 
dollarized developing countries. Notwithstanding, this country shows no speculative 
pressure in its domestic exchange market. But Panam a has relied heavely on the 
IMF in the past 35 years or so, with 17 IMF programmes since 1973 (see Edwards, 
2001 ).
A Granger causality test is used in order to analyse the issue of causality between 
the Fiscal Sustainability Indicator and currency crises. This chapter documents 
tha t there is causal relationship between the F S I  and currency crises, but in some 
cases this relationship is dependent on the definition of currency crises employed. 
Also, the empirical evidence is equally ambiguous. In some countries considered, 
the causality tests suggest evidence of bi-causality between the F S I  and currency 
crises. In others, there is evidence of causality running only from currency crises 
to the F S I .  An explanation could be tha t changes in exchange rates can cause 
changes in the sustainability of fiscal policy and an unsustainable fiscal position 
provokes pressure on the exchange markets. However, in the most of the countries 
we no found evidence of endogeneity between the F S I  and the M P I .  Interestingly, 
for El Salvador the results show tha t there is no causality between the variables 
considered. However, there is endogeneity between the F S I  and the M P I .
In addition, two more different models have been applied for the purpose of eval­
uating from an empirical standpoint, the ability of a F S I  to predict the probability 
of currency crises. A probit model is used to explore whether an unsustainable 
fiscal position increases the probability of a currency crisis. The analysis reveals 
interesting results, particularly for those countries with large unsustainable fiscal
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positions in the period considered. The F S I  anticipates the probabilities of cur­
rency crises. Also, in some countries the results do not change significantly whether 
we consider different currency crisis definitions separately. Notwithstanding, there 
is evidence suggesting tha t the most serious weakness of the crisis models today lie 
in the definition of a currency crisis rather than in the explanatory variables used.
Finally, a Markov-switching method with time varying transition probabilities 
is used to test whether the F S I  predicts a switch from tranquil to crises periods. 
Results suggest tha t in some countries considered the F S I  is useful in predicting 
probabilities of being in currency crises periods. In general, major currency crises 
(such as those in South-East Asia in 1997) are well identified by the probit and 
Markov-switching models. However, in certain countries some periods appear as 
crises for one method, but not for other. In the case of Chile, the Granger causality 
test and the probit model capture a positive relationship between the F S I  and 
currency crises. Nonetheless, this country shows small periods of unsustainable 
fiscal positions. As a consequence, the Markov-switching model presents a negative 
link between these variables. The speculative pressure in the Chilean exchange 
market could be explained perhaps by contagion from Argentina and/or Brazil. 
The Markov-switching model is also very useful in determine duration of currency 
crises periods. Expected duration of a currency crisis in Colombia are 1 . 2 1  quarters, 
while expected duration of a currency crisis in Indonesia are 2.70 quarters.
This chapter contributes to the empirical literature on currency crises by propos­
ing a F S I  to predict currency crises and using a Markov-switching model with 
time varying transition probabilities, estimated by the Bayesian Gibbs sampling 
approach, as an alternative to more standard practice. The Fiscal Sustainability 
Indicator could act as an im portant early warning system. However, in light of our 
results it has a number of limitations, mainly relating to the individual nature of 
most currency crises, where different institutional and political factors affect the 
crises in different ways. The diversity and nature of currency crises determinants
Prediction of Currency Crises using a Fiscal Sustanaibility Indicator 228
reinforces the view that country specific models are required. Also, the absence of 
additional control variables in the TV TP model could affect the results but there 
is no way we can incorporate them in this type of model. Obviously, the analysis 
of only fiscal indicators is not enough to fully assess the probability of a currency 
crisis. In spite of these, our empirical findings seem to provide supporting evidence 
for some authors, who argue th a t fiscal policy plays an im portant role in generating 
currency crises. The definition of a currency crisis as a period characterised by the 
presence of intense foreign exchange market pressure is the best definition used. This 
empirical definition of the currency crisis generally reflects either large increases in 
the exchange rate reflect only devaluation episodes or a combination of exchange 
rates and proxies for stabilising measures of the domestic currency in the general 
case of speculative attacks.
For future research, it would be interesting to apply the same analysis to a larger 
sample of countries and to a higher frequency of data, such as monthly data, as well 
as the refinement of the F S I  to include behavioural content th a t would take into 
account endogenous private savings and investment behaviour and thereby allow 
extensions to externally financed public deficits. On the other hand, one must 
investigate whether those fiscal imbalances in developing countries reflect deeper 
structural shortcomings such as soft budget constraints and inefficient tax systems.
CHAPTER 6
Conclusion
This thesis aims to investigate a range of issues relating to the selection of an ex­
change rate regime, the role of specific exchange rate regimes in generating currency 
crises and the role of a fiscal sustainability indicator (FSI )  in predicting those crises. 
The empirical and theoretical literature on the relationship between the selection of 
exchange rate regimes, currency crises and fiscal stances has developed progressively 
in the post-war period, becoming clear tha t the choice of an optimal exchange rate 
regime is one of the most complicated issues addressed by economists today. The 
literature on the subject suggests links between exchange regimes, macroeconomic 
performance and currency crises could be good indicators in determining the choice 
of an exchange rate regime. Establishing links between countries’ exchange rate 
regimes and their macroeconomic performance will, of course, depend on whether 
those exchange rate regimes are classified as de jure or de facto. This is particu­
larly true for emerging and developing countries where the de jure announcement to 
fioat, for example, has been known to not typically resemble a de facto fully floating
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exchange rate. The most complete de facto exchange rate classifications are made 
by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).
Chapter 3’s results take into account both classifications, indicating tha t fixed 
exchange rate regimes can be useful in generating anti-inflation credibility partic­
ularly in emerging and developing countries. Similarly, the results suggest tha t 
currency crises tend to occur less frequently in those developing countries adopting 
fixed arrangements. A floating exchange rate may be a difficult and costly regime 
for developing countries suffering from chronic high inflation, high currency sub­
stitution, and lack of credibility in domestic monetary policy. This explain why a 
fully floating exchange rate is not a very popular variant in developing and emerg­
ing market economies (fear of floating phenomenon) even among those tha t recently 
experienced currency crises and were forced to abandon a formal peg.
For developing countries it is possible to set up a fixed exchange rate regime 
with substantial capability to resist speculative attacks, and this is perhaps prefer­
able to a floating exchange rate regime. However, it is im portant to note tha t the 
institutional features behind specific fixed exchange rate regimes are generally im­
portant in determining the level of credibility to be gained. Unfortunately, some 
emerging and developing countries face a diversity of institutional weaknesses tha t 
manifest themselves in higher inflation, problems in fiscal and debt sustainability, 
fragile banking systems and various other sources of macroeconomic instability, all 
of which potentially undermine the credibility of policymakers (Rogoff et al., 2003). 
For this reason, our results indicate tha t emerging and developing countries with 
a lower budget deficit, higher central bank independence, higher ratio of exports 
plus imports to GDP and fixed regimes show better inflation and economic growth 
performance than other countries. Conversely, floating exchange rate regimes are 
associated with lower inflation and higher economic growth in advanced economies. 
These last results could be influenced by the high institutional nature of those coun­
tries.
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In addition, Chapter 3 contributes to the understanding of the relationship be­
tween fiscal stances and currency crises. The results suggest that excessive budget 
deficit and public debt, together with other factors, might indicate an increased 
probability of a currency crisis.
On the other hand, the continuing currency crises have ultimately motivated 
some countries to effectively abandon altogether their respective national curren­
cies by domestically using the currency of another country (otherwise known as 
“dollarization”) this started to occur in the late 1990s and the early 2 0 0 0 s. Giv­
ing up monetary policy is even perhaps a good solution for countries tha t need 
to stabilise their economies and have a negative record in terms of their economic 
policies. Dollarization imposed macroeconomic stability is purported to lower infla­
tion and interest rates and balance out public finances (fiscal discipline). Chapter 
4 presents another consideration in relation to dollarization which is the harmoni­
sation of two countries’ business cycles. Dollarization links together the dollarizing 
country’s business cycle with that of the anchor country. A country with a floating 
exchange rate can adjust differently, act counter-cyclically and devaluate to adjust 
its economy. This is not possible under dollarization. The absence of devaluation 
implies that the country can not react to asymmetric shocks, which may result in 
more debt (both internal and external), an unsustainable fiscal position and proba­
bly, increased social conflict. Neither can countries use depreciation in the exchange 
rate to stimulate internal demand or improve competitiveness, or use interest rate 
policy as an instrument to deal with recessions.
The results suggest some evidence of common cycles between some Latin Ameri­
can countries and the United States, but there is not a higher degree of synchronisa­
tion in business cycles. The results also conclude tha t this evidence does not support 
the endogenous optimal currency area (OCA) hypothesis in dollarized countries. As 
a consequence, dollarization is not appropriate for the Dominican Republic. Emerg­
ing and developing countries tha t face volatile terms of trade and are not deeply
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integrated with big economies and are therefore likely to incur net costs if they 
dollarize. This also creates difficulties in accommodating external shocks.
In context of fiscal sustainability and its relationship with exchange rate regimes, 
Chapter 5 pays special attention to the influence of a fiscal sustainability indicator 
over currency crises. The results support the fact tha t fiscal imprudence provokes 
pressure in the exchange markets of some developing countries. Large unsustain­
able fiscal positions are basically explained by primary fiscal deficit in most of the 
sample. Growing short and medium-term public obligations increase investors’ con­
cerns about the ability of governments to service them and to further finance budget 
deficits. As a result, the confidence in the domestic currency has sunk.
Assessing fiscal sustainability in developing countries is more difficult than eval­
uating fiscal sustainability in developed countries because developing economies are 
characterised by higher volatility in both revenue and expenditure. Notwithstanding 
this, using different measures of currency crises, the result present a positive assess­
ment of the usefulness of the fiscal sustainability indicator in predicting currency 
crises. The F S I  can be employed as an im portant early warning system. Results 
suggest tha t in some countries considered the F S I  is useful in predicting probabili­
ties of being in currency crises periods. In general, major and severe currency crises 
(such as those in South-East Asia in 1997) are well identified by the indicator. How­
ever, some crises th a t were identified by the speculative pressure market cannot be 
considered as crises by expert judgment. In these cases, the currency depreciation 
is due to inflation rather than to a currency crisis. In some cases, the speculative 
pressure market in countries displaying good fiscal behaviour and lower inflation 
could be explained perhaps by currency crisis contagion. But this discussion goes 
beyond the scope of this study. In addition, the results suggest tha t the most serious 
weaknesses of today’s crisis models lie in the definition of a currency crisis rather 
than in the explanatory variables used.
As can be seen from Chapters 3 and 5, in recent years currency crises have af­
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fected a large number of countries, either directly or indirectly. Chapter 3 gauges the 
importance of fiscal aspects in increasing the vulnerability of developing countries. 
It also helps to judge the potential usefulness of fiscal factors as crisis indicators, 
while Chapter 5 presents the usefulness of fiscal indicators in predicting the crises.
On the other hand, the results obtained in Chapter 5 show no evidence of na­
tions that use other countries’ currencies as being more fiscally prudent. In fact, 
it is not the dollarization itself which creates fiscal discipline and avoids currency 
crises, because only responsible fiscal policy, among other factors, can help diminish 
the risk of a currency crisis ocurrence. Notwithstanding, it is im portant to note 
tha t dollarized economies show no speculative pressure in their domestic exchange 
markets. But Panam a has relied heavily on the IMF in the past 35 years or so, with 
17 IMF programmes since 1973 (Edwards, 2001).
This thesis contributes to the existing empirical literature on the impact of 
exchange rate regimes on currency crises and macroeconomic performance in de­
veloped, emerging and developing countries. It has also contributed in its use 
of fiscal sustainability indicators to capture episodes of currency crises and of a 
Markov-switching model with time varying transition probabilities, estimated by 
the Bayesian Gibbs sampling approach, as an alternative to more standard practice. 
Furthermore, it builds on the empirical evidence of international synchronisation of 
business cycles using Markov-switching methods. On the other hand, the various 
questions laid out in the introduction of this thesis (in terms of the relationship 
between exchange rate regimes, economic performance, currency crises and fiscal 
stances) can now be answered with the results presented in this study.
It is difficult to recommend one particular regime for all the described economies. 
However, our results suggest tha t in the case of developing countries fixed exchange 
regimes can be useful in generating anti-inflation credibility, without a high cost 
to economic growth, and are associated with a lower probability of currency crises, 
while the opposite is true for intermediate regimes. Currency crises are related
Concluding Remarks 234
to inconsistent macroeconomic policies as opposed to the performance of specific 
exchange rate regimes. Credibility problem puts the currency at risk speculative 
attacks. If a sustainable fixed arrangement, not only monetary policy needs to be 
directed towards supporting its parity, but also trade, regulatory and fiscal policies 
need to be geared towards maintaining the stability of the exchange rate. Simi­
larly, if a country opts for full dollarization, it should create sound and transparent 
institutions and rules to guarantee a credible commitment. However, if a country 
opts for dollarization, i t ’s business cycles should be synchronised with the currency 
owner’s business cycles.
Of course, there are many additional questions, tha t can be derived from the 
results in this study, tha t remain unanswered. Among other reasons this is because 
this thesis is not exempt from several limitations, mostly related to the unavailability 
of data. In particular, the quarterly data  for most developing and emerging countries 
only started to be recorded in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, these limitations are 
common to all the empirical studies in this field. In addition, there are some specific 
criticisms which might affect the findings of this work.
In Chapter 3, different classifications of exchange rate regimes are grouped into 
three broader regimes: fixed, intermediate and floating. The reasoning behind this is 
to find a systematic way of linking together the different classifications within de jure 
and de facto exchange rates. Definitions of currency crises using the market pres­
sure index { M P I)  present some limitations, mainly, the arbitrary threshold value 
used to identify speculative attacks. However, a certain dose of arbitrary expert as­
sessment seems still to be necessary as an additional selection tool. Otherwise, any 
formalised definition of currency crises may select particular cases, which can hardly 
be considered as real currency crises and omit evident crisis episodes. Moreover, the 
implications of constructing this market pressure index is tha t both successful and 
unsuccessful attacks on a currency can be asserted. As a consequence, the defini­
tion of a currency crisis as a period characterised by the presence of intense foreign
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exchange market pressure is the best definition used.
Chapter 4’s limitation is tha t only Panam a presents a large level of data on 
dollarization because Ecuador and El Salvador only dollarized their economy in the 
early 2000s. However, this does not invalidate the results obtained.
A further limitation lies in Chapter 5, associated with the measurement of fis­
cal deficits. Most of the developing countries in this study presented problems 
with arrears. This became particularly relevant in the case of foreign debt repay­
ment. For example, in some cases the payment of interests on foreign debt had 
been rescheduled or delayed by governments whereas all revenues were cashed in. 
In these circumstances, the fiscal deficit decreased, but this was not really the case. 
Similarly, further problems emerged when the fiscal deficit reported was only that 
of the central government. In countries with different levels of government this 
would be an inappropriate indicator of fiscal deficit. Even if state and lower levels 
of government deficits are included, there may be other government agencies that 
are incurring deficits, which may not be reflected in the measured fiscal deficit. A 
complete measure of government budget deficit should also contain an assessment 
of quasi-fiscal activities and contingent liabilities in the public sector, which are sig­
nificant in many developing countries. Unfortunately, data limitations make such 
an assessment impossible.
Moreover, only recently has there been an active market for domestic debt in 
most emerging and developing economies. As a result the data  on domestic debt for 
most developing countries reflects only the debts governments have with domestic 
banks. On the other hand, when an M P I  currency crisis definition is used with 
quarterly data from the early 1990s the mean and standard deviation in some coun­
tries is very high. As a consequence, the results do not show periods of crisis where 
currency crises had in fact occurred. Fortunately, the Markov-switching model used 
in this chapter captured these crises. On the other hand, in this thesis there is no 
alternative early warning signal to compare, e.g. the current account balance.
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In the end, there is potential to utilise the limitations of this study for future areas 
of research. Firstly, with regards to Chapter 3, the role of an exchange rate peg in 
constrained inflation may be evaluated. In other words, investigating whether hard 
pegs or soft pegs can reduce inflation in developing countries. Similarly, it is possible 
to investigate whether hard pegs or soft pegs reduce the probability of currency 
crises. Secondly, with regards to Chapter 4, in five years’ time the model constructed 
in this chapter may be evaluated using the data  for Ecuador and El Salvador. The 
experiences of Ecuador and El Salvador should provide im portant information to 
help us assess more fully the merits of dollarization. These could also support the 
results obtained in Chapter 4. On the other hand, in some developing countries there 
are commitments with international organisations to develop their domestic market 
to relieve their internal debt. Alternatively, the data on domestic debt and fiscal 
deficits could be extended and permit re-estimating the model developed in Chapter 
5. Moreover, another crisis definition should be used in order to determine if another 
definition might produce different results. More precisely, evaluate if another crisis 
definition may give better or worse results with the same leading indicator. Also, 
there will be interesting distinguish between small crises, big crises and duration 
of crises. In addition, alternative leading indicator should be evaluate in order to 
determine if the F S I  is less powerful as a leading indicator than other.
To conclude, all exchange rate regimes have strengths and weaknesses. Devel­
oping and emerging countries choose their particular exchange rate regimes for a 
variety of reasons. This choice is particularly subject to both economic and political 
considerations, and involves factoring in current conditions as well as expected fu­
ture developments and development strategies. The stage of development in which 
the financial market for each country finds itself is key to this selection process. The 
optimal exchange rate regime depends on the circumstances of a particular country 
and varies across time and the conjuncture. There is also a large list of institutional, 
structural, and macroeconomic measures, which would help countries to avoid build-
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ing on dangerous imbalances, diminishing in this way the danger of currency crises. 
In the macroeconomic sphere, they involve balanced and transparent fiscal accounts, 
a proper monetary-fiscal policy mix, and consequently anti-inflationary policies.
APPENDIX A
Notes to Chapter 3
A . l  P a n e l  D a t a  M o d e l s
The general form of a panel data  model we shall consider is:^
Vit = XitP +  z^a +  €it (A .l)
where i = 1 ,2  N,  t = 1 ,2....T, ya is the observable scalar dependent variable,
and Xit is AT X  1 vector of unobservable non-random regressors not containing an 
intercept, /? is AT x 1 vector of unobservable parameters, z[a is a (scalar) heterogenity 
or individual effect, is Af x 1 vector containing an intercept and individual/group 
specific variables which may be observable or unobservable, a  is Af x 1 vector of 
unobservable parameters, eu is a scalar random disturbance satisfying E  {eu) = 0, 
E  {e%) — cP and E  {euejg) = Oiî i  ^  j  and/or t  ^  s , n  is the number of cross-sectional 
units and T  is the number of time periods.
T h e  F ix ed  E ffects. A type of panel model would have constant slopes but
^For details see Baltagi (2005); Greene (2003) and Hsiao (1999).
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intercepts that differ according to the cross-sectional (group) unit, for example, the 
country. Although there are no significant temporal effects, there are significant 
differences between countries in this type of model. While the intercept is cross- 
section (group) specific and in this case differs from country to country, it may or 
may not differ over time. These models are called fixed effects models.
If Zi is unobserved but correlated with xu  then Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
is biased and inconsistent due to the omitted variable. However, setting z[a =  o^, 
the model to be estimated is
Vit — T  T 5  ^ —-I,...,?!. t — 1 ,...,T
Stacking the observations for each i over f =  1, ...,T  gives
(A.2 )
Pi = XiP  -f Ixa i  -I- Q, i =  1 ,..., n (A.3)
where is T  x 1, is T  x K,  is a scalar. I t  denotes a T  x 1 vector of ones and
C i i s T  X 1 with E  and E  (e^ej) =  0 for i ^  j .
Stacking these n  equations yields
2/2
/
P T
y  Vn J  y J
I t  0 
0  I t
\
y 0 0 • • • I t  y y cvn y y Es y
0:2
El
E2
y =  X P  -f D a  -f e (A.4)
where y is n T  x 1, AT is n T  x AT, D =  1„ ® 1 t is n T  x n ,  a  ïs n x  1 and e is n T  x  1 
with E  [ee) = cr’^ InT^
This is often called the Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV).
R a n d o m  E ffects. The random effects model is a regression with a random
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constant term. If the unobservable individual heterogeneity is uncorrelated wit 2 # 
then we can write
Vit — ^  i^i^)  +  [ i^Oi — E  H- 6it
(A.5)
Vit =  ^itP  +  ^  +  4- %
where i =  and t =  1 ,..., T. The equation A.5 is a linear regression model
with a compound disturbance in which OLS is consistent but not efficient. It can 
be viewed as a linear regression with a random intercept fx-\- Ui, where it will be 
assumed tha t
E  (sit) =  0 E  {ui) ~  0
E  {i-it) =  E  (n?) =  al
E  {eit€js) =  0 E  {uiUj)  =  0 {i ^  j )
E  { e u U j )  =  0 V%, t, j
It is convenient to define the composite disturbance term
f]it =  "Ui +  &it
Obviously E  (% ) =  0 while E  (t]1) =  E  (%%g) = s), E  (%%g) =
0  f  j )
It is also convenient to define =  [ l ,% ]  and 6 =  [fJ^P'] so th a t equation A.5 
can be written as
Vit =  oj'uô +  T]it (A.6)
Stacking the observations for each i over t  ~  1, ...,T  gives
y i  =  W i ô - ] - r ) i  (A.7)
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where i =  1 , is T  x 1 and Wi  is T  x {K  +  1). Note tha t E  where
+  erg
cr:
while E  {r]ir}j) = 0 for i ^  j .  
Stacking over i gives:
(7: cr? +  o?
=  alh  +  o-JItIt
y =  W 5  +  Tj 
where y is n T  x 1, W  is n T  x (AT +  1 ) and
E ( j i r i j  =  n  =
X; 0  0
0 ^  ■ 0
(A.8 )
0 0 • ’ • ^
where <S> denotes the Kronecker product. The equation A .8  is a generalized linear 
regression model and can therefore be estimated efficiently by General Least Squares 
(GLS).
Appendix________________________________________________________________ 2 ^
A . 2  D i s c r e t e  C h o i c e  M o d e l :  P r o b i t  M o d e l
The probit model is a suitable instrum ent of analysis in the case of a binomial (or 
multinomial) dependent variable and a continuous independent variables. Suppose 
we have a regression model
y* = X p  + u  (A.9)
where y* is unobserved. This is related to the observed dichotomous variable y  by
f 1 i fx /r > 0
Vi =  \
1^ 0  otherwise
The probit model uses a probit function, which is actually a normal function of 
a cumulative distribution of the probability and allows the positioning of estimated 
values of the dependent variable within the interval (0,1). The assumption of normal 
distribution refers to the distribution of random error, Ui in the linear probability 
model, which is the starting point for a transformation into a probit model. The 
probability th a t y% =  1 is equal to the probability tha t a random error will show 
the probability greater than the negative value of the deterministic segment of the 
linear probability model.
P i  =  P r (yi = l) = P r (y* > 0)
=  Pr (îij >  - X i P )  (A.10)
=  l - P ( - n ; ; / ) )
where P  is a cumulative distribution of the random error probability, which is here 
assumed to have a normal distribution pattern. Thus a final form of the probit 
model is obtained:
Appendix 243
Pi = r J - P ' '
(A .U)
P i  =  F  =  f - c x  f  (%)
where w is a standardized normally distributed variable. Due to the absence of 
a realized probability (since the dependent variable can have two values), it is not 
possible to evaluate the model using the OLS method, and the Maximum Likelihood 
(ML) method is used instead, which evaluates the parameters by maximizing the 
probability (density) of observations of given values of the dependent variables. 
In other words, under the assumption tha t the observations of the variable are 
independent, the parameters are evaluated in an iterative manner until the selection 
of parameters maximizes the probability function;
yi=i î/î=o
H o sm er-L em eshow  T est. This statistic test is used to assess goodness-of-fit.
Let the data  be grouped into j  =  1 ,2 ,  , J  groups, and let Uj be the number of
observations in group j .  Define the number of y% =  1 observations and the average 
of predicted values in group j  as:
y U) =  ^ V i
lej
(A.13)
1 - F  ~x.(3
f t l j  /  V U j
ie j  i e j
The Hosmer-Lemeshow (HL) test statistic is computed as:
The distribution of the HL statistic is not known; however, Hosmer and Lemeshow
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(1989) report evidence from extensive simulation indicating that when the model is 
correctly specified, the distribution of statistics is well approximated by a dis­
tribution with J  — 2 degrees of freedom. Note th a t these findings are based on a 
simulation where J  is close to n.
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Table A .l: Main Characteristic of Différents Categories of Exchange Rate in the De 
Jure Classifie acion
M a in  F e a tu r e s Main Advantages Main Disadvantages
C urrency  Union
D ollarization
C urrency  B oard
A group of countries using a  T he  tim e inconsistency prob-
com tnon currency issued by a  leni is reduced by requiring
com m on regional cen tra l bank . a  m u ltin a tio n a l agreem ent on
policy.
A foreign is used as th e  only le- D ollarization  reduces (elimi-
gal tender. M onetary  policy is nates) th e  tim e inconsistency
delegated  to  th e  anchor coun- problem . Not prone to  cur-
try . rency crisis
S tric t exchange ra te  regim e T he system  m axim izes credibil-
su ppo rted  by a  m one tary  sys- ity  and  reduces the tim e incon-
tem  based on legislative com- sistency problem ,
m itm en t to  exchange dom estic 
cu rrency  for a  specified foreign 
cu rrency  a t  a  fixed ra te . Do­
m estic cu rrency  is issued only 
aga in st foreign exchange.
T he re  is no scope for indepen­
den t m one tary  policy. M em ber 
coun tries suffering asym m etric 
shocks lose a  s tab iliz a tion  tool. 
U nder do llariza tion  external 
shocks canno t be buffered by 
exchange ra te  m ovem ents, im ­
posing costs if business cy­
cles are  asynchronous; while 
seignorage revenues decline. 
C en tra l bank  lose its  role as 
lender of la s t reso rt 
E x te rn a l shocks canno t 
be buffered by exchange 
ra te  m ovem ents, im posing 
costs if business cycles are 
asynchronous. T he scope for 
lender of la st reso rt ac tiv ity  
is re s tr ic ted  to  excess reserve 
holding and  fiscal m echanism s. 
R equires high reserve holding. 
Low seignoriage.
Continued....
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Main Features Main Advantages Main Disadvantages
C onventional Peg F ixed to  an o th er single cur- T he tim e inconsistency prob- Provides a  ta rg e t for specu-
rcncy or currency basket. lem is reduced th rough  com- la tive a tta ck s . High in terna-
m itm ent to  a  verifiable ta r -  tional reserves are required
get. D evaluation  option  pro­
vides p o ten tia lly  valuable pol­
icy tool in response to  large 
shocks. Allows high inflation 
countries to  reduce inflation by 
m ode ra ting  inflationary  expec­
ta tio n s  ( it the peg is credible).
Craw ling Peg T he exchange ra te  is ad ju sted  An a t te m p t to  com bine flexibil- P rone to currency  crisis if the
period ically  according  to  a  se t ity  and  s tab ility . Allows high coun try  is open  to  in ternational
of indicators. inflation  countries to  avoid se- ca p ita l m arkets . Among vari-
vere rea l exchange ra te  overval- an ts  of fixed exchange rates,
na tion . it im poses th e  least res tric­
tions, and m ay hecen yield 
th e  sm allest c redib ility  bene­
fits. T he  cred ib ility  effect de­
pends on accom panying in s ti­
tu tio n a l m easures and record of 
accom plishm ent.
C o n t in u e d ..
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Main Features Main Advantages Main Disadvantages
M anaged F loat
P u re  F loat
Exchange ra te  is allowed 
to  fluc tuate  w ith in  a band; 
endpo in ts  defend th rough  
in terven tion , typ ically  w ith 
some in tra -b an d  in terven ­
tion . A n a t te m p t to  mix 
m arket-determ ined  ra tes  w ith 
exchange ra te  stab iliz ing  
in terven tion  in a  rule-based 
system .
Exchange ra tes  are de term ined  
in the foreign exchange m ar-
Provides a  lim ited  role for 
exchange ra te  m ovem ents to 
co u n terac t ex ternal shocks and 
p a r tia l expecta tions anchor, re­
ta in s  exchange ra te  uncerta in ty  
and  thus  m otivates develop­
m ent of exchange ra te  risk 
m anagem ent tools.
A b and  is su b jec t to  specula­
tive a ttack s , does n o t by it­
self place hard  constra in ts  on 
m one tary  and fiscal policy, and 
thus provides only p artia l solu­
tion  aga in st th e  tim e inconsis­
tency problem .
T he a rrangem en t provides a  Lack of tran sparency  of cen-
way to  m ix m arket determ ined tra l bank  behav io r (because
ket. A u th o ritie s  can and  do in- ra tes  w ith  exchange ra te  s tab i- c riterion  for in terven tion  is not
lizing in terven tion  in a  non rule disclosed) may in troduce tootervene, b u t are no t bound  by 
any in terven tion  rule. In te r- based  system , 
vention  m ay be d irec t (s te ril­
ized and  non-sterilized) o r ind i­
rec t th rough  changes in in terest 
ra tes , etc. O ften  accom panied 
by a  sep ara te  nom inal anchor, 
such as an  inflation  ta rg e t.
T he exchange ra te  is d e te r­
m ined in the m arket freely by 
dem and and supply.
much uncertain ty . High foreign 
reserves are required.
A djustm en ts to  shocks can take Does no t provide an expecta-
place th rough  exchange ra te  tions anchor. D iscreation in
m ovem ents. E lim inates the  re- m one tary  policy may crea te  in-
qu irem ent to  hold large foreign fla tionary  bias; tim e inconsis-
rese rv e s . tency problem  arise  unless ad ­
dressed by o the r in stitu tio n a l
m easures.
APPENDIX B
Notes to Chapter 4
B . l  S u p p l e m e n t :  M i x t u r e  D i s t r i b u t i o n s  a n d  t h e  E M  A l g o r i t h m
A special case of regime switching models is the i.i.d mixture distributions.^ 
Let the state (regime) tha t an unobserved process is in place at time t be noted
as St, where there are N  possible regimes, (st =  1 ,2 ,.....,N ) ,  to variable yt  ^ When
the unobserved process is at the state j ,  i.e. st = j ,  the observed sample yt is 
presumed to have been drawn from a N  distribution. Hence, the density of
yt conditional on the state variable St taking on the value j  is:
f i V t  I st = j]0)  =  - ^ e x p | - ^ ^ ^ i ^ }  Vj =  1 , 2 ,  N  (B.l)
where 0  is a vector of population parameters, given by
^The general relationship between mixture distributions and the Expectation Maximization 
(EM) algorithm has been covered in a number of sources, such as Everitt and Hand (1981), Tit- 
terington et al. (1985), and Hamilton (1990, 1994), among others.
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 ^— [/ l^ ) /^ 2 > y - N , (71, (Tg, ..... , C7^ ]
The unobserved regime {s^} is presumed to have been generated by some proba­
bility distribution, for which the unconditional probability tha t St takes on the value 
j  is TTj-;
P  {^t = j \ 0 }  ^  TTj Vj =  l , 2 , ....N  (B.2)
The vector of population parameters, 9 ,  is expanded to include the vector of
probabilities I r , where tti +  7T2 +  ttjv =  1 and each tTj- is non negative. So 9  is
given by
9  =  (^1 ,^2,.....j^W,ETi,(72,......,<7^,7ri,7T2,...... , TTjv)
By invoking the law of Bayes we can defined the joint density distribution func­
tion of yt and s*. This function is given by
P  {yt, St =  j ;  9 )  = f  {yt I St = j] 9 )  P  {st =  j] 9 }  (B.3)
Fi’om (C .l) and (C.2 ) we can re-write (C.3), so
P{Vt,St = j-,e) = \  (BA)
y27rcr? I J
The unconditional density of yt can be found by summing over all possible values 
tha t the state variable can take on:
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/  {Vù =  E l l  P  {yt, st = j \  ipt', 0}
exD
If the state variable St is distributed i.i.d. across different times t, then the log 
likelihood for the observed data  can be calculated from equation (B.5) as
(B.5)
subject to
Max{e}£ {B) =  In /  [yt\ B)
(= 1
=
4=1
N
N
Y1 f (%/( I P = r, 0}
-j=i
=  7T>0,  Vj =  l ,2,
j  =  l
N
(B.6 )
Equation (B.6 ) is maximized with respect to the arguments of vector 9, giving 
the solution to a system of nonlinear equations. Interestingly, once one has obtained 
9, an inference about which the regime was more likely to have been responsible for 
producing the observation yt can be made. For that, the necessary probability will 
be obtained by
P  \yt,st = j]9
f  (yt]9
f^jyt I St j^;9) 
f {yt ]9) (B.7)
The conventional procedure for estimating the model parameters is to maximize
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the log-likelihood function and then use these parameters to obtain the filtered and 
smoothed inferences for the unobserved state variable Sf, However this method be­
comes disadvantageous as the number of parameters to be estimated increase, like 
our case when we include the vector of probabilities ~n in the vector of population 
parameters, 0, Consequently, the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm is used 
in conjunction with the filter (introduced by Hamilton, 1989)^ and the smoothing 
algorithm proposed by Kim (1994) to obtain the Maximum Likelihood (ML) esti­
mates of the model’s parameters.^ The EM algorithm was originally described by 
Dempster et al. (1977) and proposed by Hamilton (1990), and modified by Hamilton 
(1991).^ The EM algorithm is an iterative ML estimation technique designed for a 
general class of models where the observed time series depends on some unobservable 
stochastic variables. This technique starts with the initial estimates of the hidden 
data and iteratively produces a new joint distribution that increases the probability 
of observed data. These two steps are referred to as expectations and maximization 
steps.^ This iterative process in two stages will stop with the fulfillment or satisfac­
tion of certain norm or criterion of distance (example Euclidian distance) between 
the vectors of param eter 9 considered throughout of k iterations. The first stages 
forms the expectation (E), assuming a vector of parameters 9^^^ for the k iteration, 
whereas the second stage maximizes (M) the function of maximum likelihood with 
respect to the parameters of the model, being generated 9^+^),
The diagram of iterations for the EM algorithm consider the following system of 
nonlinear equations:
^The filtering algorithm is usually associated with Hamilton (1989), but it can be traced back 
to earlier statistics literature including Baum and Petrie (1966) and Lindgren (1978).
^There are other solution methods, like the Newton-Raphson method. This method solution to 
maximum likelihood function by an iterative algorithm using gradient.
^Hamilton (1991) proposes a pseudo-Bayesian solution when correcting numerator and denomi­
nator of each one of the equations of the system considered to iterar. With it, the cases are avoided 
where the function of maximum likelihood can tend to be infinite in the measurement that the 
mean of the distribution of some of the regimes is equal to the value of any observation, with the 
variance of this equal regime to zero.
^For a detailed description of the EM algorithm see Dempster et al. (1977) and Krolzig (1997b) 
for the application of MS-VAR models.
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E L i  ytP St =  ,71 yt] §]
st = j \  yt]
, Vi =  1,2  ,N
E L i  {yt -  n Ÿ  p \ s t  = j \9
E L i ^  = i  I y t,e
, Vi =  1 ,2  ,N
T
j =  7  ^^  ^  =  .7' I Vt\ §] , Vj =  1 ,2 ....... AT
(B.8)
(B.9)
(B.IO)
Because equations (B.8 ) to (B.IO) are nonlinear, it is not possible to solve them 
analytically for 9. Thus, an iterative algorithm is used for finding the ML esti­
mate. The estimation procedure we use is described in Hamilton (1994). Starting 
from an arbitrary initial guess for the value of 9, denotes 9^^\ one could calculate 
P  {si =  i  I from equation (B.7). Then, one could calculate the magnitudes
on the right sides of equations (B.8 ), (B.9) and (B.IO) with 9^ ^^  in place of 9. The 
left sides of equations (B.8 ) through (B.IO) then can produce a new estimate 9^^\ 
This estimate 9^ ^^  could be used to reevaluate P  =  j  | yt\ a n d  recalculate the 
expressions on the right sides of equation (B.8 ) to (B.IO). The algorithm continues 
to iterate in this fashion until the change between 9^^^ and is smaller than
some specified convergence criterion. Finally, if the iterations reach a point such 
that 9^^^ =  the algorithm has found the maximum likelihood estimate 9. In
other words, equipped with the new vector of population parameters, 9, the filtered 
and smoothed probabilités are updated and so on. Thus, each EM iteration involves 
a pass through the filter and smoother, followed by an update of the parameter 
estimated and is guaranteed to increase the value of the likelihood function. Finally, 
the EM algorithm, is term inated if the number of iterations exceeds a previously 
specified upper bound.
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B . 2  R e s u l t s  o f  t h e  U n i t  R o o t  T e s t  a n d  S t r u c t u r a l  B r e a k s  
U nit R o o t Test. The presence of unit roots in the data were checked with the 
augmented Dickey and Fuller (1981), ADF, test. We have chosen to estimate an 
ADF test that employs lag length selection using a Schwarz Information Criterion.
Figure B .l: Quarterly Growth Rates of Real GDP
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N u l l  H y p o th e s is : The Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Panam a 
and United States have an unit root. In other words, the null hypothesis is H q : 
« 1  =  0  in the regression:
p-i
^ y t  =  /3 +  ^  a A 4- e t
i=l
The results are described in the table below.
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t-S ta tistic P rob .*
Dominican Republic
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic 3.644235 0.9999
Test critical values: 1% level 
5% level
10% level
-2.604746
-1.946447
-1.613238
Ectiador
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic 3.214981 0.9996
Test critical values: 1% level 
5% level
10% level
-2.604746
-1.946447
-1.613238
El Salvador
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic 3.759714 0.9999
Test critical values: 1% level 
5% level
10% level
-2.605442
-1.946549
-1.613181
Panama
Augmented Dickey-Fuiler test statistic -1.342039 0.5989
Test critical values: 1% level 
5% level
10% level
-3.632900
-2.948404
-2.612874
United States
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic 2.791784 0.9985
Test critical values: 1% level 
5% level
10% level
-2.605442
-1.946549
-1.613181
Note:  *M ackiniion (1996) one-sided p-values. Lag L eng th  was 0 to  E cuador and  Panam a; 1 to  the  D om inican R epublic and  El 
Salvador; and  2 to  U nited S ta tes . We used a  m axim um  lag leng th  of 10.
The results reports that statistic ta value is greater than the critical values in all
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countries, so tha t we do not reject the null hypothesis of an unit root at conventional 
test sizes.
S tru c tu ra l B reaks. To complement the apparent evidence of structural changes 
presented in Figure 4.1 and 4.2, we employed various structural stability tests. In 
order to test for short-run structural stability of GDP growth we estimate, firstly, a 
linear model to real GDP growth with the inclusion of lagged values of the dependent 
variables. The specification model is: A pt =  û;o+û!i A^/i-i+e^, where AT (0, cr^). 
Finally, we perform a Recursive Residuals test and a CUSUM and CUSUM of squares 
test on the residuals. These tests do not require an a priori selection of a breakpoint. 
The CUSUM test (Brown et al., 1975) is based on the cumulative sum of the recursive 
residuals. Instability in the parameters is indicated if the cumulative sum exceeds 
the area between the two critical lines. The CUSUM of square tests is based on the 
cumulative sum of square residuals resulting from a recursive estimation. Movement 
outside the critical lines is suggestive of variance or parameter instability. Similarly, 
in the Recursive Residuals test the residuals are plotted around the zero line, between 
plus and minus two standard errors. Residuals outside the standard error bands 
suggest instability in the parameters. Results of these test statistics in the countries 
under study are plotted below.
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T()e Dominican Republic
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The CUSUM test for the Dominican Republic, shown in the left panel, does 
not reveal instability in the real GDP, while CUSUM of squares test, shown in the 
right panel, detects instability in the parameter, but this was not confirmed by the 
Recursive Residuals test.
The CUSUM test for Ecuador does not show instability, but CUSUM of squares 
test detects instability between the second quarter of 1998 and the first quarter 
of 1999, The structural change in this country was confirmed by the Recursive 
Residuals test. The real GDP growth shows a severe fall in the first quarter of 1999 
(see Figure B .l).
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On the contrary, for El Salvador and Panam a both test statistics, CUSUM and 
CUSUM of squares, indicate tha t parameters of both countries are stable. However,
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Recursive Residuals test shows instability in the parameter of Panama. The GDP 
growth of the United States is structurally stable according to the CUSUM of squares 
test, but the CUSUM test shows very little instability of variance in the early 2000. 
The Recursive Residuals test shows that movement outside the critical lines (the 
standard error bands) are too small to be considered structural change.
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To summarise, we can document that only Ecuador displays structural breaks in 
its dynamics. During the period between 1998 to 2000, Ecuador experienced severe 
economic stress, culminating with the implementation of a strong stabilization plan.
Appendix 259
Table B .l: Types of Markov-Switching Vector Autoregressive Models Used
Notation V E A i
MSM(M)-VAR(p) varying - invariant invariant
MSMH(M)-VAR(p) varying - varying invariant
MSI(M)-VAR(p) - varying invariant invariant
MSIH(M)-VAR(p) - varying varying invariant
Note'. The vaa'iables are ja: Mean, v: Intercept, Variance, A ii Matrix of autoregressive parameters. 
Source: Krolzig (1997b)
B . 3  T r a n s i t i o n  M a t r i x
The transition  m atrix  to  three regimes is given by:
P  =
H o m o s c e d a s tic  a n d  H e te ro s c e d a s t ic  M a rk o v -S w itc h in g -A R  M o d e ls . The
m atrix  of estim ated transition  probabilities for the  Dominican Republic to  MSI(3)- 
AR(0) and MSIH(3)-AR(0) models is given by:
Pm  SI —
V ii Pl2 Pl3
P21 P22 P23
P31 P32 P33
0.603 0 . 0 0 0 0.396
0 . 0 0 0 0.961 0.0382
0.459 0.541 0 . 0 0 0
0.593 0 . 0 0 0 0.405
0.003 0.961 0.035
0.457 0.542 0 . 0 0 0
P m s h  =
The matrix of transition probabilities for Ecuador to MSI(3)-AR(0) and MSIH(3)-
AR(0) models is given by:
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0.402 0.335 0.262
P m s i  = 0 . 0 2 1 0.734 0.243
0.017 0.432 0.550
0 . 2 0 0 0.299 0.500
P m s h  — 0.094 0.885 0.019
0 . 0 0 1 0.834 0.163
The matrix of transition probabilities 
MSIH(3)-AR(3) models is given by:
for El Salvad
0.500 0 . 0 0 0 0.500
P m s m  — 0 . 0 0 0 0.941 0.0581
0 . 0 0 0 0.152 0.847
0.958 0.041 0 . 0 0 0
P m s h  — 0 . 0 0 0 0.836 0.163
0 . 1 1 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 8 8 8
The m atrix of transition probabilities for Panam a to V 
AR(2 ) models is given by:
0.687 0.311 0 . 0 0 0
P m s i  = 0.204 0.587 0.208
0 . 0 0 0 0.336 0.663
0.674 0.326 0 . 0 0 0
P m s h  = 0.185 0.633 0.181
0 . 0 0 0 0.362 0.637
The matrix of transition probabilities for the United States to MSM(3)-AR(2)
and MSIH(3)-AR(2) models is given by:
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P m s m
0.737 0.262 0 . 0 0 0
0 . 0 0 0 0.700 0.299
0.050 0.055 0.893
0.725 0.262 0 . 0 1 2
0 . 0 0 0 0.972 0.027
0.410 0 . 0 0 1 0.587
P m s h  =
Hom oscedastic and H eteroscedastic Markov-Switching VAR Models.
The m atrix of estimated transition probabilities for the Dominican Republic-United 
States to MSM(3)-VAR(2) and MSMH(3)-VAR(2) models is given by:
0.618 0.187 0.194
P m s m  — 0.069 0,836 0.094
0 . 0 0 0 0.048 0.951
0.603 0.396 0 . 0 0 0
P m s h  = 0.353 0.328 0.318
0.214 0 . 0 0 0 0.785
m atrix of transition probabilities for Ecuador-
and MSIH(3)-VAR(0) models is given by:
0.807 0.192 0 . 0 0 0
P m s i  = 0 . 0 0 0 0.859 0.140
0.217 0.782 0 . 0 0 0
0.696 0.302 0 .0 0 1
P m s h  — 0 . 0 0 0 0.704 0.295
0.215 0.266 0.517
The matrix of transition probabilities for El Salvador-United States to MSI(3)-
VAR(O) and MSIH(3)-VAR(0) models is given by:
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0.803 0.107 0.089
P m s m  — 0.041 0.958 0 . 0 0 0
0 . 0 0 0 0.059 0.940
0.864 0.069 0.065
P m s h  = 0.043 0.956 0 . 0 0 0
0 . 0 0 0 0.059 0.940
The m atrix of transition probabilities for Panam a to MSI(3)-VAR(1) and MSIH(3)
VAR(l) models is given by:
0.891 0.105 0 . 0 0 2
P m s i  = 0 . 1 1 0 0.575 0.313
0 . 0 0 0 0.291 0.708
0.844 0.151 0.003
P m s h  = 0.356 0 . 0 0 0 0.643
0 . 0 0 0 0.190 0.808
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B . 4  T e s t i n g  A s y m m e t r i e s
Following Clementes and Krolzig (2003) we apply a parametric test for business 
cycle asymmetries in Markov-switching autoregressive (MS-AR) and MS-VAR mod­
els. The rejection or acceptance of the null hypothesis of business cycle asymmetry 
will be based on the Wald tests. In the business cycle literature the number of types 
of asymmetry such as steepnes, deepness, (see Sichel, 1993) and sharpness or turning 
point asymmetry (see McQueen and Thorley, 1993) has been identified. According 
to Sichel (1993) there will be business cycles asymmetry type “steepness” relating to 
whether contractions are deeper (or less steep) than expansions and asymmetry type 
“deepness” to whether the amplitude of troughs exceeds tha t of peaks. Clementes 
and Krolzig (2003) suggests a test of deepness based on the coefficient of skewness 
calculated for the detrended series. Deepness of contractions will show up as nega­
tive skewness, since it implies tha t the average deviation of observations below the 
mean will exceed tha t of observations above the mean. Steepness implies negative 
skewness in the first difference of the detrended series: decreases should be larger, 
though less frequent, than increases. Formally, the definition of concepts are:
D e f in i t io n  1: Deepness-. The process {yt} is said to be non-deep (non-tail) iff 
yt is not skewed: E  [{yt — ÿü)^ ] — 0. Analogous steepness can be defined as skewness 
of the differences, shown in definition 2 .
D e n i t i O N  2 :  Steepness: T h e  p r o c e s s  { t / * }  i s  s a i d  t o  b e  n o n - s t e e p  i f f  A ? / *  i s  n o t  
s k e w e d :  E  [A?/|] =  0
On the other hand, asymmetric type “sharpness” or turning point asymmetry, 
introduced by McQueen and Thorley (1993) would result if troughs were sharp and 
peaks more rounded. Formally, that is:
D e f i n i t i o n  3 :  Sharpness: T h e  p r o c e s s  { y t }  i s  s a i d  t o  b e  n o n - s h a r p  i f f  t h e  
t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  t o  a n d  f r o m  t h e  t w o  o u t e r  r e g i m e s  a r e  i d e n t i c a l :  Pmi =  PmM 
a n d  p i m  =  PMm,  f o r  a l l  m  ^  1 ,  M ;  a n d  p i ^  =  PMm-  I n  a  t h i r d  r e g i m e  m o d e l ,  
n o n - s h a r p n e s s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  p i s  —  p z i  a n d  i n  a d d i t i o n  p u  =  P s 2 -
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The results for MS-AR models are given in Table (C.2 ) and (C.3). To the 
Dominican Republic the tests for skewness indicate negative skewness in A yt in 
both models, but are not significant. The test for the MSI model shows steepness 
asymmetries, rejecting the null hypothesis of non-steepness at the 10% level. This 
approach indicates steepness of expansions. On the contrary, the heteroscedastic 
specification does not reject the null hypothesis of non-steepness at the 5% level. 
Both specifications fail to reject non-deepness. Moreover, there is no evidence of 
sharpness (or asymmetric turning points).
The tests for asymmetries for Ecuador fail to reject non-sharpness. The observed 
growth rates display negative skewness (deepness of contrations). Similarly the 
deepness test (not significant) is negative. The null hypothesis of non-steepness is 
accepted. Conversely, the null of non-deepness is accepted implying th a t the model 
fails to generate contractions of sufficient duration.
In the case of El Salvador^ as pzi, Psi and p u  in the MSM model, and as pis, P23  
and ps2 in the MSIH model are close to zero, the matrix of second derivatives used 
for the calculation of param eter covariance is singular and the generalized inverse 
has been used, which explains the magnitude of the test statistics for sharpness. 
Also, the MS models reject non-sharpness at 5% level in both especification, because 
P 12 7  ^ P 32 in the MSM model and pis ^  psi in the MSIH. In others words, in the 
MSM model moving from contraction to normal growth is less likely than moving 
from high growth to normal growth periods, while in the MSIH specification the 
probability to moving from contraction to high growth is more higher than the 
probability to move from high gi’owth to contraction phase.
The tests for skewness and steepness indicate positive skewness and steepness in 
A yt in both models (but not significantly). The positive skewness is consistent with 
section 4.6. Both models accept the null of the non-deepness and non-steepness.
The tests for asymmetries for Panama are given in table B.3. In both models 
of the Panamanian economy we can observe that A yt is positively skewed, but not
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Table B.2 : Tests for Asymmetries in MS-AR models for DR, EC and ES
Dom inican Republic 
M SI-AR M SM H-AR
X®
Sharpness 0.121 {0.989] 0.715 [0.869]
P13 =  P32 0.005 [0.943] 0.086 [0.768]
P13 =  P31 0.030 [0.861] 0.019 [0.889]
P21 =  P23 0.087 [0.767] 0.632 [0.426]
Skewness (A y) -0.082 0.067 [0.795] -0.082 0.067 [0.795]
Deepness (A y ) 0.008 0.145 [0.703] 0.009 0.224 [0.635]
Skewness ( A “y) 0.351 1.216 [0.270] 0.351 1.216 [0.270]
Steepness (A ^y ) 0.000 6.289 [0.012]* 0.006 7.500 [0.006]**
Ecuador
M SI-A R
Sharpness 0.453 [0.929]
P l2  -  P32 0.000 [0.987]
P13 =  P31 0.022 [0.881]
P21 =  P23 0.016 [0.898]
Skewness (A y) -0.490 2.325 [0.127]
D eepness (A y ) -0.000 1.974 [0.160]
Skewness (A ^y ) 0.196 0.374 [0.540]
Steepness (A ^y ) -0.000 0.000 [0.983]
El Salvador
M SM -AR M SIH-AR
X -
Sharpness 1036.399 [0.000]** 583.304 [0.000]**
P12 =  P32 1036.398 [0.000]** 0.001 [0.971]
P l3  =  P31 0.001 [0.978] 582.931 [0.000]**
P 2 l - P23 0.002 [0.966] 0.050 [0.822]
Skewness (A y ) 0.505 2.342 [0.125] 0.505 2.342 [0.125]
D eepness (A y) 0.000 1.373 [0.241] 0.000 2.542 [0.110]
Skewness (A ^y ) -0.179 0.295 [0.587] -0.179 0.295 [0.587]
Steepness (A®y) 0.000 0.000 [0.998] -0.000 7.085 [0.007]**
Note :  H ere and  in subséquente tab les  * ind ica tes significance a t  10% level and  ** significance a t  th e  5% level. T he p robab ilities  of 
C h i-square (1) in parenthesis . In m odels w ith  a  he teroscedastic  e rro r te rm , as the  variance of th e  process is reg im e-dependen t, the 
te s t only considers th e  MG com ponen t. E cuador does no t has M SH -A R because his model no converged. T he 5% siginificance level 
critical chi value for hom oscedastic an f heteroscedastic  m odels are  5.99 and 9.49, respectively.
S o u r c e :  A u th o r 's  c a lc u la t io n s .
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Table B.3: Tests for Asymmetries in MS-AR models for PA and US
P anam a
M SI-AR M SIH-AR
x '
Sharpness 0.013 [0.999] 0.025 [0.998]
P ia  =  P32 0.012 [0.909] 0.023 [0.877]
P13 =  P31 0.001 [0.979] 0.000 [0.999]
P31 =  P23 0.000 [0.982] 0.000 [0.981]
Skewness (A y ) 0.390 0.812 [0.367] 0.390 0.812 [0,367]
Deepness (A y ) 0.003 0.256 [0.612] 0.003 0.600 [0.438]
Skewness (A ^y ) 0.300 0.480 [0.488] 0.300 0.480 [0.488]
S teepness (A ^y ) 0.000 12.663 [0.000]** 0.000 17.696 [0.000]**
U nited  S ta tes
M SM -A R M SIH -A R
x" x'^
Sharpness 0.911 [0.822] 0,701 [0.873]
P l2  =  P32 0.911 [0.339] 0.171 [0.679]
P l3  =  P31 0.000 [0.981] 0.504 [0.477]
P21 =  P23 0.000 [0.979] 0.035 [0.850]
Skewness (A y) -0.549 2.872 [0.090] -0.649 2.872 [0.090]
Deepness (A y ) -0.000 2.297 [0.129] -0.000 2.854 [0.091]
Skewness (A ^y ) -0.456 1.981 [0.159] -0.456 1.981 [0.159]
S teepness (A ^y ) -0.000 4.722 [0.029]* 0.000 0.000 [0.991]
Note :  T he  5% siginificance level critica l chi value for hom oscedastic an f heteroscedastic  models are 5.99 and  9.49, respectively. 
S ou rce: A u tho r's  ca lcu la tions. T he 5% siginificance level c ritic a l chi value for hom oscedastic an f he teroscedastic  m odels are  9.49 
and  18.31, respectively.
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significantly. The test to MSM and MSIH models shows steepness asymmetries, 
rejecting the null hypothesis at the 5% level. The test fails to reject the null hy­
pothesis of non-sharpness, because pis = p^i and p 2 i = P2 3  in both models. Also, 
both specifications fail to reject non-deepness.
The test for the United States accepts non-steepness at 5% level in the MSM 
and fails to reject the null of non-steepness in the MSIH model (no significant). 
Similarly, there is no evidence of sharpness in both specifications. The skewness are 
negative but not significant in both models. Also, the test accepts non-deepness in 
both specifications.
Applying the same method to test for business cycle asymmetries with MS-VAR 
models, we find tha t the Dominican Republic- United States reject non-sharpness (or 
turning point asymmetry) at 5% level, because P13 7  ^p^i in the MSM model. Also, 
the magnitude of the test statistics for sharpness reflect tha t psi is zero (the matrix 
of second derivatives used for the calculation of parameter covariance is singular and 
the generalized inverse has been used). Nervertheless, in the heteroscedastic model 
the null of non-shapness is accepted (see Table B.4). Each of the both countries 
display non-deepness and non-steepness in the common cycle in both specifications 
(at 5% level). Interestingly, both economies show negative skewness in Ayt.
The tests for asymmetries to Ecuador-United States fails to reject the null hy­
potheses of non-sharpness, non-deepness and non-steepness. Accept non-sharpness 
means that troughs and peaks are of same shape.
The relationship between El Salvador-United States shows tha t the test accepts 
the null of non-sharpness (see Table B.5). The skewness for the US are negative but 
not significant in both models, but are positive for El Salvador. Both models fails 
to reject non-deepness and non-steepness.
The tests for asymmetries for Panama-United States accepts the nulls of non­
sharpness, non-deepness and non-steepness.
To conclude, the results of testing for asymmetries based on parametric models
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Table B.4: Tests for Asymmetries in MS-VAR models to DR-US and EC-US
D om inican R epublic-U nited  S tates
M SM -VAR MSMH-VAR
x"
Sharpness 373.432 [0.000]** 0.036 [0.998]
P l2  =  P33 0.826 [0.363] 0.013 [0.906]
P l3  =  P31 365.791 [0.000]** 0.000 [0.992]
P21 =  P33 0.046 [0.830] 0.021 [0.883]
D om inican Republic
X^ X=
Skewness (A y) -0.155 0.228 [0.632] -0.155 0.228 [0.632]
D eepness (A y) -0.006 2.543 [0.110] -0.000 0.103 [0.747]
Skewness (A ^ y ) 0.341 1.106 [0.292] 0.341 1.106 [0.292]
Steepness (A ^y ) 0.000 0.359 [0.548] 0.005 0.395 [0.529]
U nited  S ta tes
x" x"
Skewness (A y ) -0.549 2.872 [0.090] -0.549 2.872 [0.090]
Deepness (A y ) -0.000 0.132 [0.716] -0.000 0.000 [0.990]
Skewness (A ^y ) -0.456 1.981 [0.159] -0.456 1.981 [0.159]
S teepness (A ^y ) 0.000 0.381 [0.536] -0.000 16.561 [0.000]**
E cuador-U nited  S ta tes
M SI-VAR M SIH-VAR
X= X^
Sharpness 0.486 [0.921] 0.341 [0.952]
P ia  =  P32 0.476 [0.490] 0.009 [0.921]
P l3  =  P31 0.009 [0.921] 0.228 [0.632]
P21 =  P23 0.000 [0.987] 0.098 [0.753]
E cuador
x" x"
Skewness (A y) -0.490 2.325 [0.127] -0.490 2.325 [0.127]
Deepness (A y) 0.000 0.048 [0.490] 0.000 0.029 [0.863]
Skewness (A ^y ) 0.196 0.009 [0.921] 0.196 0.374 [0.540]
S teepness (A ^y ) 0.000 0.000 [0.987] -0,000 0.159 [0.690]
U nited  S ta tes
X=* x"
Skewness (A y) -0.502 2.438 [0.118] -0.502 2.438 [0.118]
D eepness (A y) -0.000 0.171 [0.679] -0.000 0.347 [0.555]
Skewness (A ^y ) -0.411 1,640 [0.200] -0.411 1.640 [0.200]
S teepness (A ^y ) -0.000 1.396 [0.237] -0.000 1.896 [0.168]
Note :  T he  5% siginificance level critica l chi value for hom oscedastic an f heteroscedastic  m odels are 9.49 and  13.31, respectively. 
Source:  A u tho r's  calcu lations.
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Table B.5: Tests for Asymmetries in MS-VAR models to ES-US and PA-US
El Salvador-U nited  S ta tes
M SI-VAR MSIH-VAR
x " x "
Sharpness 0.212 [0.975] 0.027 [0.998]
P12 =  P32 0.202 [0.652] 0.013 [0.907]
P13 == P31 0.008 [0,652] 0.008 [0.925]
P21 =  P23 0.008 [0.928] 
0.002 [0.961]
0.005 [0,941]
El Salvador
x ' X=
Skewness (A y ) 0.532 2.739 [0.097] 0.532 2.739 [0,097]
Deepness (A y ) 0.000 5.488 [0.019]* 0.000 5.469 [0.019]*
Skewness (A ^y ) 0.622 3.739 [0.053] 0.622 3.739 [0.053]
Steepness (A ^y ) 0.000 2.597 [0.107] 0.000 4.437 [0.035]*
U nited  S ta tes
X^ x "
Skewness (A y) -0.502 5.438 [0.118] -0.502 2.438 [0.118]
D eepness (A y ) -0.000 1.994 [0.157] -0.000 1.888 [0.169]
Skewness (A®y) -0.411 1.640 [0.200] -0.411 1.640 [0.200]
Steepness (A ^y ) -0.000 2.813 [0.093] -0.000 3.730 [0.053]
P anam a-U n ited  S ta tes
M SI-VAR M SIH-VAR
x " X^
Sharpness 1.047 [0.789] 0.466 [0.926]
P l2  =  P32 0.638 [0.424] 0.054 [0.815]
P13 =  P31 0.007 [0.931] 0.009 [0.923]
P21 -  P23 0.784 [0.375] 0.414 [0.519]
P anam a
x" x "
Skewness (A y ) 0.335 0.620 [0.431] 0.335 0.620 [0.431]
Deepness (A y ) 0.001 0.072 [0.788] -0.000 0.033 [0.854]
Skewness (A ^y ) 0.336 0.623 [0.429] 0.336 0.623 [0.429]
Steepness (A ^y ) -0.000 0.141 [0.706] -0.000 0.046 [0.829]
U nited  S ta tes
x ' x '
Skewness (A y ) -0.243 0.326 [0.567] -0.243 0.326 [0.567]
D eepness (A y ) -0.000 0.863 [0.352] 0.000 0.547 [0,459]
Skewness (A ^y ) -0.571 1.797 [0.180] -0.571 1.797 [0.180]
Steepness (A ^y ) 0.000 0.069 [0.792] -0.000 11.833 [0.000]**
Note :  T he 5% siginificance level critical chi value tor hom oscedastic  an f heteroscedastic  models are 9.49 and  18.31, respectively. 
S ource: A u th o r’s ca lcula tions.
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may be sensitive to the model specification used (see Clementes and Krolzig, 2003).
APPENDIX C
Notes to Chapter 5
C . l  S u p p l e m e n t ; A s s e s s i n g  F i s c a l  S u s t a i n a b i l i t y
This section presents some simple algebraic expressions, which are in turn used in 
Chapter 5 to assess fiscal sustainability, based on the stochastic model developed by 
Croce and Juan-Ramon (2003). In addition to facilitating the analysis, the formulas 
also provide an intuitive understanding of what fiscal sustainability involves.
The goverment deficit for period t, which is assumed to be financed by net do­
mestic and external indebtness, is descomposed into the primary deficit and interest 
payment.
Dt — Dt~\ — Gt — Tt -\- itD t-i
(C .l)
A D  — P D t 1Pt
where Df is the stock of public debt outstanding at the end of period t  — Gt 
is the primary public expenditure, th a t is, public expenditure excluding interest
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payments the public debt, T* is the public sector revenue, and it is the nominal 
interest rate on public debt. All variables are expressed in nominal terms. Equation 
(C .l) shows that the change in public debt will be equal to the difference between 
public expenditures (including interest payments) and public revenues.
The goverment budget constraint for period t  in term of domestic currency is 
given by:
P D t  + I P t  =  (D f  -  +  Et (Z?f -  D f i t )  (C.2)
where PD t is the primary deficit, IP t is the interest payment, is the domestic 
debt expressed in domestic currency, D f  is the external debt expressed in foreign 
currency and Et is the average exchange rate, defined as domestic currency per unit 
of foreign currency between the end of period t  — 1 and the end of period t. The 
external debt can be expressed in domestic currency as D f  =  E tD [.
Denoting i ^  and i [  as the average representative interest rates on the domestic 
and external debt at time t, respectively, interest payment can be expressed as:
I P t ^ i f D ^ _ , + E t i f D f _ i  (C.3)
Notice tha t equation (C.3) implicitly assumes that there is no interest incurred 
for period t  on the debt acquired between the end of the time t  — 1 and the end of 
time t.
We can define primary surplus as P St =  —PD t. Using this definition and equa­
tion (C.3), we can rearrange equation (C.2 ) as:
o f  + E tD f  =  (1 +  t f ) + E t { l +  i f )  D f_, -  P St (C.4)
In order to express all variables in real terms, we divide both sides of equation
(C.4) by nominal GDP at time t  (Ij). The domestic debt, foreign debt (in domestic
currency) and primary surplus, all expressed in real terms, may be defined as: d f  =
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d f  = ^  =  — and pst =  Making use of these definitions, equation 
(C.4) becomes
d f + d f = ( i + i f )  df_i ( ^ ) +(1+ i f )  <ei ( ^ )  ( ^ )  -  (C.5)
One can express the change of the nominal gross domestic product in terms 
of the growth rate of the real gross product (g) and the inflation ( t t )  as =  
( 1  +  JTt) ( 1  +  gt), and defining the rate of change in the average nominal exchange 
rate as e* =  ”  U we can then rewrite equation (C.5) as:
By defining the real interest rates on the domestic and external debt expressed 
in domestic currency as r f  =   ^ and “  1 , respectively, we
can write equation (C.6 ) more concisely as:
Defining the ratio of to tal debt expressed in domestic currency to the nominal
't-idtGDP as dt =  d f-f-d f  and multiplying the right hand side of equation (C.7) by ^
we obtain:
* = 0 ^  (fc) (fe)
Alternatively, we can rewrite equation (C.8 ) as
=  l ^ ^ ^ d t - i  -  pst (C.9)
where the weighted real interest rate relevant for the to tal debt (n ) is defined as:
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Ctfc—1 1
Finally, we may define the spread between the weighted real interest rate relevant 
for the total debt and the rate of growth of the real domestic product at time t  as 
(5t =  Then public debt as a proportion of GDP (in real terms) is given by:
dt — Ptdt-i — pst (C.IO)
Equation (C.IO) display that, in absence of shocks and corrective policies, dt will 
increase over time in the presence of persistent primary fiscal deficits joint with a 
real interest rate higher than the growth rate of real GDP.
Table C .l: Results of the Hausman Endogeneity Test
Country Null Hypothesis t-Statistic Probability
Argentina There 8 not endogenity 1.829 0.073
Brazil There 8 not endogenity -1.097 0.277
Chile There s not endogenity -6.261 0.173
Colombia There s not endogenity 0.461 0.647
Costa Rica There s not endogenity -0.645 0.521
Czech Republic There s not endogenity 1.270 0.211
Dominican Republic There s not endogenity -1.484 0.143
El Salvador There 8 not endogenity 2.384 0.022
Honduras There 8 not endogenity 1.864 0.068
Hungary There s not endogenity 1.984 0.052
Indonesia There s not endogenity -1.204 0.233
Malaysia There s not endogenity -0.129 0.897
Mexico There s not endogenity -0.609 0.544
Peru There s not endogenity 1.017 0.313
Philippines There s not endogenity -5.002 0.618
Thailand There 8 not endogenity -1.645 0.105
Turkey There 8 not endogenity -0.734 0.466
Source: A uthor’s calculations.
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Table C.2: Unit Root Test: M P I
Country Null Hypothesis t-Statistic Probability*
Argentina M P I  has a unit root -15.344 0.000
Brazil M P I  has a unit root -4.826 0.000
Chile M P I  has a unit root -7.030 0.000
Colombia M P I  has a unit root -6,597 0.000
Costa Rica M P I  has a unit root -5.664 0.000
Czech Republic M P I  has a unit root -5.656 0.000
Dominican Republic M P I  has a unit root -5.113 0.000
El Salvador M P I  has a unit root -5.768 0.000
Honduras M P I  has a unit root -4.792 0.000
Hungary M P I  has a unit root -5.953 0.000
Indonesia M P I  has a unit root -4.965 0.000
Malaysia M  P I  has a unit root -4.109 0.002
Mexico M P I  has a unit root -6.175 0.000
Peru M P I  has a unit root -6.660 0.000
Philippines PI P I  has a unit root -6.089 0.000
Thailand M P I  has a unit root -4.575 0.000
Turkey M P I  has a unit root -6.462 0.000
Note:  *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. 
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Table C.3: Unit Root Test: E R D
Country Null Hypothesis t-Statistic Probability*
Argentina E R D  has a unit root -8.639 0.000
Brazil E R D  has a unit root -5.117 0.000
Chile E R D  has a unit root -6.725 0.000
Colombia E R D  has a unit root -7.070 0.000
Costa Rica E R D  has a unit root -3.526 0.000
Czech Republic E R D  has a unit root -6.335 0.000
Dominican Republic E R D  has a unit root -3.721 0.006
El Salvador E R D  has a unit root -20.189 0.000
Honduras E S I  has a unit root -8.707 0.000
Hungary E R D  has a unit root -4.017 0.002
Indonesia E R D  has a unit root -5.030 0.000
Malaysia E R D  has a unit root -6.467 0.000
Mexico E R D  has a unit root -6.145 0.000
Peru E R D  has a unit root -4.651 0.000
Philippines E R D  has a unit root -6.567 0.000
Thailand E R D  has a unit root -6.800 0.000
Turkey E R D  has a unit root -4.839 0.000
Note: *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. 
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Table C.4: Unit Root Test: F S I
Country Null Hypothesis t-Statistic Probability*
Argentina F S I  has a unit root -12.278 0.000
Brazil F S I  has a unit root -7.581 0.000
Chile F S I  has a unit root -5.082 0.000
Colombia F S I  has a unit root -2.066 0.258
Costa Rica F S I  has a unit root -7.096 0.000
Czech Republic F S I  has a unit root -2.957 0.047
Dominican Republic F S I  has a unit root -3.058 0.035
El Salvador F S I  has a unit root -1.733 0.409
Honduras F S I  has a unit root -1.567 0.492
Hungary F S I  has a unit root -4.545 0.000
Indonesia F S I  has a unit root -2.515 0.116
Malaysia F S I  has a unit root -2.836 0.059
Mexico F S I  has a unit root -1.075 0.719
Peru F S I  has a unit root -48.361 0.000
Philippines F S I  has a unit root -3.718 0.006
Thailand F S I  has a unit root -2.594 0.100
Turkey F S I  has a unit root -1.041 0.731
Note: * MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. 
Source: Author’s calculations.
Appendix 278
Figure C .l: Smoothed Probabilities of Currency Crises. MPI D ata Set
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Table C.5: Panel of Quarters
Tim e in T V T P Q uarte rs T im e in T V T P Q u arters
1 1990.01 31 1997.03
2 1990.02 32 1997.04
3 1990.03 33 1998.01
4 1990.04 34 1998.02
5 1991.01 35 1998.03
6 1991.02 36 1998.04
7 1991.03 37 1999.01
8 1991.04 38 1999.02
9 1992.01 39 1999.03
10 1992.02 40 1999.04
11 1992.03 41 2000.01
12 1992.04 42 2000.02
13 1993.01 43 2000.03
14 1993.02 44 2000.04
15 1993.03 45 2001.01
16 1993.04 46 2001.02
17 1994.01 47 2001.03
18 1994.02 48 2001.04
19 1994.03 49 2002.01
20 1994.04 50 2002.02
21 1995.01 51 2002.03
22 1995.02 52 2002.04
23 1995.03 53 2003.01
24 1995.04 54 2003.02
25 1996.01 55 2003.03
26 1996.02 56 2003.04
27 1996.03 57 2004.01
28 1996.04 58 2004.02
29 1997.01 59 2004.03
30 1997.02 60 2004.04
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